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ABSTRACT 
 
Cohen, Joshua Michael.  Revenue Structure, Revenue Diversification, and Severe 
Economic Downturns: Using Ordered Response Models to Predict Public 
Research University Credit Ratings.  Published Doctor of Philosophy dissertation, 
University of Northern Colorado, 2015. 
 
 
In a progressively more competitive market, postsecondary institutions across the 
country have undertaken large capital projects to remain viable and attract prospective 
students, faculty, and staff.  In order to finance the construction of these plants, 
institutions of higher education have been turning to debt markets, specifically through 
the sale of long-term tax-exempt municipal bonds, at an increasing rate.  When issuing 
debt via bonds, an institution’s credit rating becomes especially important given that it 
directly determines the interest rate and debt costs associated with borrowing, and the 
ability to find buyers. 
 While the impact of credit ratings is broad, from fiscal sustainability to budgetary 
policies affecting access and affordability for students, the topic of institutional credit 
ratings, particularly public research university credit ratings, is largely unexamined in the 
higher education scholarly literature.  Because there is a dearth of research on this topic, 
relatively little is known about how changes in institutional, state, and national factors 
impact changes in public research university credit ratings. Additionally, little analysis 
has been undertaken that can guide decision-makers around the incentives and difficulties 
that arise when credit rating optimization is a broad organizational and policy goal.   
! iv!
 This study explores how changes in known credit rating determinants impact 
public research university credit ratings–employing a data set of 75 public research 
universities, spanning 12 consecutive years, and using two types of ordered response 
estimators.  The results show that factors associated with increased market position, 
demand, and wealth are positively associated with higher credit ratings.  However, 
association with an academic medical center is shown to negatively impact university 
credit ratings.  Credit ratings are shown to be highly revenue dependent, although as 
revenue bases become less broad and more focused on state interests the impact becomes 
negative.  On a related note, improved revenue diversification is also positively 
associated with higher credit ratings.  High state credit ratings are positively associated 
with improved university credit ratings, as the former suggests increased ability to fund 
public institutions.  Increased total debt burden is positively associated with higher credit 
ratings, while decreased debt servicing ability appears to work in the opposite direction. 
 Furthermore, the impact of severe economic downturns, measured by The Great 
Recession, is positively associated with higher credit ratings.  The spillover effects from 
this economic variable indicate increased emphasis being placed upon an institution’s 
ability to distinguish itself nationally, as well as generate revenues.  Moreover, while 
large amounts of debt are still positively associated with higher credit ratings, the 
magnitude of the impact is lessened when accounting for the recession.  This suggests 
increased caution around large debt loads during times of economic uncertainty. 
 Finally, the results of the analysis suggest that while certain policies may improve 
an institution’s credit rating, it is important that decision makers and other senior 
! v!
administrators do not lose sight of the impacts that these capital planning policies have on 
student access and affordability, as well as public service and the public good.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
 
 In a progressively more competitive market, postsecondary institutions across the 
country have undertaken large capital projects to remain viable and attract prospective 
students, faculty, and staff.1  To finance these projects, colleges and universities have 
turned to debt markets at an increasing rate (Blustain, Cobine et al., 2009; Carlson, 
2013a; Jacob, McCall, & Stange, 2013; Jaschik, 2013; Pollack, 2000).  Evidence of this 
trend is found in a 2006 article published in The Economist, which states that between 
2000 and 2006 the higher education debt market grew to $33 billion (The Economist, 
2006).  By 2011, debt levels among the public higher education sector surpassed $60 
billion (Kiley, 2012).2  
 One recent example of a public institution issuing large amounts of debt is The 
Ohio State University, which in 2011 “became the first public university to issue a 100-
year bond, which totaled $500 million” (Kiley, 2012, Rethinking Funding section, para. 
4).  With the issuance of this century bond, the debt level at Ohio’s flagship university 
surpassed $2.4 billion.  Another example is the University of California System, which in 
February of the following year issued its own century bonds.  While the University of 
California’s sale was initially planned at $500 million, it was ultimately expanded to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Definitions of relevant terms are located in Appendix H. 
 
2 The 2006 debt number of $33 billion is equal to about $36.82 billion in 2011 constant dollars. 
!!
2 
$860 million. This was the largest university issued 100-year bond, both public and 
private, since 1995 (Nolan & McGee, 2012). 
 These two examples highlight the importance of understanding how debt, and in 
particular debt costs which are based primarily upon a university’s credit rating, matter 
for public higher education.  Since these ratings affect borrowing costs and debt service 
by determining interest rates (Moody, 2008; O’Hara, 2012; Rabson, 2008; Serna, 2013a; 
Thau, 2011), it would be prudent for institutional decision-makers and fiscal managers to 
educate themselves regarding the factors impacting college and university credit ratings.  
Specifically, by understanding how various internal and external factors influence an 
institution’s creditworthiness, these senior administrators can most effectively implement 
short- and long-term university planning.  However, this topic still remains largely 
unexamined in the research literature.  This study examines this topic, focusing 
specifically on the determinants of public research university credit ratings and highlights 
many of the implications related to both their determination and larger impacts. 
 In this study public research universities are defined as public four-year 
universities that have a high or very high level of research activity.3  These categories 
follow those established by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 
(2010).4  This study is not concerned with private, nonprofit or for profit colleges and 
universities, doctorate granting institutions with a low level of research activity (i.e., 
Carnegie Classification Doctoral/Research universities), or institutions that primarily 
award masters, baccalaureate, or associates degrees.  Lack of focus on these types of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Following Serna (2012) and Trautman (1995), public four-year universities are defined as a type of public 
authority, which during establishment are considered subordinate agencies of the state government. 
 
4 Definitions of the Carnegie Classifications and their corresponding methodology can be found at 
http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/methodology/basic.php!
!!
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institutions is not intended to downplay their importance, especially since they are 
beginning to actively utilize debt markets for capital project funding (Kiley, 2012; 
Supiano, 2008).  Instead, decisions regarding this study’s chosen population are 
motivated by issues such as data availability, research literature focus, and increased 
validity from analyzing institutions that are more-similar to one another. 
 In examining public research university credit ratings, this study asks three 
related research questions: 
Q1 How are the factors involved in public research university revenue 
structure associated with institutional credit ratings?  
 
Q2 How is the level of revenue diversification in public research university 
revenue structure associated with institutional credit ratings?  
 
Q3 How do severe economic downturns impact public research university 
credit ratings? 
 
By answering these questions, this study significantly contributes to the knowledge 
surrounding public research university credit ratings and their effects on the operation 
and decision-making structure of public institutions.  In doing so, it fills a gap in the 
extant literature by thoroughly examining a topic that has recently gained attention in 
higher education circles, but has been left largely unexamined in the peer-reviewed 
literature. 
Scope of the Study 
 The focus of this research is at the institutional level and emphasis is placed 
upon examining how factors involved in public research university revenue structure 
impact institutional credit ratings.  Therefore, it does not draw upon the literature on 
private postsecondary institution credit ratings (e.g., Morgan, 2002; Tuby, 2009).  
Recently, a handful of higher education scholars have examined issues pertaining to 
!!
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state capital appropriations (e.g., Delaney & Doyle, 2014; Harris, 2011; Ness & 
Tandberg, 2013; Tandberg & Ness, 2011) and the rising costs of deferred maintenance 
(e.g., Harris, Manns, & Katsinas, 2012; Manns, 2003/2004; Manns & Katsinas, 2006).  
While this literature is important for higher education finance, particularly the area of 
capital budgeting, it is beyond the scope of this study.   
With regard to the first, although state appropriations are a factor in public 
research university credit ratings, the focus of this study is on how changes in individual 
determinants impact institutional creditworthiness, not on the determinants of individual 
revenue streams (i.e., determinants of determinants).  As for the second, there is a 
connection between deferred maintenance and credit ratings, since building renewal 
projects will likely require institutions to issue large amounts of debt.  However, while 
the level of an institution’s creditworthiness may influence decisions around deferred 
maintenance, ultimately credit ratings are just one of many factors involved in such 
decisions. 
 In addition to individual revenue streams, this study looks at the relationship 
between revenue diversification and credit ratings.  There is a fair amount of literature in 
the field of public finance that examines the relationship between public governments’ 
level of revenue diversification and the stability of their revenue base (e.g., Carroll, 2009; 
Carroll & Stater, 2009; Chernick, Langley, & Reschovsky, 2011; Tuckman & Chang, 
1991).  However, while the above literature examines the positive role of revenue 
diversification in general, this study is specifically focused on the relationship between 
revenue diversification and credit ratings.  Finally, this study examines the role played by 
severe economic downturns, particularly The Great Recession, on public research 
!!
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university credit ratings.  Its primary hypothesis with regard to this question is that severe 
economic downturns, measured by The Great Recession, negatively impact public 
research university credit ratings, due to the reverberations from poor macroeconomic 
conditions on federal and state budgets.   
Warrant for the Study 
 Historically, the use of debt instruments to finance capital projects at universities 
was relatively minor.  In fact, prior to the mid-20th century, university operations 
(including capital projects) were largely funded with public monies (Thelin, 2004).  
While public postsecondary institutions occasionally borrowed money to finance physical 
facilities, this type of financing was confined to buildings with the ability to generate 
revenue from service charges (e.g., auxiliary plants).  This self-generated revenue could 
then be used to service the debt (Millet, 1952).  In fact, financing educational plants 
without sufficient cash-on-hand to finish projects was traditionally viewed as a threat to 
an institution’s stability (Russell, 1954). 
 During the 1960s and 1970s, increased student demand for higher education 
resulted in a “college building boom” (Jenny, Hughes, & Devine, 1983, p. 41), requiring 
increased capital funding.  Still, during this time, debt market utilization remained the 
domain of larger institutions with sizeable endowments and complex fiscal structures.  
But, in the 1980s, changes in “federal tax laws, bank lending programs, institutional 
management capacity, and mounting fiscal pressures” resulted in a sizeable increase in 
the number of colleges and universities utilizing bond markets (Blustain, Cobine et al., 
2009, p. 8).   
!!
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Although the number of institutions using debt markets, along with the different 
types of available debt instruments, increased during the 1980’s, the bonds sold by 
colleges and universities were still primarily secured by narrow revenue streams.  As a 
result, creditworthiness for the institution as a whole was of secondary importance in the 
rating process (King, Anderson, Cyganowski, & Hennigan, 1994).  However, beginning 
in the 1990s many institutions began utilizing long-term debt obligations that were 
secured by the full-faith and credit of the institution (Fitzgerald, 2005; King et al., 1994).  
Thus, the entirety of an institution’s revenue base gained importance in the rating 
process. 
 Since bond pledges broadened and credit ratings were soon based on the entirety 
of an institution’s revenue structure, universities were able to secure lower interest rates 
based on their higher credit ratings (King et al., 1994).  As a result, bond market 
utilization once again increased.  Rapid growth in capital projects financed primarily with 
debt flourished, as colleges and universities undertook rapid construction of ever larger 
and more luxurious plants intended to help attract prospective students and staff (Carlson, 
2013a; Jacob, McCall, & Stange, 2013; Pollack, 2000).  In a sense, the beginning of the 
21st century can be understood as the beginning of another college building boom. 
 Colleges and universities also continued to defer maintenance on existing 
facilities (Manns, 2003/2004; Carlson, 2013b; Harris, Manns, & Katsinas, 2012; Manns 
& Katsinas, 2006).  In fact, it is estimated that with many of the buildings constructed in 
the 1960s and 1970s nearing the end of their initial 50-year life-span, large building 
renewal projects are going to require additional debt financing in the near future 
!!
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(Blustain, Bruszewski, Daigneau, Roloff, & Ledbetter, 2009).  Such demands further 
warrant the need for a better understanding of factors impacting university credit ratings.   
 Furthermore, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, there has been a high 
degree of volatility in state funding for capital projects, decreased access to tax-exempt 
bonds, and higher interest rates on debt instruments (Gephardt & Nelson, 2010; Kiley, 
2012; Weisbrod & Asch, 2010).  In addition, as assets began to shrink in value during the 
recession, many feared institutions had over-leveraged themselves and now lacked 
sufficient liquidity to service their outstanding debt (Blumenstyk & Field, 2008; 
Goodman & Nelson, 2009; Wilson, 2008; Wolverton, 2008).  While liquidity concerns 
have since lessened (Gephardt, 2011; Serna, 2013b), these events suggest a debt market 
where increased uncertainty is occurring within an environment of greater variability.  It 
also suggests that in order to navigate the current economic environment, a thorough 
knowledge of credit rating determinants and the credit rating process are essential of 
capital planning.  
  Thus, as postsecondary institutions seek out increased debt financing, a more 
nuanced understanding of how resource allocation and policy decisions impact credit 
ratings will allow institutional decision makers to best lead the planning process.  While 
credit ratings and their determinants can play an important role in the decision-making 
process, it is important that these processes are ultimately made with education at the 
forefront.  That is, when trying to maximize creditworthiness and lower the costs of debt, 
it is vital that access and affordability are not jeopardized in the process.  Since price-
sensitive students are more susceptible to the negative effects of tuition and enrollment 
decisions (Heller, 1999; Martin & Gillen, 2011a, b; Shin & Milton, 2006), capital 
!!
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planning that is not made with education and public service as the primary motivators can 
inadvertently harms this population.  Therefore, by adding to the understanding of how 
changes in credit rating determinants impact public research university credit ratings, 
capital planning decisions that benefit institutional finances and all of their student 
populations can be made.  
Study Foundations 
The topic for this study stems from recent discussions in trade publications around 
issues of university debt and capital project financing (e.g., Carlson, 2013a; Jaschik, 
2013; Kiley, 2012; Supiano, 2008; The Economist, 2006).  While some of this debt 
issuance is used for expansion and renovation of academic facilities, as means to attract 
faculty and researchers (Pollack, 2000), the majority of recent bond issuance has aided in 
funding consumption amenities (e.g., luxury dorm rooms, expansive student recreation 
and leisure facilities) aimed at attracting new students.  This trend has led researchers 
with the National Bureau of Economic Research to brand these new postsecondary 
universities as country club campuses (Jacob, McCall, & Stange, 2013).   
 With the recent economic recession, and the rapid growth in these country club-
type campuses that are fuelled by large amounts of debt financing, those in higher 
education circles have begun worrying about institutions overleveraging themselves (i.e., 
borrowing beyond the ability to repay debt) and lacking sufficient liquidity to service 
their growing debt (Blumenstyk, 2009; Blumenstyk & Field, 2008; Field, 2008; Gephardt 
& Nelson, 2010).  That is, as assets decrease in value, resources that can be used to 
service debt decrease as well.  This lack of resources may lead to resource allocation 
decisions that ultimately work to the detriment of students, especially those who are more 
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price-sensitive.  In other words, insufficient resources may force institutions to adopt 
revenue generating policies, such as increased tuition and fees, that decrease access and 
affordability for some students.  Furthering this concern are the consistently negative 
forecasts issued by the credit rating agencies since 2009, which have been motivated by 
the macroeconomic conditions emanating from the recession and increased uncertainty 
around university revenue streams (Bogaty, 2013; Gephardt & Nelson, 2010; Goodman 
& Nelson, 2009; Tuby, 2014; Tuby & Nelson, 2012).  Exacerbating these concerns is the 
continued growth in deferred maintenance among colleges and universities (Manns, 
2004/2004; Carlson, 2013b; Harris, Manns, & Katsinas, 2012; Manns & Katsinas, 2006), 
which will inevitably require attendance in the near future.  Therefore, as debt financing 
becomes more commonplace in capital financing policy, a thorough understanding of the 
factors impacting ratings is important not just for the fiscal longevity of an institution, but 
also for the betterment of its students.  With regard to the latter, since the primary mission 
of public universities is public service and education, it is important that debt service and 
credit rating obligations do not lead institutions to rely on resource management policies 
that disconnect them from their public mission.   
Although the significance of this topic is evidenced by its impact on many facets 
of higher education (e.g., finance, budgeting, planning, access), it is still largely ignored 
in the empirical research literature.  In fact, prior to this study, Michael Moody’s (2008) 
analysis of public university credit ratings was the only published study to employ 
econometric methods to analyze higher education bond rating determinants.5  Although it 
plays an influential role in motivating this current study, Michael Moody’s analysis !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Serna (2013a, b) is also worth mentioning in this regard, since these two articles on higher education 
credit ratings provide a theoretical foundation for this topic.  
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employed a relatively small data set (142 observations) and few university specific 
variables.  In other words, while taking a large step forward by utilizing rigorous 
analytical methods to examine this area of research, Moody’s work ultimately revealed 
that there are many questions still unanswered.  The purpose of this study is to fill the gap 
revealed by Moody’s article and to bring attention to an important, but neglected, topic in 
higher education finance.  
Dissertation Synopsis 
 This section provides a brief overview of the remaining four chapters in this 
study.  Chapter II provides a review of the extant literature, as it applies to public 
research universities and helps set a foundation for the subsequent analysis and 
implications.  Since few studies have yet to examine university credit ratings, the chapter 
draws on a number of different sources.  These include literature on higher education 
budgeting and planning, higher education economics and finance, published reports and 
methodologies by credit rating agencies, and public finance research focusing on 
municipal debt and credit ratings.  After providing an overview of long-term municipal 
bonds and their relationship to credit ratings, Chapter II discusses the major factors 
involved in the ratings process.  The chapter culminates with a functional form equation 
for public research university credit ratings.  It is arguably the case that Chapter II 
advances one of the most in-depth theoretical discussions of public research university 
credit ratings to date. 
 Chapter III begins by discussing the study’s paradigm, population, and data.  The 
data set includes 75 public research universities, classified as having either a high or very 
high level of research activity, observed between 2001-2002 and 2012-2013 (900 
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observations).  Additionally, it provides a rationale for the chosen research design, 
including decisions regarding the inclusion and exclusion of particular universities, as 
well as each variable.  The chapter also discusses the methodological approach used in 
the study, including the econometric methods employed.  For each of the research 
questions, ordered response models (i.e., ordered probit and ordered logit) are estimated.  
Marginal effects are calculated for the probability of receiving specific credit ratings 
based on changes in individual predictor variables.  In addition, since data separation, 
resulting in convergence issues and unreliable parameter estimates, is a particularly 
problematic issue in categorical data analysis, the data for each variable is examined, 
using either contingency tables or scatterplots.  Chapter III concludes by specifying the 
models for each of the three research questions, along with a list of 14 corresponding 
hypotheses that are developed from the literature review.  Providing the hypotheses in 
this manner connects them, along with their corresponding research questions, back to the 
literature.  In doing so, it establishes the study’s theory-driven analysis. 
Chapter IV provides the estimation results and findings from the econometric 
specifications.  The findings provide evidence that increased market presence and 
demand for an institution’s enrollment spaces positively impacts creditworthiness.  
Increases in selectivity and enrollment are shown to increase the likelihood of receiving a 
higher credit rating.  As institutions increase their selectivity and enrollment, they signal 
to credit rating agencies increased demand, as well as the ability to generate additional 
revenues. 
Turning to revenue factors and other financial variables, evidence is provided that 
increases in federal operating grants and contracts, tuition and fees, and endowment value 
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positively impact credit ratings.  Increases in state and local operating grants and 
contracts and affiliation with an academic medical center (AMC) increase the likelihood 
of receiving a lower credit rating.  Although these facilities provide options for further 
diversification in an instituion’s revenue base, through patient care fees and research 
funding, uncertainty surrounding medical education and healthcare has resulted in these 
facilities being viewed as a credit liability.  Finally, changes in state appropriations do not 
show statistically significant effects in the models related to the first research question.  
These findings support the argument that credit ratings favor both a broader fiscal base 
and factors more akin to a private model of higher education.  
Of the governance variables included in the models, high state credit ratings, as 
measured by a state general obligation (GO) bond rating of Aa2 or higher, is shown to 
positively impact institutional credit ratings.  This is not surprising, since strong state GO 
ratings may signal a state’s increased ability to finance its public institutions (Moody, 
2008; Serna, 2013a).  Additionally, high state ratings may also suggest a lack of binding 
fiscal restraints, such as debt limits. 
Both debt factors, total debt burden per student and leverage (percentage of debt 
to revenue) follow their hypothesized relationships.  Increased total debt positively 
impacts credit ratings, while increased leverage has a negative impact.  Taken together 
these findings suggest that while active debt market usage and experience managing debt 
is rewarded by credit rating agencies, the ability to service outstanding debt is just as 
important. 
The primary variable related to the second research question, revenue 
diversification, is positively associated with higher credit ratings.  This finding follows 
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the hypothesized relationship as well as findings from previous state-level credit rating 
studies (e.g., Grizzle, 2012; Yan, 2011).  Revenue diversification is viewed as a credit 
benefit, due to its ability to limit the effects of variance in revenue streams.  That is, by 
drawing revenue from a variety of sources, institutions are better able to compensate for 
fluctuations in specific sources. 
In the third research question, the variable for recession is positively associated 
with higher credit ratings.  This is surprising, considering the large body of literature 
showing the negative impacts on funding from the Great Recession, as well as the 
numerous negative outlooks issued by the rating agencies.  However, since this study 
examines research universities, which tend to be larger and wealthier than other types of 
colleges and universities, the noted macroeconomic effects of the recession may have not 
impacted those in the data set as strongly.  Chapter IV also compares the estimates from 
the models without the recession variable with those from the models including 
recession.  Doing so allows for a more nuanced interpretation of the spillover effects 
from economic downturns. 
Chapter V returns to the estimation results presented in Chapter IV, focusing 
specifically on the implications for policy, research, and practice.  Furthermore, this 
chapter frames the study’s findings in the context of the concerns over access and 
affordability presented in the warrant.  The results for market position and demand 
suggest that the credit ratings process favors larger, wealthy institutions, because of their 
ability to generate revenues through student demand and greater philanthropic support.  
This also suggests that private models of higher education, which tend to be characterized 
!!
14 
by greater emphasis on tuition and fee revenue and research, are preferred by credit rating 
agencies. 
The positive estimates for federal operating grants and contracts, as well as tuition 
and fees, supports the privatization hypothesis.  By incentivizing wealth, size, and 
research, the credit rating process may lead institutions to focus more on research, high 
tuition, and increased selectivity and less on public service, access, and affordability.  
Such an outcome would be detrimental to both the mission of public higher education, as 
well as to the larger population. 
The debt measures demonstrate the importance of adequate debt service coverage.  
However, they also imply that if institutions are able to afford larger debt burdens they 
will be positively rewarded with higher credit ratings.  Chapter V discusses how in order 
to service larger debt loads, institutions may institute policies such as increased tuition 
and fees or reduced tuition subsidies.  Returning to the study’s larger theme of access and 
affordability, such policies may prove hazardous for price-sensitive students, since these 
individuals are disproportionately impacted by such practices. 
Chapter Conclusion 
 This chapter has provided a general introduction to the study.  It introduced the 
study’s topic and the three primary research questions.  The scope, warrant, and 
foundations were provided and connections were made to issues such as institutional 
longevity, access, and affordability.  Finally, a synopsis of the studyas a whole was 
provided, including summaries for chapters two through five.  In introducing the research 
in such a manner, this chapter has provided a solid foundation for the remainder of the 
study. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
In order to develop the theory to begin addressing the three research questions 
posed in Chapter I– How are the factors involved in public research university revenue 
structure associated with institutional credit ratings? How is the level of revenue 
diversification in public research university revenue structure associated with 
institutional credit ratings? How do severe economic downturns impact public research 
university credit ratings?–this chapter builds a conceptual foundation by reviewing the 
extant literature related to university debt and credit ratings.  Since few studies have yet 
to examine credit ratings in higher education, this chapter draws on a number of different 
literatures, including literature on higher education budgeting and planning, literature on 
higher education economics and finance, published reports and methodologies by credit 
rating agencies, and public finance literature on state and municipal debt and credit 
ratings.  The decision to examine research from the field of public finance is motivated 
by a historical lack of attention in higher education journals towards the topic of 
institutional debt and credit ratings.   
Traditionally, higher education finance scholars have focused largely on the topic 
of state funding (e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2011; Callan, 2002; 
Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008; Dar, 2012; Hossler, Lund, Ramin, & Irish, 1997; 
Longanecker, 2006; McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Serna, 2013c; Serna & Harris, 
!!
16 
2014; Tandberg, 2008, 2010; Weerts & Ronca, 2006).  There are many possible 
explanations for this, some of which include: trends in decreased state funding for higher 
education, especially during and following recessionary periods (State Higher Education 
Executive Officers, 2013; Zumeta, 2013; Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, & Finney, 2012); 
the spillover effects of reduced state funding on tuition and fees– i.e., many states try to 
mitigate funding reductions by shifting costs onto students and parents (Johnstone, 2004; 
Johnstone & Marcucci, 2010; Zumeta, 2010, 2012; Zumeta & Kinne, 2011); and state 
appropriations’ traditional role as the primary source of funding for public college and 
university operating budgets (Barr & McClellan, 2011; Goldstein, 2012; Zumeta, 2009).  
However, as postsecondary institutions continue to utilize municipal debt markets more 
readily (Kiley, 2012; Supiano, 2008), further research into areas associated with capital 
funding is necessary.  Additionally, since capital projects also affect operating budgets 
(e.g., need for increased staff, cost of operation and utilities, regular maintenance), this is 
an area of research that exceeds the boundaries of capital budgeting and directly relates to 
the day-to-day fiscal activities of institutions (Goldstein, 2012). 
This is not to say that research on postsecondary capital funding has been 
completely absent from the research literature.  In fact, recently a handful of higher 
education researchers have begun directing their attention toward exploring state capital 
appropriations (e.g., Delaney & Doyle, 2014; Harris, 2011; Ness & Tandberg, 2013; 
Tandberg & Ness, 2011), the rising costs of deferred maintenance (e.g., Harris, Manns, & 
Katsinas, 2012; Manns, 2003/2004; Manns & Katsinas, 2006), and describing the factors 
involved in rating college and university long-term tax-exempt bonds (e.g., Serna 2013a, 
b).  Since the first body of research is primarily concerned with state funding, albeit 
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funding that is dedicated to capital budgets, and the second focuses primarily on 
maintenance costs and capital budget master plans, they are not directly applicable to this 
study’s examination of credit ratings.  These two literatures focus on trends in and factors 
associated with changes to single variables (e.g., federal capital appropriations, deferred 
maintenance); that is, capital appropriations, or deferred maintenance, can be understood 
as the dependent variable in these studies.  With this study, the emphasis is placed not on 
what impacts individual variables, but how each variable works to predict changes in 
institutional credit ratings.  Credit ratings become the dependent variable and the various 
individual factors the predictors.  Stated differently, this study can be understood as 
moving up one level in unit of analysis to examine how these factors help predict public 
university credit ratings.   
As for the latter, these two studies will be discussed in more depth later in this 
chapter, as they provide a foundation for developing a functional framework for 
understanding university credit ratings.  Thus, the sparseness of research on credit ratings 
in the higher education literature specifically requires that this study be interdisciplinary. 
This requires spanning the fields of higher education, public finance, public policy, and 
economics to focus on the research literature that examines tax-exempt municipal bonds 
and the financial and economic behaviors of public sector entities 
The motivation to borrow from these fields is further supported by the assumption 
that research pertaining to governments and nonprofits are transferable to higher 
education.  As nonprofit organizations, public colleges and universities are similar to 
governments in that they are both mission-oriented, focus on sustainability rather than 
profit, and both participate in tax-exempt borrowing (Yan, Denison, & Butler, 2009).  
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Additionally, public colleges and universities can be understood as a type of public 
authority.  Public authorities are public benefit corporations, with appointed boards that 
are “wholly owned by units of regular government,” but enjoy separation of legal liability 
from their parent government (Leigland, 1993, p. 376).  Both public authorities and 
public institutions of higher education are creations of the state, operate within political 
jurisdictions, and rely on similar sources of revenues, such as user charges and fees 
(Denison, Fowles, & Moody, 2014; Trautman, 1995).  In fact, King et al., (1994) directly 
classify public colleges and universities as “government entities or public benefit 
corporations” (p. 33).   
By drawing on the literatures listed in the beginning of this chapter, this review 
will form a theoretical foundation for modeling public research university credit ratings– 
a foundation which arguably has yet to be assembled.  The remainder of this chapter is 
divided into five sections: 1) an overview of the fundamentals of tax-exempt municipal 
bonds, including credit ratings basics; 2) a discussion of the main factors that contribute 
to bond ratings; 3) a review of the literature on revenue diversification; 4) an examination 
of the impact of severe economic downturns on credit ratings; and 5) a conclusion that 
provides a theory-driven functional model of credit ratings. 
Fundamentals of Long-Term Municipal 
Bonds and Credit Ratings 
 
 Today, public colleges and universities have access to a diverse array of financial 
instruments for financing debt (King et al., 1994); however, their primary long-term debt 
instrument for funding capital projects remains tax-exempt municipal bonds (Blustain, 
Cobine et al., 2009).  There is a large body of literature examining municipalities’ 
decisions to issue long-term debt (e.g., Bahl & Duncombe, 1993; Bowman, 2002; Bunch, 
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1991; Calabrese, 2011; Clingermayer & Wood, 1995; Denison, 2009; Denison, Fowles, 
& Moody, 2014; Denison, Hackbart, & Moody, 2006; Ellis & Schansberg, 1999; 
Farnham, 1985; Hackbart & Leigland, 1990; Kiewiet & Szakaly, 1996; Moody, 2007; 
Trautman, 1995; Yan, Denison, & Butler, 2009).  But, since this study is concerned with 
the determinants of credit ratings, rather than the influences surrounding debt issuance 
decisions, that literature will not be discussed in-depth.   
Still, in order to understand the rationale behind tax-exempt municipal bond 
usage, it is important to briefly discuss some of the conventional logic used when issuing 
public debt.  Capital projects are essentially “long-term investment programs with 
benefits spread over the years to come” (Oates, 1972, p. 153); therefore, it is presumed 
that future residents, or students, should share in the project costs.  This is known as the 
benefit principle of taxation.  Since future students are going to be the ones realizing 
many of the project’s benefits, these individuals share the financial burden.  In other 
words, debt financing of capital projects allows numerous project costs to be shifted to 
the primary beneficiaries- future users.  Additionally, since many capital projects are 
extremely expensive, issuing municipal bonds, as opposed to a PAYGO approach, allows 
institutions to be more ambitious than would be possible if only using resources on-hand 
(Blustain, Cobine et al., 2009).6  In fact, many of these projects are too expensive to 
finance with existing resources.  Furthermore, debt financing can often times be more 
cost-effective for an institution, since internal funds, which would be used in a PAYGO 
approach, can be invested at a greater rate of return than the cost of financing debt 
(Blustain, Cobine et al., 2009). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 PAYGO, which stands for “pay-as-you-go”, is a policy requiring capital needs to be financed directly 
from current revenues (Forsythe, 1993).  
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But, there are some potential downsides to utilizing debt as a means of financing 
capital projects.  Since debt service is a fixed cost, it requires a constant allocation of 
future streams of resources, which may have to be shifted from other areas, such as 
additional faculty lines and student financial assistance (Blustain, Cobine et al., 2009).  
Another risk is that as public research universities continue to utilize debt markets at a 
greater rate, they become more susceptible to market fluctuations.  For example, 
following the mortgage crisis in 2008, many institutions experienced declines in their 
asset values, resulting in liquidity risks and potential violations of debt ratio covenants 
(Gephardt, 2011; Weisbrod & Asch, 2010). 7  These changing ratios have only proved 
problematic for a small segment of the industry, but have the potential to become 
significant for a larger share (Blumenstyk, 2009).  Even as median expenses continually 
surpass median revenues (Tuby. 2014), postsecondary institutions have increasingly 
taken on larger amounts of debt (Gephardt, 2011).  If these trends continue, it is 
reasonable to infer that larger institutions may begin experiencing problems servicing 
outstanding debt, especially if both their asset values and liquidity decrease.  
Additionally, while institutions of higher education have traditionally received fairly high 
credit ratings (Johnson & Kriz, 2005; Serna, 2013b; Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, 
2014a), recent reports from two of the three major credit rating agencies have forecasted 
negative outlooks and increased volatility for the sector (Bogaty, 2013; Standard & 
Poor’s Ratings Services, 2013). 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Bond covenants are legal provisions placed on specific issues with the intent of maintaining the “credit 
strength of the obligor” (King et al., 1994, p. 82).  Debt ratio covenants require institutions to maintain a 
specified debt service coverage ratio, such as debt to revenue or liabilities to assets (King et al., 1994; 
Rubinoff & Marion, 2007). 
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Characteristics of Tax-Exempt  
Municipal Bonds 
 
One of the key characteristics of municipal securities is their exemption from 
federal taxes on interest paid.8  Since public postsecondary institutions function as state 
government agencies (i.e., public authorities), they qualify under Internal Revenue Code 
§ 103’s public benefit corporation provision (Blustain, Cobine et al., 2009).  In addition 
to exemption from federal taxation, many states also provide state resident investors 
exemption from state taxes when municipal bonds are issued within their own borders.  
However, although tax exemption applies to interest, capital gains from selling tax-
exempt bonds at a higher price than purchased or from redeeming bonds bought at a 
discount are subject to federal income taxes (O’Hara, 2012). 
For investors, the benefits of tax exemption are reflected in the security’s interest 
rate and yield.9 Because investors receive tax benefits (i.e., they do not have to pay 
federal and in some cases state and local income taxes on the bonds), they are willing to 
accept lower interest rates than would be required with a similar taxable security 
(Blustain, Cobine et al., 2009; O’Hara, 2012).  Therefore, issuers are afforded lower debt 
service payments. 
Credit Ratings Fundamentals 
 
There are many factors that can affect a municipal bond’s yield.  Of particular 
interest to this study are credit ratings.  A credit rating is a measure of the likelihood–
usually expressed with a letter with some sort of qualifier–that an issuer will make timely 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Internal Revenue Code § 103(b) states, “interest paid on state and local obligations will not be taxable to 
the recipient” (Internal Revenue Service, n.d., p. B-3). 
 
9 Bond yields express rate of return on an investment.  See O’Hara (2012, pp. 26-27) for an explanation of 
the types and of bond yields and their respective calculations. 
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principal and interest payments (Blustain, Cobine et al., 2009; Johnson, 1993; O’Hara, 
2012; Rabson, 2008; Serna, 2013a).  From a risk prevention perspective, credit ratings 
can be understood as a measure of “the likelihood of default on contractually promised 
payments and the expected financial loss suffered in the event of default” (Moody’s 
Investors Service, 2014, p. 7).  It should be noted that failure to redeem principal at 
maturity, as well as failure to make interest payments on time, both constitute default 
(Thau, 2011).  
 Ratings for long-term obligations for the three major credit bureaus are listed in 
Table 1.  These ratings refer to debt issues with a maturity of more than one year 
(Moody’s Investors Service, 2014; Rabson, 2008).  Since this study is concerned with the 
rise in research universities’ use of municipal bond markets to finance long-term capital 
projects, long-term ratings are the focus.  While municipal bonds are often rated by more 
than one credit rating agency, there are times when they are rated by only one (Rabson, 
2008).  This is evidenced in the differences in numbers of U.S. public four-year higher 
education institutions and systems rated by each agency (see Table 1).  Otherwise, the 
rating scales used by the three agencies are fairly similar.  However, Moody’s ratings 
have traditionally been given more “weight” by the marketplace (Lamb, 1993, p. 32). 
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Table 1 
Credit Ratings for Nonprofit Long-term Obligations 
 Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Investment Grade Aaa AAA AAA 
 Aa AA AA 
 A A A 
 Baa BBB BBB 
Speculative Ba BB BB 
 B B B 
Speculative:  Caa CCC CCC 
Nearing Default Ca CC CC 
  C C 
Default* C SD  RD 
  D D 
Qualifiers 1 through 3, 
where 1 > 2 > 3 
Plus and minus used to 
indicate 
stronger/weaker 
position 
Plus and minus 
used to indicate 
stronger/weaker 
position 
Number of U.S. Public Four-
Year Higher Education 
Institutions and Higher 
Education Systems Rated 
226 (2011) 163 (2014) <119 (2015) 
 
Note: Standard & Poor’s and Fitch have two default ratings.  SD (selective default) or RD (restricted 
default) are assigned if an obligor has defaulted on an issue but is believed to able to continue meeting 
obligations on other issues; D (default) is assigned if the default is believed to affect payment on all 
obligations.  
Sources: Fitch Ratings (2015); Moody’s Investor’s Service (2014, 2015a); Standard & Poor’s Ratings 
Services (2014b).  
 
 Credit ratings can affect an institution’s debt financing in a number of ways.  In 
general, the higher an issuer’s credit rating (i.e., its creditworthiness), the lower the 
interest rate (i.e., its coupon) on the bond sold (Moody, 2008; O’Hara, 2012; Rabson, 
2008; Serna, 2013a; Thau, 2011).  The reasons for this are fairly straightforward.  As a 
measure of the probability of default, lower credit ratings signal to investors increased 
investment risk.  Therefore, in order to attract buyers, less creditworthy issuers must sell 
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bonds at a higher coupon, providing greater investment income for potential buyers based 
on the increased credit-risk associated with lending to the entity.   
Additionally, movement within and between different rating categories (e.g., 
investment grade, speculative, speculative: nearing default, default) can impact a bond’s 
coupon differently.  Traditionally, movement within the investment grade category 
impacts interest rates much less than movement within or into other categories (Thau, 
2011).  But, with the rise in rating downgrades (Bogaty, 2013; Kiley, 2013) and 
increasing amounts of debt being issued by institutions of higher education, even 
differences in rating qualifiers are beginning to result in considerable differences in bond 
prices (Serna, 2013a). 
Long-Term Municipal Bonds   
The type of long-term municipal bond issued by a university also has a bearing on 
that institution’s assigned credit rating.  Tax-exempt municipal bonds are traditionally 
classified into two different categories, general obligation bonds (GOs) and revenue 
bonds.  These refer to the type of security pledged by the issuer.  GOs are backed by the 
“full faith and credit of the issuer” (Blustain, Cobine et al., 2009, p. 38).  These bonds can 
be serviced from any of the issuer’s revenue sources.  Revenue bonds, on the other hand, 
are issued to fund specific projects and are secured by and paid for with a specific 
revenue pledge.   
Due to their narrower pledge, and thus increased obligation volatility, revenue 
bonds tend to have lower credit ratings than GOs (Ambler, Burr, McManus, Mischel, & 
Roswick, 1993).  However, such a generalization is somewhat simplistic and can be 
deceiving, since ratings can be influenced by the industry in which the issuer operates 
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(Thau, 2011).  For example, revenue bonds issued by a major state university or 
university system may receive higher credit ratings than GOs issued by a small liberal 
arts college, due to the former’s significantly larger revenue base.  Related to this is that 
when rating revenue bonds ratings agencies do not solely examine the pledged security in 
isolation.  Instead the institution as a whole is examined, and then afterwards the specific 
pledge is analyzed and its financial standing is weighted accordingly (Fitzgerald, 2005). 
Therefore, it is important to understand the industry or sector of a specific issue. 
Additionally, generalizing bond types into two distinct categories can lead to a 
misunderstanding of the subtleties embedded in the many variations found in these 
securities.  In 1994, King et al., identified at least seven different types of higher 
education municipal bond security pledges, ranging from general obligation and state 
appropriation pledges on the high creditworthiness end to auxiliary revenue bonds 
(secured by facilities such as housing and dining) on the low creditworthiness end.  
Perhaps it is more appropriate to refer to tax exempt municipal bonds issued by public 
postsecondary institutions as being secured by consolidated revenue pledges versus 
individual revenue streams, with various bonds (GO and revenue) existing on a spectrum 
of high to low creditworthiness.  Such a model is illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Revenue Pledge and Associated Creditworthiness, by Author 
 
King et al., (1994) first noted the movement among institutions of higher 
education towards issuing bonds secured by all unrestricted resources.  Over a decade 
later Moody’s Investors Service echoed this observation, by writing that “[o]ver the past 
Individual  
Revenue  
Streams 
Consolidated  
Revenue 
Pledges Less  
Creditworthy 
More  
Creditworthy 
!!
26 
several years, public higher education institutions have increasingly been moving to 
consolidated revenue pledges, rather than issuing debt supported only by individual 
revenue streams” (Fitzgerald, 2005, p. 1).  The use of these “consolidated” bonds lends 
itself to increased validity in analysis, as models can focus on factors that are universal to 
revenue structure, rather than trying to account for the multiplicity of factors that are 
unique to a specific, individual revenue stream.  
Factors Involved in Determining Credit Ratings 
 Since the models used to predict credit ratings in this study are rooted in the 
theory developed from extant literature, this section provides a review of literature related 
to credit rating determinants.  While a more detailed discussion of specific variables, 
including measurement and expected impact, is provided in Chapter III, this section’s 
purpose is to provide a theoretical foundation for analysis.  This framework is applicable 
to all three of the study’s research questions, but it is especially germane to the first, 
because of the question’s focus on individual revenue and institutional components. 
 The credit rating process has been accurately described with adjectives such as 
“complex, opaque [and] murky” (Serna, 2013a, pp. 4-5).  Although rating agencies 
publish methodologies related to the process of rating postsecondary institutions (e.g., 
Kedem, 2011; Moody’s Investors Service, 2014, 2015a; Standard & Poor’s Ratings 
Services, 2014b; Viacava, 2010), these primarily consist of descriptive overviews of 
specific factors analyzed in the ratings process and do not provide a cohesive summary of 
the data generating process in full.  In other words, what is missing from these 
publications is the actual mechanics (e.g., statistical calculations) used to estimate higher 
education credit ratings.  
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In the public finance literature there exist succinct overviews of the categories of 
factors involved in rating tax-exempt municipal bonds (e.g., Denison, Yan, & Zhao, 
2007; Feldstein, 2008; Feldstein & Goode, 2008; Hildreth & Miller, 2002; 
Johnson,1993).  These include economic, financial, debt, and issuer management.  While 
these four categories are useful for understanding the general aspects involved in the 
ratings process, a more thorough overview is needed, specifically one that accounts for 
the unique aspects of public postsecondary education revenue structure.  A starting place 
is Serna’s (2013a, 2013b) five-category typology, which is reproduced in Figure 2.  It 
provides a succinct overview of the criteria used in rating public postsecondary 
institutions. 
Criteria Measured via 
Market Position and 
Demand 
Enrollments, number of students accepted, student quality, 
student yield, retention and graduation rates, percent of tenured 
faculty, and competition 
Finances and Operating 
Performance 
Revenues (including tuition and state appropriations), expenses, 
risk management, operating budgets and balance sheets, 
endowment and long-term investment pools, liquidity 
provisions, and total debt burden 
Governance and 
Management  
Overall institutional strategies and policies implemented by 
university administration, track record of dealing with 
unforeseen difficulties, tenure of management, composition and 
structure of the university governing board, and reporting 
mechanisms and monitoring procedures 
Debt Profile Security pledges, debt covenants, as well as other liabilities and 
debt instruments 
State Policies and 
Government 
Relationship 
Mandated tuition caps, declines in budgetary resources 
provided by the state, requirement to remit surpluses or unspent 
dollars back to the state, bonding limits, and relationship with 
the state board 
 
Figure 2. Public Higher Education General Credit Rating Criteria.  Reproduced with permission from 
“Employing College and University Credit Ratings as Indicators of Institutional Planning and 
Effectiveness, 2013, Planning for Higher Education Journal, 41(4), p. 4. Copyright 2013 by Gabriel 
Ramón Serna, Ph.D. 
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Market Position and Demand 
As the public higher education sector remains one in which institutions face 
continued fiscal constraints, an institution’s market position, essentially its marketability, 
has become an increasingly important factor for ratings analysts (Serna, 2013a).  Since 
greater market position and increased demand for services can be understood as reflecting 
the odds that an institution will fair better during changing economic conditions, rating 
agencies employ a number of demand related variables to measure an institution’s 
vulnerability to market changes (Serna, 2013a, 2013b).  Essentially, stronger market 
position is viewed as better enabling universities to “compete effectively for tuition 
revenue, private gifts, research grants, and government support” (Kedem, 2011, p. 3).  
The criteria that Moody’s Investors Service uses to evaluate market position and demand 
are listed below:10 
1. Scope of operations- Greater diversity in operations provides insulation against 
economic and demographic changes by allowing an institution to better leverage 
its influence and consolidate resources during difficult economic periods; 
affiliation with an academic medical center (AMC) 11 can provide a level of 
stability, or instability, due to its financial relationship with the university 
(Kedem, 2011); when operations are diversified it is likely that the same can be 
said for revenue structure. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 For brevity, Moody’s Investors Service and Standard and Poor’s Rating Services will be referred to as 
Moody’s and S&P from here forward, except when the full name is needed to avoid confusion. 
 
11 An academic medical center is a university affiliated teaching hospital that functions as a major health 
provider for the state and conducts a broad array of biomedical and health services research.  This 
definition is developed from the Association of Academic Health Centers Annual Report (2014). 
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2. Student demand and pricing power- Greater demand provides increased flexibility 
in shaping offerings and student body characteristics; it also decreases an 
institution’s price elasticity, allowing for greater flexibility in setting tuition and 
fees (Kedem, 2011); increased selectivity, which may result from greater demand, 
may reflect an institution’s competitive position (Standard & Poor’s, 2007). 
3. Philanthropic support- Donor funds are a form of public endorsement and can 
provide greater media exposure and national recognition (Kedem, 2011).  
Typically, endowments are a good measure of philanthropic support and the 
ability to accrue donative resources (Winston, 1999). 
Market position and demand is one of the more understudied aspects of ratings 
criteria.  Since these factors are somewhat unique to higher education (e.g., enrollments 
and selectivity), it is difficult to locate related findings from analyses of governments or 
other nonprofits.  Michael Moody’s (2008) analysis of public university credit ratings is 
the only empirical study to examine the relationship between university demand factors 
and creditworthiness.12  The presence of a university hospital, which did not return 
statistically significant results, can be understood as reflecting the scope of an instituion’s 
operations.  Next, freshman selectivity–a measure of student demand and/or selectivity–
returned a small positive coefficient, which suggests that an increase in the ratio of 
acceptances to applicants (decreased selectivity) probably positively impacts credit 
ratings.  This is surprising, since the literature suggests that rating agencies favorably 
view increased selectivity (Kedem, 2011; Standard & Poor’s, 2007).  However, since 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Michael Moody is a public policy researcher who is not affiliated with Moody’s Investors Service. !
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none of the marginal effects are statistically significant, this variable provides little in the 
way of evidence. 13   
 This one study shows that there is much work to be done in this area.  For 
example, it would be interesting to see if a larger dataset returns different results for 
Moody’s (2008) two demand variables.  Also, other measures of demand and selectivity 
might be analyzed.  For example, S&P (2007) states that the most selective institutions 
predominantly have retention rates of “90% or more”; in addition, they claim that 
“[g]raduation rates tend to correlate with selectivity–the more selective an institution, the 
higher the four-and five-year graduation rates” (p. 178).  Therefore, these two measures 
could be included to help capture selectivity.  Additionally, enrollment growth rates could 
be used to help capture student demand (Kedem, 2011). 
Finances and Operating  
Performance  
 Financial strength is one of the more important criteria in the ratings process 
(Serna, 2013b).  It serves as an indicator of an institution’s ability to service its debt, 
especially when confronted with “financial stress, tight budgets, diminished demand, and 
lower revenues or increased expenses” (Serna, 2013b, p. 55).  In addition to servicing  
debt, strong operating performance allows universities to continue supporting their 
institutional missions (Kedem, 2011).  Analysis of finances and operating performance is 
further illustrated with the two subcategories below:  
1. Cash flow- The concern is whether institutions are generating sufficient cash flow 
to cover operational costs while still being able to invest in programs and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 One of the limitations in Michael Moody’s analysis is his use of the ordered probit estimator, which 
requires the calculation of marginal effects for interpreting the specific impact of covariates.  Although 
Moody does not enter into any explanation about this, his analysis’s failure to return statistically significant 
marginal effects for freshman selectivity may be due to the small sample size of 142 observations. 
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facilities; in addition to traditional revenue sources that provide much of the 
operating revenue for a single year (e.g., tuition and fees, state appropriations, 
grants), Moody’s also evaluates investment pools, including endowments, since 
such revenue sources may aid an institution’s operations (Kedem, 2011). 
2. Budgetary flexibility and operating freedom- Well-run universities have the 
ability to adjust their operations in order to generate needed revenue in response 
to market changes; revenue generation is decidedly a primary focus when 
evaluating an instituion’s creditworthiness, since expense reduction could result in 
program reduction/elimination, negatively impacting market position; increased 
flexibility can be measured through an instituion’s level of revenue diversity, 
which measures both the number and distribution of funds (Kedem, 2011).   
Although there are few statistical analyses of the relationship between specific 
revenue streams and credit ratings, especially at the institutional level, prior literature 
provides us with a starting point from which to begin understanding these associations.  
Returning to Moody’s (2008) study of state debt policies and public university credit 
ratings, expendable financial resources per student, measured in thousands of dollars, is 
both statistically significant and positively associated with a higher credit rating.  An 
additional $10,000 per student in total financial resources increases the probability of 
receiving a Aa2 rating (from Moody’s Investors Service) by 31%.  Conversely, the same 
addition decreases the probability of being rated A1 by 33%.  While informative (i.e., 
increased revenues is positively associated with higher credit ratings), it tells us little 
about the associations for individual revenue streams or how the distribution among 
streams might matter. 
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Looking at county and city government credit ratings, Palumbo and Zaporowski 
(2012) find that per capita general revenues are positively associated with higher credit 
ratings.  Since this variable measures “the fiscal capacity of the issuing government to 
meet its expenditure needs as well as debt service requirements,” it is applicable to higher 
education (Palumbo & Zaporowski, 2012, p. 93).  That is, it is similar to Michael 
Moody’s (2008) expendable financial resources per student variable, in that both provide 
an overall understanding that increased revenue is associated with increased 
creditworthiness.  Unfortunately, neither of these studies tells us anything about 
individual revenue streams, which are important for this study’s examination of revenue 
structure.  However, by looking at some of the descriptive literature, inferences can begin 
to be made regarding the individual revenue streams and university credit ratings. 
Tuition and fees.  Tuition and fees have long been viewed as “a primary revenue 
source for both public and private higher education institutions” (McKeown-Moak & 
Mullin, 2014, p. 70).  But changes in economic conditions have increased price 
sensitivity among certain students (Serna, 2013a).  Following the economic crash in 
2007-2008, a combination of fewer high school graduates, decreased household net 
worth, “depressed family income,” and increased government scrutiny over tuition costs 
have led to slowed enrollment and net tuition revenue growth (Bogaty, 2013, p. 4). In 
fact, in FY 2008 only 9% of public higher education institutions failed to grow their 
tuition revenue by the Federal Reserve’s target inflation rate of 2%.  Yet, in FY2011, 
21% of public universities failed to grow their tuition revenue by this number (Bogaty, 
2013).  Days of retarded tuition growth do not appear to be ending any time soon.  In 
their 2015 Outlook, Moody’s forecasts aggregate revenue growth below 3%, with 
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“[c]onstrained net tuition revenue growth as the key driver” (Tuby, 2014, p. 2).  This 
volatility suggests that ratings analysts may cautiously view heavy dependence on this 
funding source.  This inference is supported by Grizzle’s (2012) empirical findings that 
among state GO debt, increased revenue volatility is negatively associated with a stronger 
credit rating. 
State and local appropriations.  As discussed toward the beginning of this 
chapter, there is a large body of literature documenting variations in state appropriations.  
Even as early as 2012, rating agencies began forecasting negative outlooks for state 
funding to higher education, noting the weak economic recovery and competition with 
other state priorities (Bogaty, 2013).  For comparison, public university reliance on state 
appropriations accounted for over 30% of operating revenues in FY2009, but by FY2013 
that number dropped below 25% (Tuby, 2014).  Public institutions have seen slight 
increases in state funding during FY2013 and FY2014; yet, in many cases these monies 
are attached to performance requirements (Tuby, 2014), which can impede a school’s 
ability to access such support (Dougherty et al., 2014; Dougherty & Reddy, 2011).  
Because state appropriations are becoming an increasingly unstable funding option, 
dependence on this source introduces a greater amount of variation and unpredictability 
into a university’s revenue base.  This may lead analysts to regard these institutions as 
more susceptible to revenue shortfalls and as a result have difficulty meeting debt 
obligations.  Supporting this assumption is that in FY2013 S&P (2014a) reported that for 
institutions rated AAA state funds represented 8.2% (median) of their total revenues, 
while those rated A relied on state funds for 26.5% of their revenues.  While this data is 
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not to be understood as demonstrating a causal relationship between state monies and 
credit ratings, it does suggest an inverse correlation between the two. 
Federal grants and contracts.  Federal grants and contracts represent the third 
primary source of public higher education funding (McKeown-Moak & Mullin, 2014).  
For the past 150 years, the federal government has played an integral role in funding 
public and private postsecondary institutions.  These monies not only include student 
financial aid, but also competitive grants for research and other public activities 
(McKeown-Moak & Mullin, 2014).  Grants include funding for both direct (e.g., salary 
and benefits for investigators, graduate assistants, technicians, supplies, travel) and 
indirect (e.g., utilities, accounting, payroll, costs associated with maintaining space) costs 
(Goldstein, 2012).   
As with other areas of funding, federal grants and contracts have also suffered in 
recent years.  While there has always been competition around this source of funding, the 
difficulty in obtaining these monies has intensified in recent years (Bogaty, 2013).  For 
example, the success rate for university grant proposals submitted and approved by the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) dropped from 30% in 2003 to 18% in FY2011 
(Bogaty, 2013).  Whether this drop reflects a decrease in grant money or increased 
competition is unclear.  What is known is that large research universities have fared 
better in securing federal grants in recent years.  This may be due to their large brand 
recognition, the broad scope of activities, and that many are affiliated with research 
hospitals, where biomedical research remains one of the largest areas of this type of 
support.  However, affiliation with an academic medical center (i.e., a university-
affiliated teaching hospital), or AMC, may be a double-edged sword.  With healthcare 
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reforms, patient-care revenues have experienced slowed growth (Bogaty, 2013; Tuby, 
2014).  Still, federal grant and contract revenues are likely to be positively associated 
with higher credit ratings, as they may reflect factors such as institution size and stability, 
brand recognition, and national reputation.   
Endowment funds.  Although endowment funds are technically not a revenue 
source on their own, they generate investment returns that are used by many high 
creditworthy universities to help fund operations (Bogaty, 2013).  Traditionally, under the 
rules of the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA), a portion of an 
endowment’s cash income (e.g., dividends, interest, etc.) was distributed to the university 
for either specified purposes or general uses.  This payout rate was usually based upon 
the endowment’s historical market value and payouts from previous years.  The 
remaining cash and investment income was then reinvested into the endowment so that 
the fund could grow into perpetuity (Goldstein, 2012).   
However, with the market crash of 2008, endowment funds lost value and as a 
result payouts were not available, or were insufficient to fund many of the activities 
normally supported by these monies.  Therefore, the Uniform Prudent Management of 
Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) was passed, which allows “prudent use of a portion of 
principal to meet current spending needs” (Goldstein, 2012, p. 50).  Stated otherwise, 
endowments now function as large reserve funds.  Both S&P and Moody’s consider 
endowments to be “indicator[s] of strength” (Serna, 2013b, p. 61).  In fact, in FY 2013, 
S&P AAA rated institutions had a median endowment market value of $6 billion, $585 
million for AA institutions, and $9 million for those in the BBB category (Standard & 
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Poor’s Rating Services, 2014a).  Thus, it is likely that statistical analysis will find a 
positive relationship between endowment value and credit rating. 
Governance and Management 
 When evaluating an institution’s governance and management, rating agencies 
look at factors such as leadership, management policies and strategies, and track record, 
especially during fiscal hardships (Serna, 2013a).  One of the primary concerns in such an 
analysis is whether “management and governance of the institution might lead to default 
or even closure of the institution” (Serna, 2013b, p. 56.).  Three sub-factors that further 
illustrate governance and management are listed below:  
1) The board and senior management’s composition- A balance between tenured and 
new members, possessing a variety of skills such as knowledge of institutional 
history, leadership in a variety of sectors, and fiscal and risk management are 
valued; also accounted for is the board’s role in strategic planning and decision 
making (Kedem, 2011). 
2) Oversight and disclosure practices- The institution’s policies should be clearly 
articulated, and controls put in place to allow for transparency, accountability, and 
oversight (Kedem, 2011); since these allow for efficient debt management, larger 
amounts of debt may suggest that clearly articulated policies are in place. 
3) Short- and long-term planning- Clear definition of an institution’s long-term 
strategic plan, long-term financial plan, and prudent short-term budgeting, as well 
as the alignment of all three allow for efficient use of debt (Kedem, 2011); as with 
oversight, larger amounts of debt may suggest the implementation of clearly 
defined short- and long-term planning. 
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Since effective management can help ensure prudent decisions regarding debt 
issuance and financing, a well-established leadership team can often mean the difference 
between being viewed as more or less creditworthy.  While Moody’s argues “[t]here are 
no purely quantitative ratios that can be used to ascertain the strength of an institution’s 
management and governance” (Rubinoff & Marion, 2007), board centralization and its 
relationship to institutional autonomy has been quantified and studied in the research 
literature.  Lowry (2001) finds that reduced institutional autonomy can negatively impact 
a school’s net tuition and fee revenues.  State legislators make funding decisions based on 
the political costs and benefits to their states (i.e., they are motivated by the desire to 
maximize political support).  Hence, they may wish to increase voter support by keeping 
tuition and fees low.  Since governing board members are appointed through political 
processes or directly by a state’s governor (Lowry, 2001; National Association of College 
and University Business Officers, 2012; Purcell, Harrington, & King, 2012), a highly 
centralized board (e.g., a consolidated governing board)14 can essentially link universities 
to the state by as little as one-degree of separation.    
Two studies confirm and further illustrate this relationship between 
centralization/regulation, institutional alignment, and revenues.  Analyzing tuition 
policies at land-grant universities, Burgess (2011) finds that institutions in states with low 
levels of centralization tend to have lower tuition and fees.  Knott and Payne (2004) find 
similar results while looking at comprehensive and Ph.D.-granting public universities.  
Additionally, their analysis shows that increased centralization negatively impacts 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Consolidated governing boards exercise control over their institutions’ operating and capital budgets and 
hold authority over revenue allocation (McGuinness, 2001). 
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endowment value and total research funding.  The explanation is that while centralized 
boards more strongly align public universities with the state’s interests,  
decentralized boards align institutions with a “private university model that relies more 
on tuition revenue and research dollars rather than state appropriations” (Knott & Payne, 
2004, p. 28).  
In the context of credit ratings, since reliance on state appropriations have been 
shown to negatively impact creditworthiness, while grants and contracts have an opposite 
relationship, it can be hypothesized that high levels of centralization may too strongly 
dictate a university’s activities.  This can result in limited managerial freedom and 
hampered revenue generation.  This conclusion is bolstered by Michael Moody’s (2007) 
findings that highly centralized governing boards lead to lower overall debt levels, which 
may negatively impact an institution’s creditworthiness.  While governing board 
restrictions may protect institutions from over-leveraging their assets, such austerity may 
also “inhibit the ability of universities to leverage their full debt-capacity” (Serna, 2013b, 
p. 62).  Additionally, it may signal to the debt markets potential problems accessing debt 
for refinancing and other needs. That is to say, when a governing board intervenes too 
often or too directly in institutional matters this can send a negative signal to debt 
markets.   
Debt Profile 
 The inclusion of total debt burden as a measurement under finances and operating 
performance is meant to contextualize revenue with regard to budgetary surpluses or 
deficits.  Analysis of a university’s debt profile, on the other hand, focuses on the 
institution’s ability and willingness to meet debt obligations; in other words, whether or 
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not an institution is able to make timely debt payments (Serna, 2013b).  Moody’s does 
not prescribe an ideal debt profile for universities.  Instead, they state “[t]he appropriate 
debt structure for a university depends on its unique credit characteristics and 
management’s risk tolerance” (Kedem, 2011, p. 17).  Factors such as the breadth and 
stability of revenue pledges, security pledges, ability to adjust to interest rate spikes in the 
case of variable rate securities, staggered obligation expiration dates, access to various 
types of debt products, and restrictions placed on universities by debt covenants are all 
accounted for when evaluating debt profile (Kedem, 2011).   
 Unfortunately, the empirical literature has yet to fully explore most of these 
factors through statistical analysis.  Instead, debt profile is usually modeled as a general 
measure of total outstanding debt (Grizzle, 2010, 2012; Johnson & Kriz, 2005; Moody, 
2008; Palumbo & Zaporowski, 2012; Yan, 2011).  In all of these studies, higher levels of 
debt are associated with weaker credit ratings.15  But, some of the more nuanced factors 
analyzed in debt profile are not explored.  One explanation for this analytical gap may be 
due to feasibility.  University credit characteristics are “unique,” (Kedem, 2011, p. 17).  
When building a statistical model, one seeks an acceptable level of generalizability.  This 
requires finding variables that are applicable in some fashion to the entire population.  It 
may be the case that institutional debt profiles are so unique that many of their 
characteristics are difficult to adequately reduce.  This suggests that analysis of debt 
profile may benefit from qualitative studies.  However, to date no qualitative research on 
credit ratings or university debt profile exists.  This is a deficiency in the research 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Johnson and Kriz (2005) also include a variable for per capita state short-term debt outstanding, as well 
as indicator variables for bonds with maturities of less than 10 years and bonds with maturities of greater 
than 10 years.  All of these variables return negative coefficients (i.e., negatively associated with credit 
ratings). 
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literature that could benefit from such attention.  In the meantime, the use of total 
outstanding debt in econometric models likely tells something about the debt-behaviors 
of public universities.  
State Policies and Government  
Relationship 
 The connection between university credit ratings and state-level factors is one 
based on an interesting relationship.  On the one hand, many states have statutes and 
constitutional provisions that provide legal protection from public university obligations 
becoming their own (Moody, 2008).  Yet, state debt officers often report feeling morally 
obligated for the borrowing activity of their public entities, as well as concerned that they 
will still be affected by their public institutions’ debt (Hackbart & Leigland, 1990).  As a 
result, states may institute constraints, such as debt-limits, as means to control what may 
be viewed as universities lacking the “resolve to limit their own borrowing” (Moody, 
2008).  Ultimately, the decision to institute debt-limits is based on a lack of confidence in 
public institution competence or willingness to take on risk by executive leadership. 
 Although there is a wide variety in the characteristics of a debt-limit’s restrictions, 
they usually impose limitations in the form of total dollar amount of debt or percentage of 
debt institutions are allowed to incur (Serna, 2013c).  Also, the term “debt capacity” is 
often alluded to with regard to these restrictions.  This term is most commonly used in the 
context of optimality.  Debt capacity is the optimal amount of debt that can be incurred 
before additional borrowing results in increased borrowing costs due to credit ratings 
being adversely affected (Denison, Hackbart, & Moody, 2006; Moody, 2008).  If debt-
limits are properly aligned with debt capacity, they can work to assist universities in 
maintaining favorable debt service ratios and demonstrating prudent financial 
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management with the rating agencies (Moody, 2008).  Unfortunately, there is no 
evidence that states link debt limits to debt capacity; rather, these fiscal restrictions are 
more commonly implemented as means to minimize debt by states with strong, 
politically motivated, aversions to borrowing (Denison, Hackbart, & Moody, 2006). 
 The potential risk to postsecondary institutions of such an austere policy approach 
is that they may be unable to efficiently finance their capital projects.  For example, if a 
university wishes to undertake the construction of a facility that they project will produce 
ample revenue after completion (e.g., revenue that can be used to service the obligation), 
a debt limit may not allow the needed borrowing based on the future revenue not yet 
having been realized.  Thus, as with state oversight, debt limits may signal to the debt 
markets potential problems accessing debt.  
 Still, universities are never completely independent from the states in which they 
reside.  This is why a state’s own GO credit rating is accounted for, as a measure of its 
fiscal health and ability to support its public postsecondary institutions (Serna 2013a).  
Michael Moody’s (2008) findings support this assumption.  A state credit rating of Aaa, 
as opposed to A, increases the probability of a university receiving an Aa2 rating by 
30.5%; conversely, a state rating of Aa, as opposed to A, increases the probability of a 
university receiving an Aa2 rating by only 24.8%.16 
Revenue Diversification 
As discussed earlier, revenue diversification can improve budget flexibility.  It 
provides “greater revenue stability,” which allows institutions to lessen the negative 
effects of adverse economic conditions and better ensure their prosperity through !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Although the marginal effects for an institution receiving Aa1 and Aaa were not statistically significant, 
they show a similar trend where Aaa state rating is associated with a higher probability of increased 
university creditworthiness than is Aa. 
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consistent revenue generation (Kedem, 2011, p. 8).  Since this area of fiscal structure is 
the focus of the second research question–How is the level of revenue diversification 
associated with public research university credit ratings?–this section will review how 
such a factor has been observed and measured in the extant literature.  In doing so, it 
contributes to a hypothesis about the expected association with university credit ratings. 
 The concept of revenue diversification is rooted in Modern Portfolio Theory, 
specifically literature on selecting a combination of investment securities that most 
efficiently reduces portfolio variation or risk (Markowitz, 1952).  If investors make 
decisions based entirely on maximizing expected returns, they may end up situating all of 
their resources into a single investment that is expected to provide the greatest profit.  
Since the future is uncertain, such a resource allocation decision introduces a large 
amount of variance (i.e., risk), exposing investors to all of the market impacts that are 
incurred on that one investment.  Markowitz goes on to state that diversification is 
something that is observable.  By employing such an approach, investors can minimize 
correlation between a portfolio and random fluctuations in individual investments.  
Additionally, because securities are likely to be correlated with one another, especially 
within the same sector, it is also advisable to invest in firms representing different 
industries (e.g., railroads, mining, public utility, manufacturing, etc.) in order to reduce 
covariance.  This reduction in covariance between investments enables investors to 
minimize the variance/risk due to market volatility, so that the risk they face is random 
(Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1963).  The implications of this are important, in that by 
diversifying one’s portfolio (both in number and type of investments), investors are able 
to effectively minimize risk (Markowitz, 1952). 
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At the state level, scholars also provide empirical evidence supporting revenue 
diversification as a policy decision for fiscal stability.  Suyderhoud (1994) finds that 
diversification is correlated with strong fiscal performance, including support for higher 
tax effort, increased tax equity via less regressive income taxes, and lower property taxes 
when controlling for the overall state-local tax rates.   
 As might be expected, the public finance and nonprofit literature suggests that a 
more diversified revenue base is positively associated with increased revenue stability 
(Chang & Tuckman, 1994; Chernick, Langley, & Reschovsky, 2011; Carroll, 2005, 2009; 
Carroll & Stater, 2009; Tuckman & Chang, 1991).  For example, Carroll and Stater 
(2009) find that increased revenue diversification among nonprofit 501c3 organizations, 
including educational organizations, is associated with decreased revenue volatility over 
time.  This makes sense, because for well-diversified public universities declines in one 
funding source (e.g., state appropriations) have the potential to be offset by increases in 
another (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). 
Other research focusing on nonprofits finds that increases in fund-raising 
expenditures and accumulation of revenue surpluses are positively associated with greater 
revenue diversification (Chang & Tuckman, 1994).  This can be illuminated by referring 
back to public higher education governing boards.  As discussed in the last section, 
increased centralization/regulation among university governance can negatively impact 
managerial adaptation (Volkwein and Malik, 1997), which can limit an institution’s 
ability to grow its endowment (Knott & Payne, 2004) and can restrict its tuition and fee 
revenue (Burgess, 2011; Knott & Payne, 2004; Lowry, 2001).  Thus, it can be inferred 
that institutions operating under centralized governing boards are more limited in their 
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ability to generate funds from alternate sources and are less likely to have diverse revenue 
bases and surpluses. 
 The research discussed thus far provides a fairly strong case for the role played by 
revenue diversification in fiscal stability at all levels of public finance.  It can be inferred 
that increased diversification is positively associated with higher education credit ratings, 
since rating agencies value consistent cash flow and financial stability (Kedem, 2011; 
Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, 2014a).  In fact, in the context of the U.S. higher 
education sector, S&P explicitly states that they view “revenue diversity as a credit 
strength and revenue concentration as a credit weakness” (S&P Capital IQ, 2014, 
Revenue diversity section, para. 1).  Furthermore, Suyderhoud (1994) notes greater 
diversification is positively correlated with higher rated state GO bonds. 
 While this literature allows us to form some fairly strong assumptions about the 
impact of revenue diversification on credit ratings, empirical analysis primarily focusing 
on the relationship between these two variables is lacking.  To date, only two studies 
have undertaken such analysis, and both are at the state level (Grizzle, 2012; Yan, 2011).  
Using similar ordered response estimators, both of these studies find increased 
diversification is positively associated with improved credit ratings.  For example, for a 
one standard deviation (0.09) increase in the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI),17 the 
probability of a state receiving a Aaa credit rating increases by nearly 25% (Grizzle, 
2012, p. 45). These two studies further bolster the assumption that increased diversity in 
postsecondary institution funding increases the likelihood of being deemed more 
creditworthy.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The HHI is a commonly used index to measure revenue diversification.  A zero is equal to no 
diversification and a one is equal to perfect revenue diversification among all streams.  This index is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter III.  
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Severe Economic Downturns 
 Goldstein (2012) notes that “[t]he economies of all institutions are linked with the 
national economy” (p. 25).  This statement is illustrated by looking at the 2008-2009 
economic downturn, referred to as The Great Recession,18 the worst economic crises 
since the Great Depression (Zumeta, 2010; Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, & Finney, 2012).  
Consumer spending, high rates of unemployment, and declines in property values 
impacted the three major sources of state and local taxes (Peng, Kriz, & Wang, 2014).  
Macroeconomic conditions also weakened postsecondary budgets by creating uncertainty 
around “the prospect for growth of household income and wealth, philanthropic support, 
investment returns, state appropriations, and federal funding” (Bogaty, 2013, p. 1).  These 
sustained problems have driven Moody’s to issue negative outlooks for the sector since 
2009 (Bogaty, 2013; Goodman & Nelson, 2009; Tuby, 2014; Tuby & Nelson, 2012).  
This section explores some of the post-recession issues facing higher education.  In doing 
so, it contributes to the study’s theoretical framework, especially concerning the third 
research question– How do severe economic downturns impact public research university 
credit ratings? 
 When The Great Recession hit, Wachovia bank froze the accounts of 1,000 
postsecondary institutions (Blumenstyk & Field, 2008).  The combined $9.3 billion was 
invested in the Commonfund for Short Term Investments, which was often used by many 
colleges and universities to fund operating expenses.  Wachovia eventually resigned its 
role as trustee of the fund and institutions were said to be able to access assets once 
securities matured.  However, the tight credit markets worried many that difficulty selling !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 The terms Great Recession and severe economic downturns will be used interchangeably throughout this 
study, since the former will function as a treatment variable for the latter.  This will be discussed more in 
Chapter III. 
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securities would leave institutions without adequate liquidity to make payroll (Field, 
2008). 
 In 2008, the concern over higher education liquidity was also expressed by the 
credit rating agencies.  For instance, in March of 2008, Moody’s downgraded Colorado 
School of Mines’ debt rating, due in part to the school holding $54 million in variable-
rate bonds and only $24.9 million in operating cash.  Moody’s downgrade was motivated 
by fears that the university was not operating with enough flexibility (i.e., it was 
leveraging itself too highly) to weather market fluctuations (Wolverton, 2008).  In other 
words, if interest rates were to rise, Colorado School of Mines may not have had enough 
cash to service its debt.  These liquidity concerns prompted Moody’s to introduce two 
new ratios in FY 2009–one to assess the portion of cash and investments that is 
unrestricted and the other to assess the portion that is liquid within one month or one year 
(Gephardt, 2011).  Although concerns have since lessened, Moody’s admits that they are 
still unsure about liquidity risks for some universities (Gephardt & Nelson, 2011).  Since 
there does not exist empirical research examining the role played by liquidity in public 
university credit ratings, both pre- and post-recession, this is an area that still remains 
largely uncertain.  
 The effects of the Great Recession can also be seen with individual revenue 
streams.  In 2013, Moody’s reported that all non-tuition revenue sources (e.g., 
government appropriations, investment earnings, gifts, research grants, patient care 
reimbursements) had either slowed or declined since FY 2008 (Bogaty, 2013).  One 
especially notable area is state appropriations.  As discussed earlier, state appropriations 
have become an increasingly unstable revenue source, especially with the recent trend in 
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attaching performance requirements (Tuby, 2014).  Furthermore, with state budget 
cutbacks, higher education has had to compete with K-12 and health care (including 
Medicaid) for a piece of an even smaller pie (Zumeta & Kinne, 2011).  In fact, between 
FY 2008 and FY 2013, state support to higher education declined by a total of $8.8 
billion, or 10.8% (Zumeta, 2013, p. 31).  These declines may be further explained by the 
fact that states do not have “constitutional funding mandates nor linkages to federal 
matching dollars,” as they do with K-12 and health care, to protect higher education 
funding (Zumeta & Kinne, 2011, p. 32).  Public colleges and universities are assumed to 
be able to simply make up the difference by charging their clients more.  Thus, the earlier 
hypothesized negative relationship between state appropriations and university credit 
ratings is likely to be accentuated in recent years. 
 In response to declining state support, public universities have shifted more of the 
cost burden onto students by raising tuition and fees, as well as increasing out-of-state 
enrollments (Bogaty, 2013; Serna, 2013a).  As noted earlier, high unemployment, flat 
earnings, and uncertain job prospects for many recent graduates have motivated public 
scrutiny over tuition and fee increases (Bogaty, 2013; Zumeta, 2013).  This has increased 
price-sensitivity, resulting in greater importance being placed on universities’ ability to 
distinguish themselves from one another (Tuby & Nelson, 2012).  Thus, measures that 
reflect demand (e.g., selectivity, endowment) are likely to play a more significant role in 
improving creditworthiness.  At the same time, because growth in tuition and fee revenue 
has slowed in recent years as a response to what are arguably recessionary pressures 
(Bogaty, 2013; Zumeta, 2013), the already hypothesized negative relationship between 
this factor and improved creditworthiness is likely to be magnified in the post-recession 
!!
48 
years; that is, since tuition and fees have become even more uncertain following the 
recession, increased dependence on this revenue stream is likely to be viewed by ratings 
agencies in an increasingly negative light.  This inference is supported by claims from 
Moody’s regarding its prominent role in generating negative outlooks for the sector 
(Bogaty, 2013; Tuby, 2014). 
 Also mentioned earlier, endowment value and grant revenues can signify the 
scope and market position of an institution, as well as increase its fiscal base.  Thus, 
endowments are expected to positively impact credit ratings.  With the endowment losses 
experienced by many institutions following the recession (Bogaty, 2013; Goldstein, 
2012), and the increased competition for grant funding in recent years (Bogaty, 2013), 
these factors are likely to continue their role in strengthening university credit ratings.  
That is, institutions that are able to grow endowments and obtain grant funding are likely 
to be viewed favorably by rating agencies.  On a related note, AMCs are also able to 
bring in biomedical grants and philanthropic support.  But, challenges such as reductions 
in funding to graduate medical education, cuts to Medicare and Medicaid, and uncertainty 
over the effects of healthcare reform pose potential problems for universities affiliated 
with AMCs.  So, amidst a lack of empirical research, it is difficult to infer how the 
presence of hospitals impact university credit ratings post-recession. 
 The literature reviewed thus far may suggest that revenue diversification should 
positively impact public research university credit ratings, especially in the post-recession 
years.  Such a view is supported in part by Carroll’s (2005) findings that states with 
higher levels of diversification generally experienced smaller revenue declines during and 
after the 2001 recession, than did states with less diversification.  However, in light of the 
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immense strain placed on all tuition and non-tuition revenue by the most recent economic 
downturn, placing such high importance on revenue diversification may be overzealous.  
In fact, in their 2013 negative outlook, Moody’s specifically noted that “diversity no 
longer offers a safe haven,” due to the strain on all non-tuition revenue sources (Bogaty, 
2013, p. 7).    Ultimately, since the impact of the Great Recession, and its associated 
spillover effects, on public research university credit ratings have yet to be empirically 
tested, answering this study’s third research question will significantly add to an under 
examined area of higher education finance.  
Chapter Conclusion 
 This chapter has reviewed the literature pertaining to public research university 
credit ratings.  Surveying literature on higher education budgeting and planning, higher 
education economics and finance, credit report methodologies published by credit rating 
agencies, and research on state and municipal debt and credit ratings, it has sought to 
establish a theoretical framework from which the study’s analysis may proceed.  In doing 
so, it has laid the groundwork for a functional framework and the selection of variables to 
be included in the next chapter.  The review’s order was intended to follow the 
progression of research questions and illustrate their development: beginning with an 
overview of municipal securities and credit ratings, followed by a discussion of 
characteristics involved in the ratings process, proceeded by an overview of the literature 
on revenue diversification, and finally a discussion of the impact of severe economic 
downturns on credit ratings.  In structuring this chapter in the above manner, the goal was 
not only to cover literature pertaining to all three research questions, but also to show 
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how each question, while distinct, builds on the previous one(s).  To help illustrate this 
point, the study’s research questions are reiterated once again:  
Q1 How are the factors involved in public research university revenue 
structure associated with institutional credit ratings?  
 
Q2 How is the level of revenue diversification in public research university 
revenue structure associated with institutional credit ratings?  
 
Q3 How do severe economic downturns impact public research university 
credit ratings?   
 
 Michael Moody’s (2008) study of debt policies and public university credit 
ratings is the only analysis to date that empirically examines credit ratings on the level of 
higher education.  Due to this limitation in the empirical literature, along with Moody’s 
small dataset and limited number of variables, this literature review had to draw on 
empirical work at the municipal and state levels to cover the study’s scope.  Such a 
decision was based on public universities’ similarities to state governments, nonprofits, 
and public authorities.  Still, even the empirical research on credit ratings at these other 
levels is fairly small.  Thus, many inferences were made based on descriptive studies and 
research that is only tangentially related to the study’s topic.  As a result, this chapter 
uncovered a large gap in the subject of public higher education bond ratings. 
 Still, by covering a broad expanse of literature it is possible to formulate a 
functional form equation for public research university credit ratings to guide the 
analysis:! !!
   (2.1) 
Where credit ratings are a function of demand related factors (e.g., enrollment and 
selectivity), revenue factors (e.g., tuition & fees, state appropriations, grants, revenue 
diversification), governance and management factors (e.g., governing board 
CR = f (Dem,R,Gov,Debt,End,State,Econ)
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centralization, total debt capacity), debt related factors (e.g., debt per student, debt service 
ratios), the value of the university endowment fund, state relationship factors (e.g., debt 
limits, state credit ratings), and the condition of the national economy (e.g., recession).  
As will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter III, various revenue and economic 
variables (e.g., revenue stream variables, revenue diversification, recession) will be 
interchanged in the study’s models, as deemed necessary for specific research questions.     
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 This chapter provides an overview of the study population, data collection, and 
proposed methodology to answer the study’s three research questions.  As posed in 
Chapter I and reiterated in Chapter II, these questions are as follows: 
Q1 How are the factors involved in public research university revenue 
structure associated with institutional credit ratings?  
 
Q2 How is the level of revenue diversification in public research university 
revenue structure associated with institutional credit ratings?  
 
Q3 How do severe economic downturns impact public research university 
credit ratings?   
 
More specifically, it carefully presents how this study will begin testing these three 
questions and the related hypotheses stated in this chapter’s conclusion.   
 The outline of Chapter III is as follows.  Part one describes the paradigmatic 
worldview in which study is situated.  Part two describes the population and 
characteristics of the dataset.  Additionally, it explains the study’s time-span and rationale 
for these choices.  Part three covers the method of data collection, including the data 
sources, the manner in which the data was measured, and descriptions of the included 
variables.  In addition, it provides the rationale behind these choices, including how the 
variables best utilize the theory developed in Chapter II to answer the three research 
questions.  Part four provides an overview of the ordered probit and ordered logit 
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estimators used to analyze the data, along with the rationale for their choice.  Finally, part 
five provides a discussion of some of the problems that occurred during data collection 
and analysis.  This chapter concludes with a list of 12 hypotheses used to answer the 
three research questions in Chapter IV.  All analyses, except when stated otherwise, are 
conducted with Stata/IC 13.1. 
Paradigm 
 This study is situated in an objectivist, post-positivist worldview.  As with most 
econometric analyses, this project assumes a “deterministic philosophy,” in which 
associations between factors (e.g., financial variables) are empirically tested to determine 
their relationship to a specific outcome (i.e., credit ratings) (Creswell, 2009, p. 7).  In 
other words, claims are tested on observations, using objectivity and rationality as criteria 
(Benton & Craib, 2011).  Post-positivism aligns with the ontological position of 
philosophical realism, the notion that reality exists independent of human perception 
(Maxwell, 2012).  But, unlike traditional positivism, which presumes that reality can be 
known with certainty (Crotty, 2013), post-positivism argues that such certainty can never 
be fully attained (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).  There is an inherent level of uncertainty 
in observations.  Thus, knowledge is developed through falsifying theories, and reality is 
only ever known probabilistically (i.e., imperfectly) (Crotty, 2013; Guba & Lincoln, 
2005).  Since this study uses statistical analysis to predict how university credit ratings 
are impacted by changes in institutional and state factors, it aligns well with the post-
positivist view of knowledge and approach towards falsifiability.  Additionally, while 
credit ratings are acknowledged as the product of individual analysts who impose a 
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certain degree of subjectivity, university bond ratings are nevertheless formulated 
according to a predetermined set of criteria, such as those listed in Figure 2. 
Population 
 The population for this study includes public four-year research universities with 
either a high or very high level of research activity as defined by the Carnegie Foundation 
for the Advancement of Teaching (2010).19 Decisions regarding this population are 
motivated by both theoretical and practical considerations.  To begin with, private 
institutions were excluded because of the differences in revenue structure between them 
and their public counterparts; namely, that they do not receive direct state appropriations 
and rely heavily on tuition and fees (Goldstein, 2012; McKeown-Moak & Mullin, 2014 ).  
For example, state support to private institutions represented a mere 1.4 percent in 2010 
for the four-year sector as compared to 14.4 percent of public four-year total revenues; 
and, private four-year institutions generated 40.2 percent of their revenues from tuition 
and fees, whereas their public counterparts only generated 19.2 percent from this source 
(Goldstein, 2012). As discussed in Chapter II, and suggested above, due to differences in 
sectors it is important to compare bond ratings from the same, or similar, industry (Thau, 
2011).  Therefore, the differences in revenue structure between public and private 
postsecondary institutions motivate the decision not to include both in the study’s 
population. The cost shifting that is occurring in the form of decreased state 
appropriations (due to decreased budgets and greater calls for accountability) and 
increased tuition and fees raises important implications for public university revenue 
dependence–implications that do not necessarily affect private universities that are far !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Descriptions of these categories are located in the List of Definitions.  A more thorough discussion of the 
methodology used by the Carnegie Foundation and a description of their classifications can be found at 
http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/methodology/basic.php. 
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less dependent on state funding.  Additionally, governance and management, as well as 
the relationship to the parent state are far more important factors when examining public 
institutions.  Board centralization has been shown to impact the managerial behavior and 
decision-making at public institutions (Knott & Payne, 2004; Lowry, 2001).  
Furthermore, a state’s credit rating is more likely to influence public university credit 
ratings, since such a measure reflects the state’s fiscal health and ability to consistently 
fund its public institutions (Moody, 2008), which as noted in chapter two are often 
impacted by severe economic downturns. 
While decreases in state appropriations and increased dependence on tuition and 
fees revenue, which were discussed in Chapter II (Bogaty, 2013; Standard & Poor’s 
Ratings Services, 2014a; Serna, 2013a; Tuby, 2014; Zumeta, 2013), may blur the 
distinction between public and private based solely on revenue streams, the established 
role of public higher education institutions clearly distinguishes them from their private 
counterparts.  As a type of public authority, public universities function as creations of 
the state, operating within political jurisdictions, and relying on similar sources of 
revenues, such as user charges and fees (Denison, Fowles, & Moody, 2014; Trautman, 
1995).  That is, public authorities (i.e., public postsecondary institutions) are subordinate 
agencies of the state (Serna, 2012; Trautman, 1995).  Thus, through the legal nature of 
their establishment, they are aligned with the parent state, sharing a similar revenue 
structure and mission.   This role as government entity distinguishes the public and 
private higher education sectors.  
Turning to the specific population for this study, theory also plays a role in 
choosing a suitable population from among all public postsecondary institutions.  As with 
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the comparison to private institutions, public universities should be compared to those 
that are similar, so as to avoid comparing bonds that differ too much in the factors in 
which they are based (Thau, 2011).  This means that it would make little sense to 
compare a state flagship research university to a regional school, as the former would 
have a much broader market position and revenue base such as larger research grants, 
generally larger endowments, increased grant funding, and a focus on research as 
opposed to teaching (Bogaty, 2013).  This is probably not universal across the sector, but 
it is likely that by focusing exclusively on research universities much of the variation in 
institutional structure can be minimized.  Additionally, as of 2011 Moody’s Investor 
Services rates 226 public four-year U.S. colleges and universities (see Table 1).  While 
regional institutions are beginning to utilize more debt financing, research universities 
still comprise the majority of higher education debt market activity (Bogaty, 2013; Kiley, 
2012; Supiano, 2008).  Thus, examining the research questions from the perspective of 
these institutions provides significant information regarding the ways in which credit 
markets react to different revenue structures, diversification, and severe economic 
variability.  
Data 
 The data set in this study spans the 2001-2002 through 2012-2013 academic 
years.  The starting year was chosen because it marks a change in how financial data was 
reported by the National Center for Education Statistics’ Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS).  Beginning with this year better ensures that data on 
selected variables are observed in a consistent manner.  The final year, 2012-2013, 
coincides with the most recent year in which data is available.  In total, 75 public research 
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universities, defined by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 
(2010) as having a high or very high level of research activity, are included in the data 
set.  These institutions are listed in Table A1 of Appendix A.  Originally, there were a 
total of 151 public research universities that fell into the chosen Carnegie classifications.  
However, institutions that lacked published data were excluded.  Also, institutions that 
are rated at the system level, or whose debt is issued at the state level, were excluded in 
order to avoid unit of analysis problems.  But, if a university is rated at the system level 
and there is one campus that generates an average of 85% or more of the system’s total 
revenue, then that one campus was included with its associated system rating.20  The list 
of omitted universities, and the reason for their removal from the data set can be found in 
Table A2 (Appendix A). 
The list of variables and corresponding data sources are provided in Table 2. 
While there are many more variables that can be included, these predictors were chosen 
because of their prominence in the literature, evidence that they are best able to measure 
the major factors in public research university credit ratings, and their ability to answer 
the research questions.   
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Unfortunately, because of the limited research on higher education credit ratings there is no theory to 
drive this decision.  However, if a campus represents 85% of a system’s total revenue it can be inferred that 
it occupies a significant position in the system’s revenue base, and by extension plays a significant role in 
the rating process. 
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Table 2 
 
Variables and Data Sources for Years 2001-2002 through 2012-2013 
 
Variable Source 
Institutional Credit Rating Moody’s Investor’s Service 
Freshman Selectivity IPEDS; Individual University IR Officers 
Research Intensity IPEDS (Graduate FTEs/Total FTEs) 
Undergraduate Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) IPEDS (Self Calculated for Missing Years) 
Tuition and Fees per FTE IPEDS 
State and Appropriations per FTE IPEDS 
Federal Operating Grants and Contracts per FTE IPEDS 
State and Local Operating Grants and Contracts 
per FTE 
IPEDS 
Academic Medical Center Association of Academic Health Centers 
Endowment Value per FTE National Association of College and University 
Business Officers (NACUBO) 
High Regulation Knott & Payne (2004); Education Commission 
of the States (ECS) 
Debt Limit National Association of State Budget Officers 
(NASBO) 
High State Credit Rating Moody’s Investors Service 
Debt Burden per Student IPEDS 
Financial Leverage IPEDS 
Revenue Diversification Calculated with Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
(HHI) 
Recessionary Impact ≥ FY 2009 
 
Note. IPEDS = Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System. 
 
Another factor involved in choosing variables is model parsimony.  In addition 
to its noted desirability in writings spanning philosophy, probability theory, and 
statistics (Grünwald, 2000), parsimony plays an important role in constructing discrete 
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response models.  Small numbers of events per covariate have been shown to bias 
parameter estimates in logistic regression models (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 
2013; Nemes, Jonasson, Genell, & Steineck, 2009; Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper, 
Holford, & Feinstein, 1996; Vittinghoff & McCulloch, 2007).  That is, as the number 
of outcomes for a specific regressor decreases, the size of the parameter bias and the 
probability of overstating its statistical significance increase.21  For example, in the 
case of two outcomes (binary response), parameter estimates for independent variables 
with only 2 “yes” outcomes are more likely to show inflated values and overstated 
statistical significance than variables with 10 “yes” outcomes.  Such an issue is 
significantly more important with multinomial ordered response models, where small 
sample sizes can lead not only to biased estimates but also problems with model 
convergence (Long & Freese, 2006).22  Therefore, model parsimony helps ensure that 
parameter estimates are not biased in addition to achieving model convergence. 
 Parsimony is also achieved through the measurement of specific variables.  For 
example, Serna (2012) codes state governance as simply “high regulation,” rather than 
“minimal, moderate, and high regulation,” since his goal is to determine whether states 
maintained such level (p. 64).  Hence, based on the literature reviewed in chapter two, the 
this study examines how “high regulation” is associated with changes in credit ratings, 
since such a variable has been shown to influence school priorities and revenue 
dependence (Burgess, 2011; Knott & Payne, 2004; Lowry, 2001).   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Parameter bias refers to the difference between the mean, or expected value, of the estimated parameter 
and the true population parameter value: (!! − !).  For a discussion of unbiasdness, see Kennedy (2008). 
 
22 The estimation procedure follows an iterative process that first estimates regression coefficients and then 
continues to repeat the process until it reaches a fixed value.  Nonconvergence occurs if the process is 
unable to maximize the likelihood function; that is, if the estimated values grow infinitely. 
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Institutional Review Board 
Since this study examines factors impacting public university credit ratings, all 
data and analysis is at the institution and state levels (e.g., tuition and fees, institutional 
credit rating, state credit rating, state debt policies).  Hence, no data are directly related to 
an individual and is there no personally identifying information.  All data are drawn from 
publically available data sets (e.g., IPEDS, Moody’s Investors Service) and require no 
permission to access and use the data.  Therefore, Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval is not required. 
Variables and Data Sources 
 Since this study makes use of a large amount of data, multiple sources are utilized 
in order to supply the needed variables.  These include Moody’s Investors Service 
(2015b); the National Center for Education Statistics’ Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (U.S. Department of Education, 2015), specifically the 
Institutional Characteristics component, the Enrollment component, and the Finance 
component; the National Association of College and University Business Officers’ 
(NACUBO) Commonfund Study of Endowments, for fiscal years 2002 through 2013; 
and the National Association of State Budget Officers (2002, 2008).  Data on university 
governance is obtained from ECS data and the framework set forth in Knott & Payne 
(2004) and McGuinness (2001, 2003).  Finally, data on whether a university is affiliated 
with an academic medical center (AMC) is gathered from the Association of Academic 
Health Centers’ (AAHC) 2014 annual report.  All continuous non-ratio independent 
variables are transformed into natural logarithms, which allow for interpretation of 
coefficients as percent changes.  The natural logarithm transformation standardizes the 
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continuous independent variables, so that comparison and analysis can be conducted on 
the same scale (i.e., in percent changes).  This practice is common in higher education 
finance studies (e.g., Baldwin & McCraken, 2013; Dar & Lee, 2014; Delaney & Kearney, 
2015; Doyle, 2010 2012; Hearn, Griswold, & Marine, 1996; Lacy & Tandberg, 2014; 
Morphew & Baker, 2004; Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Serna, 2012; Serna & Harris, 2014; 
Tandberg, 2010; Tandberg & Ness, 2011; Zhang, 2007, 2011).  
 Dependent variable.  The dependent variable in this study is the underlying 
credit rating assigned to public research universities by Moody’s Investors Service.  
Moody’s was chosen because of the relatively large number of public four-year 
institutions rated (see Table 1) and the increased weight allotted to it, over S&P and 
Fitch, by the marketplace (Lamb, 1993).  It is important to note that on some issues, 
alternative ratings such as enhanced and insured, are also provided.23  But since these 
ratings introduce additional factors, which may not be consistent across the entire sector, 
the underlying rating was chosen; in other words, underlying credit ratings solely 
measure the specific risk posed by the institution, rather than a hedge introduced by state 
enhancement or credit insurance programs.   Additionally, because the criteria evaluated 
in the rating process can vary depending on the narrowness of the pledge (Fitzgeralid, 
2005), this study focuses on consolidated pledges (see Figure 1), which tend to primarily 
emphasize the entirety of a university’s operations. 
 Since bonds are rated throughout the year, deciding what to consider as the 
beginning and end of a given observation year was necessary.  Because academic years, 
and by extension their funding, tend to run from the July 1st through June 30th of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Enhanced ratings factor in the added support provided by state credit enhancement programs, while 
insured ratings do the same thing with the added benefit of financial guarantees (Moody’s Investors 
Service, 2015a).  
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following year, a rating issued on June 1st, 2005 is included as part of the 2004-2005 time 
period.  Conversely, a rating issued on August 1st, 2005 is included as part of the 2005-
2006 time period. This relates to the time lag between university factors and assigned 
credit ratings.  Since credit ratings are assumed to temporally follow institutional factors 
(e.g., credit ratings are a response to previous financial conditions), all of the independent 
variables are lagged one year.  So, a rating issued in 2006-2007 is paired with data from 
2005-2006.  This way, for example, a rating issued in March 2007 is not modeled as 
dependent upon the market value of an endowment fund measured at the end of June 
2007.   
 By placing public research university credit ratings on the left side of the 
regression equation, as the dependent variable, the study is best be able to estimate how 
different factors are associated with changes in creditworthiness.  That is, temporally, the 
independent variables on the right hand side occur prior to the assignment of credit 
ratings.  Furthermore, credit ratings take on a natural ordering that reflect increasing 
creditworthiness (e.g., A3<A2<A1<Aa3<…<Aaa).  In order to account for this ordering, 
identifiers are assigned on an increasing scale, in relation to the improved 
creditworthiness represented by their credit rating.  In total, there were nine different 
observed credit ratings.  The frequency distribution of responses is displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Original Response Variable Frequency Distribution 
Institutional Credit Rating Counts Percent Cumulative Percent 
Baa2 1 .11 0.11 
Baa1 9 1.00 1.11 
A3 11 1.22 2.33 
A2 115 12.78 15.11 
A1 272 30.22 45.33 
Aa3 253 28.11 73.44 
Aa2 144 16.00 89.44 
Aa1 55 6.11 95.56 
Aaa 40 4.44 100.00 
Total 900 100.00  
 
Due to the small number of observations in Baa2, Baa1, and Aaa, these ratings were 
collapsed with their adjacent categories.  The six-category frequency distribution is 
shown in Table 4.  Although the majority of observed responses still fall in the A1 and 
Aa3 categories, this re-ordering improves upon the sparseness in the tails of the original 
response distribution, where 1 indicates the lowest credit rating and 6 the highest rating, 
while still retaining much of this variable’s ordinality. 
Table 4 
Six-Category Response Variable Distribution 
Institutional Credit Rating Ordering Counts Percent Cumulative Percent 
≤ A3 1 21 2.33 2.33 
A2 2 115 12.78 15.11 
A1 3 272 30.22 45.33 
Aa3 4 253 28.11 73.44 
Aa2 5 144 16.00 89.44 
≥ Aa1 6 95 10.56 100.00 
Total ------- 900 100.00 -------- 
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Market position factors.  This study includes a number of independent variables 
to capture the impact of market position and demand on institutional credit ratings.  The 
first is freshman selectivity.  This is measured by taking the total number of first-time, 
degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who were accepted and dividing it by 
the total number of first-time, degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who 
applied; the lower the ratio, the more selective the university (Moody, 2008).  Increased 
selectivity (small freshman selectivity ratio) may result from greater demand and reflect 
improved competitive position (Standard & Poor’s, 2007).  A second market position 
related predictor is the degree of research intensity, measured by the ratio of graduate 
full-time equivalents to total full-time equivalents (FTEs).  This measure functions as a 
“proxy for the level of research intensity and desirability of programs for highly sought 
after graduate students” (Rubinoff & Marion, 2007, p. 5).  A third variable is total 
undergraduate FTEs.  Moody’s considers enrollment numbers as an indicator of demand 
(Kedem, 2011).  Changes in an institution’s enrollment can be understood as reflecting 
changes in student demand for a specific institution (Heller, 1999; Koshal & Koshal, 
2000 McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Serna, 2012).  Additionally, past studies (e.g., 
Moody, 2007, 2008; Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Serna 2013a, b, c; Serna & Harris, 2014; 
Tandberg, 2013; Tandberg & Ness, 2011), indicate that the use of undergraduate FTEs as 
a proxy for enrollment demand is appropriate.    
For years in which undergraduate or graduate FTEs are not provided, these data 
are calculated using the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) methodology 
(U.S. Department of Education, n.d.), which is “based upon an institution’s 12-month 
instructional activity … and calendar system” (McKeown-Moak & Mullin, 2014, p. 28).  
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If a school operates on a quarter system, the total number of undergraduate and graduate 
credit hours are divided by 45 and 36, respectively, to arrive at the corresponding FTE 
numbers.  For schools operating on a semester/trimester system, the undergraduate and 
graduate divisors are 30 and 24  (McKeown-Moak & Mullin, 2014).  These formulas are 
derived from the NCES definition of full-time undergraduate/graduate enrollment under a 
quarter system as 45/36 credit hours and under a semester/trimester system as 30/24 
credit hours (U.S. Department of Education, n.d.).  Other selectivity variables discussed 
in chapter two, specifically retention and graduation rates, are not included because of the 
unavailability of data before fall 2003 and a lack of methods for calculating earlier years.  
Revenue variables.  This study includes four revenue specific independent 
variables: tuition and fee revenue per FTE, state appropriations per FTE, federal 
operating grants and contracts per FTE, and state and local operating grants and contracts 
per FTE.  To answer the first research question, interest lies in determining the 
association between each of these variables and public research university credit ratings.   
Drawing on the literature, these four variables are judged to best represent revenue 
categories that determine credit ratings (Bogaty, 2013; Kedem, 2011; Moody, 2008; 
Serna, 2013a, b; Tuby, 2014).  In order to account for differences in university size, each 
of these variables are divided by undergraduate FTEs.  Studies in public finance and 
higher education also use this approach (i.e., controlling for population), in order to 
mitigate concerns around scale effects (e.g., Grizzle, 2012; Moody, 2008; Palumbo & 
Zaporowski, 2012; Yan, Denison, & Butler, 2009; Serna & Harris, 2014; Tandberg, 
2010).  Also, in order to account for inflationary effects, all revenue variables are 
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adjusted to constant 2012-2013 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2015). 
The first three of these variables represent the three largest sources of revenues 
for public postsecondary institutions (McKeown-Moak & Mullin, 2014).  Incidentally, 
they also represent three levels of funding–student, state, and federal.  By including 
tuition and fee revenue as a variable, this study evaluates how dependence on student 
funding influences credit ratings.  With the increased variability and slowed growth in 
tuition revenue in recent years (Bogaty, 2013; Tuby, 2014), estimates from this predictor 
provide insight into how ratings agencies view the uncertainty associated with this 
source.   
As another major revenue source that has suffered reductions in recent years 
(Bogaty, 2013; Tuby, 2014), state appropriations also provide insight into how ratings 
agencies view potential instability in public university funding.  This variable provides a 
measure of a school’s dependence on state funding.  In addition to providing information 
about a school’s dependence on the state, it also informs about how states view their role 
in funding public higher education.  
The third major source of funding is federal operating grants and contracts.  By 
including this factor and scaling it by FTEs, total federal operating grants and contracts 
allows the study to examine the level of financial support received beyond the student 
and state levels.  As a supplement to student and state support, federal operating grants 
and contracts may also indicate a broader revenue base and improved market position.  
This argument is possibly supported by the fact that competition for federal grants has 
increased in recent years (Bogaty, 2013; Tuby, 2014); thus, increases in grant funding 
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serve as a strong signal of an institution’s dependence upon external funding, and 
possibly as an indicator of research standing. 
The final revenue variable that is included is state and local operating grants and 
contracts.  This variable is composed of state and local funds for research projects and 
programs deemed part of an institution’s operations.  It is included as a contrast to federal 
operating grants.  Whereas increased federal grant dollars may represent a broader 
revenue base and improved market position, the state and local grant category focuses on 
a narrower geographic revenue scope.  In part, it is a compliment to state appropriations 
and adds further nuance to the measurement of breadth in an institution’s revenue base. 
Other fiscal variables.  Although not “pure” sources of revenue, academic 
medical centers (AMCs) and the size of a university’s endowment are related to an 
institution’s market position and fiscal sustainability.  AMCs can be a significant source 
of revenue for universities, due to their steady funding from patient care, but at the same 
time these facilities can incur significant expenses as a result of demands for new 
buildings and physical plant maintenance (Moody, 2008).  The size of these operations is 
illustrated with the University of Mississippi.  Recently, its medical center budget was 
reported at $1.7 billion, while its flagship campus budget was $600 million (Basken, 
2015).  With large medical centers comes the ability to generate revenues from 
biomedical research grants.  But recently, slowed growth in patient-care revenues, 
reductions in funding to graduate medical education, cuts to Medicare and Medicaid, and 
uncertainty over the effects of healthcare reform means AMCs face a number of revenue 
generating challenges (Kedem, 2011; Tuby, 2014).  Finally, as discussed in Chapter II, 
AMCs may also function as a proxy for increased operational scope.  In order to measure 
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the presence of an AMC, a binary variable, where one is equal to university affiliation 
with an AMC and zero is equal to no affiliation, is included. 
 University endowment size can signify an institution’s fiscal health, by reflecting 
its ability to accumulate wealth and increase reserves (Serna, 2013a, b; Winston, 1999).  
Related to this, endowment size provides evidence that universities will be able to meet 
their debt obligations in a timely manner, since as an endowment increases so too does 
the value of an institution’s assets (Moody, 2008).  Supporting this argument are the 
recent changes in endowment management regulations, which now allow schools to 
access a portion of their endowment principle (Goldstein, 2012).  As with the revenue 
variables, endowment values are divided by undergraduate FTEs in order to mitigate 
scale effects.  University endowment is also adjusted to constant 2012-2013 dollars, using 
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CIPAUCSL). 
 Oversight and governance.  Since public university finances are influenced by 
the level of regulation imposed by state oversight (Burgess, 2011; Knott & Payne, 2004; 
Lowry, 2001; Moody, 2007, 2008; Serna 2013a, b, c; Serna & Harris, 2014), three 
variables are included to control for these relationships: board centralization, 
constitutional debt limits, and state credit rating.  Board centralization is incorporated as a 
binary variable, where one is equal to high centralization and zero is equal to moderate or 
minimal centralization.  Using the framework set forth by McGuinness (2003) and Knott 
and Payne (2004), and utilized in past research studies (e.g., Moody, 2007; Tandberg, 
2013), the existence of a consolidated governing board constitutes high centralization.  
These governance structures exercise decision-making authority over an institution’s 
salaries, governance, policies, and resource allocation, whereas less centralized boards 
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are often limited to an advisory role.  This variable provides insight into how the impact 
of centralization on university funding (Burgess, 2011; Knott & Payne, 2004; Lowry, 
2001) transfers to credit ratings. 
 As noted in the literature, whether a state has policies limiting the amount of debt 
issued can impact an institution’s borrowing activity and their credit ratings (Moody, 
2007, 2008).  In light of this evidence, the presence of a debt limit is coded with a binary 
variable, where one indicates an umbrella debt limit and zero indicates no debt limit.  
Finally, state credit ratings are also be accounted for in the models.  As discussed in 
Chapter II, a state’s GO rating reflects its fiscal health and ability to support its public 
institutions (Serna, 2013a).  Following the research literature (Moody, 2008), state credit 
ratings are included as a binary variable, where one equals high state credit rating (≥ Aa2) 
and zero equals not high state credit rating (< Aa2).  While Michael Moody (2008) 
incorporates three state credit rating variables in his analysis of university credit ratings 
(A, Aa, and AAA), a single measure is included in this analysis to improve model 
parsimony and capture the influence of strong state creditworthiness.24  
 Debt variables.  Two independent variables are included to account for a 
university’s debt portfolio.  The first, debt burden per student (DBS) is intended to 
measure an institution’s total debt burden (Moody, 2008, Serna, 2013a), scaled by 
undergraduate FTE students.  This variable is likely to provide insight into how credit 
rating agencies view a university’s “prior and current reliance on debt financing in its 
financial planning” (Moody, 2008, p. 295).  Additionally, it may provide insight into the 
scope of a university’s debt portfolio, since larger amounts of debt could be interpreted as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Greater than or equal to Aa2 was chosen as the cut-off for high state credit rating based on the 
distribution of the data.  While Aaa and Aa1 were considered as cut-offs, these specifications resulted in 
separation issues with the data.  Separation is discussed in more depth later in this chapter. 
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greater and more diverse debt market usage and experience with debt management 
policies.  As with the other variables expressed in dollars, debt burden per student (DBS) 
is adjusted to constant 2012-2013 dollars using the CPIAUSCL. 
 While DBS tells us about the amount of debt being held by an institution, it 
provides little insight into an institution’s ability to service said liabilities.  In order to 
capture this factor, an independent variable for financial leverage is included.  This 
variable consists of a ratio equaling the portion of total debt divided by total revenue.  
Since institutions with high levels of research activity tend to exhibit higher levels of debt 
(Kedem, 2011; Rubinoff & Marion, 2007), this variable helps explain the level at which 
institutions are leveraging themselves and their potential risk of default.  
 Revenue diversification.  In order to capture the level of diversification in a 
university’s revenue structure, and answer the second research question, a Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (HHI), such as the one used by Suyderhoud (1994) is employed.  This 
index measures the level of diversification by summing the squared relative shares of 
each revenue source, subtracting the sum from one, and dividing the difference by the 
maximum level of diversification.  Suyderhoud’s (1994) HHI index is shown in equation 
3.1 below: 
 RD =
1− ∑
i=1
4 ri
R
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
0.75    (3.1) 
Where, ri = the revenue from source i, and R = total revenue.  Since there are four 
revenue sources used in this study–tuition and fees, state appropriations, federal operating 
grants and contracts, and stat and local operating grants and contracts–maximum 
diversification (0.75) is calculated by dividing 1 by 4 and subtracting the quotent from 1. 
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 This version of the HHI is common in recent empirical literature on both revenue 
diversification and credit ratings (Carroll, 2005; Carroll & Stater, 2009; Grizzle, 2012; 
Yan, 2011).  The index score approaches one as the shares of revenue derived from each 
source become more even; conversely, the score approaches zero as a larger portion of 
the total revenue comes from one or few sources.  All revenue sources are weighted 
equally and the index score is not dependent on instituion size (Chang & Tuckman, 
1994).  Thus, the HHI gives a fairly objective interpretation of revenue distribution, 
allowing for an analysis of how the level of revenue diversification is associated with 
university credit ratings. 
 Recessionary impact.  In order to measure the impact of severe economic 
downturns, The Great Recession of 2008-2009 is used as a treatment variable.  By 
including a binary variable equal to one for years greater than or equal to 2009, the 
recession is treated as an exogenous macroeconomic shock, impacting ratings across the 
entire sector.  This is supported by Moody’s negative outlooks for the entire higher 
education sector, beginning in 2009 (Bogaty, 2013; Goodman & Nelson, 2009; Tuby, 
2014; Tuby & Nelson, 2012).  Because 2009 marks the first year of these sector-wide 
negative outlooks, this year serves as an ideal cut-point for this variable.  Additionally, 
estimates for the covariates in the models with recession are compared to the models 
without this predictor.  While this will not demonstrate a direct, or causal, effect for 
recession, comparison allows for observations around possible spillover effects.  
Methodology 
 As with population, data, and variable selection, theory drives the decisions 
regarding the most appropriate methodology to answer this study’s research questions.  
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By referring back to recent studies on municipal credit ratings (Grizzle, 2012; Johnson & 
Kriz, 2005; Moody, 2008; Palumbo & Zaporowski, 2012; Yan, 2011) it is clear that 
ordered response models are the dominant statistical approach.  Recent studies were 
consulted because of advances in statistical methods.  Modern estimators capable of 
capturing credit ratings’ nonlinear ordinal nature were not introduced until McElvey and 
Zavoina (1975) proposed the ordered probit and McCullagh (1980) derived the 
proportional odds model.25  Since credit ratings are reported as discrete categories (e.g., 
A3, A2, A1, Aa3 … AAA), they are not continuous nor are they unbounded.  
Additionally, with discrete responses, the relationship between the dependent outcome 
and the covariates is likely to be nonlinear (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).  
Therefore, linear regression may not be the most appropriate method for modeling credit 
ratings.  Conversely, the ordered response approach accounts for this nonlinearity in the 
data.26 
Alternative Models 
Next, the decision regarding which ordered response model to choose was 
undertaken.  One of the difficulties in working with this type of regression is the many 
options regarding estimators.  Decisions were motivated in part by the past literature and 
also by the study’s research questions.  All of the municipal credit rating studies 
mentioned in the beginning of this section default to the ordered probit and assume 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Older studies of bond ratings, particularly in the corporate sector, tended to rely primarily on techniques 
such as multiple linear regression (e.g., Horrigan, 1966; Pogue & Soldofsky, 1969; West, 1970). The linear 
probability model focuses on a small interval of independent variable values.  Those that fall outside this 
interval can return negative probabilities, which are meaningless.   
 
26 Ordinal response models also account for ordinality in data; however, it could be argued that a linear 
regression model that uses an integer scale for the dependent variable may be able to account ordinality. 
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parallel lines (i.e., equivalent slopes throughout all categories).27  Use of the probit link 
function is predicated on the assumption that the residuals are normally distributed 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2010).  However, one of the limitations with the 
probit link is that the parameter estimates are not directly interpretable, due to the normal 
cumulative distribution function’s (cdf) complexity.  As a result, the coefficients are not 
directly interpretable and marginal effects (i.e., partial derivatives of the probability of 
falling into a specific category) must be calculated (Wooldridge, 2010). 
 Alternatively, due the simpler logistic cdf, the ordered logit, which to the best of 
my knowledge has not been used in public finance studies, provides coefficients that can 
be directly interpreted as either odds ratios or probabilities.  Whereas the ordered probit 
assumes that the residuals are normally distributed, the ordered logit assumes that they 
are logistically distributed.28  The probability density functions (pdf) for both of these 
distributions are shown in Figure 3.  These two distributions are fairly similar, where both 
are symmetric around the mean, and the logistic pdf has slightly thicker tails (Agresti, 
2013).  Additionally, as sample sizes increase, the logistic distribution “converges to a 
normal distribution” (Nemes, Jonasson, Genell, & Steineck, 2009, Background section 
para. 4).  What this means is that both provide similar results, with ordered logit 
providing slightly larger coefficients and standard errors (Agresti, 2013).  Since the 
ordered probit is the default choice in public finance, but the ordered logit lends itself to 
easier interpretation, models with both link functions are estimated. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Parallel lines assumes that each independent variable’s coefficient is the same for each response 
category.  That is, a specific variable’s impact on the probability of moving to a higher/lower category is 
the same, regardless of which rating category a university currently occupies. 
 
28 The standard normal distribution has a mean (µ) of zero, a variance (σ2) of one, and a standard deviation 
(σ) of one.  For the standard logistic distribution, µ equals 0, σ2 equals π2/3, and σ equals 1.81. 
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                 Figure 3. Normal and Logistic Probability Density Functions 
  The ordered probit models found in the public finance literature can be 
understood as cumulative models.  That is, they estimates of the probability of falling into 
either a lower or higher category.  But with the logit link there are also other options, 
such as the continuation ratio logit, adjacent category logit, baseline category logit, and 
stereotype logit.29  However, since all three of this study’s research questions are 
concerned with the probability of an institution either increasing or decreasing its 
creditworthiness, and not with comparing specific categories or focusing on movement 
between specific adjacent ratings, cumulative models are deemed best to answer the 
research questions.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 For a discussion of these models, see Agresti, 2013; Ananth & Kleinbaum, 1997; Anderson, 1984; 
Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013; and Lall Campbell, Walters, & Morgan, 2002). 
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Proportional Odds, Random Effects 
and Data Separation 
 
 Two modeling issues that were considered were whether to assume proportional 
odds and how to treat the longitudinal nature of the data set.  With regard to the first, the 
assumption is that regressor slopes remain the same in each rating category; that is, the 
probability, or odds of moving into a higher or lower rating is only affected by a 
category’s intercept, or threshold parameter.  This is referred to as the proportional odds, 
parallel lines, or parallel slopes assumption (e.g., Brant, 1990; Hosmer, Lemeshow, & 
Sturdivant, 2013; Long & Freese, 2006; Rabe-Hesketh & Skorondal, 2012; Williams, 
2006).  For example, suppose the coefficient on endowment is 2.5.  This would mean that 
for a one-unit increase in endowment a university is two and a half times more likely to 
be in a higher credit rating, regardless of whether it is currently rated A3 or Aa2.  While 
this is a fairly strong assumption, relaxing the covariate slopes introduces a number of 
potential complications.  For one, relaxing the proportionality constraint on all of the 
regressors often results in estimating more parameters than necessary (Williams, 2006).  
Additionally, it has been argued that a completely unconstrained model loses ordinality, 
as categories can be rearranged in any manner (Clogg & Shihadeh, 2004).  While it is 
possible to relax proportionality on select covariates, a partial proportional odds model 
(Peterson & Harrell, 1990), such an approach can lead to negative fitted values 
(McCullaph & Nelder, 1989).  Because the slopes are allowed to vary between 
categories, the logits (i.e., logistic cdfs) can cross each other and return negative 
probabilities.    
With regard to the longitudinal nature of the data, panel data methods were 
considered.  Because there are repeated observations on universities over multiple time-
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periods, there is clustering within universities and there is likely to be serial correlation 
and dependence between measures.  There are two sources of residual variance–that 
which is between institutions and that which is within institutions (Kennedy, 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2010).  In the higher education finance literature, the common approach in 
such situations is to use a fixed effects estimator (e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 2006, 
2008a; Dar & Lee, 2014; Delaney & Doyle, 2014; Doyle, 2012; Hillman, Tandberg, & 
Gross, 2014; Jaquette & Curs, 2015; Leslie, Slaughter, Taylor, & Zhang, 2012; 
McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Tandberg, 2013; 
Toutkoushian & Hillman, 2012).   The fixed effects procedure essentially uses each unit 
as its own control (Allison, 2009).  By including dummy variables or transforming the 
data with a differencing procedure, the estimator “wipes out all explanatory variables that 
do not vary within an individual” (Kennedy, 2008, p. 284).  All that remains is the within 
unit variance, which can be controlled for with the inclusion of additional time-varying 
covariates.  ! 
Attempting to apply a fixed effects approach to ordered response models is 
impeded by two major obstacles.  First, unlike linear regression, a method for 
differencing out the fixed effects has not yet been developed for these types of estimators 
(Greene & Hensher, 2009, p. 207).  Second, if dummy variables are included for each 
unit (e.g., university) this results in what is known in the statistics and econometrics 
literature as the incidental parameters problem.  What happens is that with a finite 
number of time periods, the number of fixed effects dummy parameters grows with the 
sample size.  This violates the maximum likelihood properties and results in biased 
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estimates (Allison, 2009; Greene & Hensher, 2009; Lancaster, 2000; Neyman & Scott, 
1948; Wooldridge, 2010).30  
This leaves two remaining options.  The data can be pooled, assuming that there is 
only one level of residual variance, and robust standard errors employed to account for 
the serial correlation; or, a random effects estimator can be used (Wooldridge, 2010).  
The traditional random effects model makes a strict Orthogonality assumption, where the 
residuals are assumed to be statistically independent of the covariates: Cov(xij,uij)=0 and 
Cov(xij,εij)=0 (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2010).  A solution to this problem, 
originally proposed by Mundlak (1978), is the correlated random effects model, which 
involves including group means for each time-varying covariate in order to control for 
correlation. 
Unfortunately, the data set in this study does not allow for either relaxing the 
proportional odds assumption or estimation via correlated random effects.  This is likely 
due to separation in the data.  This issue, which is particularly problematic in categorical 
outcomes, occurs when there is a single predictor or set of values that are allocated to one 
outcome (Albert & Anderson, 1984).  For example, suppose that for a specific variable, 
values 1-100 always result in response 1, while 101 and up always result in response 2.  
This variable is said to perfectly predict the outcome, since observations above or below 
100 always result in a specific response.  As a result, the maximum likelihood estimator 
is unable to maximize the likelihood function, and the parameter coefficients will 
continue to increase, while failing to converge on a fixed value (Allison, 2008).  This can 
also occur when an independent variable almost perfectly predicts an outcome (i.e., !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 It is documented that with binary data and as few as two periods, the parameter coefficients are biased by 
as much as two times: ! = 2!  (Greene & Hensher, 2009; Lancaster, 2000).   
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quasi-complete separation); that is, there is some overlap in the data, but there are still 
values that only result in one response.  While statistical packages usually detect 
separation in data and report the problem, improvements in estimation algorithms 
sometimes result in models appearing to converge, though with incorrect parameter 
estimates (i.e., false convergence).  Although these false estimates can usually be 
detected by large parameter coefficients coupled with “enormous” standard errors 
(Agresti, 2010, p. 65), plotting the responses provides a much clearer of picture of 
whether there is separation and where it may be occurring. 
Contingency tables showing counts for each of the binary independent variables 
are located in Appendix B.  Since there are no response categories with zero counts for 
any of these covariates, it can be assumed that separation is not an issue with these 
variables.  Variable fit can be further assessed by examining the yes responses for 
pairwise combinations of these regressors.  This is shown in the contingency tables 
located in Appendix C.  Except for category A3 and below, where there are no counts for 
both Academic Medical Center and High State Rating reporting yes, each pairwise 
combination of categorical covariates have at least one count.  This further demonstrates 
the desired variability in the data, as well as the relationship between these variables. 
Assessing separation in continuous variables is not as straight forward as with 
categorical variables, whose counts can be neatly assigned to cells in contingency tables.  
However, using the method described by Agresti (2010), the data can be plotted, 
collapsed, and examined between responses.  In other words, category one is compared to 
categories two through six, categories one and two are then compared to three through 
six, categories one through three are compared to four through six, etc.  The scatterplots 
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in Appendix D indicate the occurrence of separation in several of the independent 
variables.31  One such example is endowment fund value per full-time equivalent (FTE), 
where the values increase with the response category.  In fact, in the raw data, 
endowment values greater than $1 billion were largely associated with Aa1 and Aaa rated 
institutions (response category six).   Two other examples include tuition and fees per 
FTE and federal operating grants and contracts per FTE.  In the former the separation 
appears to occur most clearly in response category six.  With the latter, this can be seen 
with categories four through six versus one through three.   
 While the log transformations, which are also plotted in Appendix D, seem to 
help with some of these problems, there are still outliers in these data.  One important 
observation that can be made from these “messy” data is that revenue is a strong 
predictor of credit ratings.   That is, increases in certain revenue (e.g., endowment) 
overwhelmingly predict stronger credit ratings agencies.  This aligns with the literature 
that was discussed in Chapter II (e.g., Bogaty, 2013; Kedem, 2011; Tuby 2014). 
 Estimating the models with correlated random effects resulted in the warning 
messages, “model is nearly unidentifiable,” and “Variance-covariance matrix of he 
parameters is not defined.”  As a result, some of the coefficients were extremely large 
(e.g., leverage group mean = 216.54), and standard errors, z values, and p-values could 
not be calculated.  This is likely due to the data separation just discussed.  Convergence 
issues also arose while trying to relax the proportional odds assumption.  Since estimation 
methods designed to address data separation in logistic regression, such as exact methods 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 All scatterplots were created with the R package ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham, 2009). 
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(see Cox & Snell, 1989) and penalized maximum likelihood (see Firth, 1993),32 have not 
been adequately extended to ordered response models, the data were estimated with the 
pooling approach involving standard errors clustered for institution (75 clusters).  That is 
to say, this study employs both ordered probit and ordered logit models with the 
proportional odds assumption as its estimation technique.  
Estimation 
 Ordered response models, particularly cumulative models, are most commonly 
derived as either generalized linear models (GLM) (e.g., Agresti, 1996, 2013; 
McCullagh, 1980; McCullagh & Nelder, 1989) or as latent variable models (e.g., 
Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Greene, Hensher, 2009; Wooldridge, 2010).  The former 
approach has traditionally been favored in the fields of statistics and biostatistics, while 
the latter is largely used in econometrics and psychometrics (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 
2012).  What is important to remember is that these two approaches are largely 
conceptual, and that they lead to equivalent models (Rabe-Hesketh & Skorondal, 2012).  
Interestingly, statisticians and biostatisticians working under the GLM framework have 
noted the usefulness of imagining these models as motivated by an underlying continuous 
random variable (e.g., Anderson, 1984; Anderson and Philips, 1981; Hosmer, Lemeshow, 
& Sturdivant, 2013; McCullagh, 1980).  
 The finance literature largely takes the latent variable approach, viewing 
creditworthiness as an underlying continuous random variable measuring an institution’s 
credit strength (e.g., Afonso, Gomes, & Rother, 2009, 2011; Grizzle, 2012; Moody, 2008; 
Palumbo & Zaporowski, 2012; Yan, 2011).  Although methodologies published by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Bias correction has been extended to the proportional odds model in a select number of theoretical 
articles (e.g., Kosmidis, 2014; Lipsitz et al., 2013), but software implementing these methods is not yet 
available. 
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ratings agencies are extremely vague as to whether they view credit ratings as predicated 
on a latent variable, since this study is deeply ingrained in the field of public finance it 
will follow this disciplinary approach.   
To begin with, it can be assumed that creditworthiness is a continuous, albeit 
unobservable, random variable, which takes the form found in equation 3.2. 
 Yit* = βXit + ε it    (3.2) 
Where Y* equals creditworthiness, X is a vector of time-variant and time-invariant 
regressors associated with institution and state characteristics, β is a corresponding vector 
of variable effects, and ε is the idiosyncratic random error term associated with each 
institution i at each time period t.  As discussed earlier, in the ordered probit and ordered 
logit models, the individual level error terms are either normally or logistically 
distributed: 
Probit: εit ~ N (0,1)                                                     (3.3) 
  Logit: εit ~ Logistic (0, π2/3) 
Because the latent variable Yit* is unobservable, creditworthiness must be 
partitioned into discrete categories separated by J-1 thresholds, or cut points (J = the 
number of credit rating categories/the highest category).  The threshold parameters (α) 
are ordered integers, where α1 < α2 < α3 < … < aJ-1.   They can be understood as marking 
points in the distribution of Yit* where a university’s creditworthiness moves to a 
higher/lower credit rating.  In the context of the model, they can also be understood as the 
intercepts for each category.  This censoring of Yit* is illustrated below: 
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                                    Y!" =
!1!(≤ A1)!if!!!"∗ ≤ !!2! A2 if!!! < !!"∗ ≤ !!∙∙∙!6!(≥ Aa1)!if!!!"∗ > !!
                                                (3.4)                                             
If a university’s creditworthiness crosses cut point α1, the university is upgraded to the 
next highest credit rating.  This is further illustrated with a three-category example in the 
density plot in Figure 4. 
 
                   Figure 4. Three Category Density Plot with Cut Points  
In the above figure, as creditworthiness surpasses cut point 1 (j = 1) credit rating is 
upgraded from A to Aa. 
Whereas in linear regression the mean of the outcome is modeled, ordered 
response models estimate the probability of creditworthiness falling into one of the 
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specified intervals, defined by the J-1 cut points.  This produces the ordinal logistic and 
probit regression equations. 
 Pr(Yit ≤ j | Xit ) = Pr(Yit* ≤α j | Xit ) = F(α j − βXit )    (3.5) 
Where F equals the cdf of the standard normal distribution (Φ) with the ordered probit 
and the cdf of the standard logistic distribution (Λ) with the ordered logit.33  Cumulative 
models predict the probability, or odds, of falling into a lower category based on a one-
unit change in a regressor, ceteris paribus.  Using F(α j − βX) , each response probability 
is computed as follows: 
 
Pr(Yit = 1| Xit ) = Pr(Yit* ≤α1 | Xit ) = F(α1 − βXit )
Pr(Yit = j | Xit ) = Pr(α j−1 <Yit* ≤α j | Xit ) = F(α j − βXit )− F(α j−1 − βXit )
Pr(Yit = 6 | Xit ) = Pr(Yit* >α 5 | Xit ) = 1− F(α 5 − βXit )
   (3.6) 
In the above equation, one equals the lowest credit rating category (≤ A3), five equals the 
highest credit rating category (≥ Aa1), and j equals any of the middle rating categories. 
Parameters are estimated by maximizing the log likelihood equation shown 
below: 
 
LL(α ,β,X) = 1[Yit = 1]log[F(α1 − βX)]+1[Yit = 2]log[F(α 2 − βX)− F(α1 − βX)]
+...+1[Yit = 6]log[1− F(α 5 − βX)]
  (3.7)  
As discussed earlier, F equals Φ in the ordered probit and Λ in the ordered logit.  Since 
the ordered probit does not provide estimates that are directly interpretable, marginal 
effects, for both functions, for the continuous covariates are calculated with the following 
equations: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Due to the standard logistic distribution having a variance of π2/3, as opposed to the standard normal’s 
variance of one, the ordered logit coefficients and threshold parameters are scaled by this value.  
!!
84 
                                            
∂Pr(y = 1)
∂x = − ′F (α1 − βX)
∂Pr(y = j)
∂x = ′F (α j−1 − βX)− ′F (α j − βX)
∂Pr(y = 6)
∂x = ′F (α 5 − βX)
                   (3.8) 
 Where F' is the derivative of F, and 1 < j < 6.  The parameter coefficients from these 
equations can be interpreted as measuring the change in response probability for a one- 
unit increase in a particular covariate, ceteris paribus.34  For discrete variables, marginal 
effects are calculated using the finite difference method, which is equal to the difference 
in response probability for changing a specified binary predictor from zero to one 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Wooldridge, 2009).  Additionally, in this study average 
marginal effects (AME), as opposed to marginal effects at the mean (MEM), are 
calculated.  The former averages the marginal effects for each covariate value in the data, 
and the latter calculates the marginal effects at the average x value.  AMEs are 
recommended in policy work, since they account for all of the data (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2010).  Also, AMEs are recommended when there are discrete variables, since the mean 
values of such covariates (i.e., they fall somewhere between zero and one) are unrealistic 
(Wooldridge, 2009). 
Models and Hypotheses  
To answer all three research questions, this study employs six different models.  
In addition, based on the literature reviewed in Chapter II, this study also tests 14 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Since derivatives calculate a very small, or infinitesimal, change, marginal effects for a “one unit-
increase” for continuous predictors is more ambiguous than with binary covariates.  Regardless, they can be 
interpreted as the change in probability of receiving a different credit rating for a small change in a specific 
x-value.    !
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hypotheses.  These hypotheses are listed below, under their corresponding research 
question number and model(s).35 
Quesion1 (Revenue Structure): 
Model: 
Pr(Yit ≤ j | Xit ) = F[α j − (β1xsel + β2xres + β3xlnufte + β4xln tfpfte + β5xln sappfte
+β6xln fgpfte + β7xln statefte + β8xamc + β9xlnendowpfte + β10xhighreg
+β11xdl + β12xhighstate + β13xlndbs + β14xlev )]
    (3.9) 
H1: All variables representing market position and demand should be 
positively associated with improved creditworthiness. 
 
H2: Due to increased volatility and constraint, tuition and fee revenues should 
be negatively associated with improved creditworthiness. 
 
H3: Due to instability and declines in state funding for higher education, state 
appropriations should be negatively associated with improved 
creditworthiness. 
 
H4: Federal operating grants and contracts should be positively associated with 
improved creditworthiness, since these funds signify improved market 
position and provide a greater financial base. 
 
H5:  Increases in an institution’s state and local operating grants and contracts 
should be negatively associated with increased creditworthiness, since it 
may represent narrower geographic scope. 
 
H6: Increases in an instituion’s endowment fund should be positively 
associated with improved creditworthiness, since it improves fiscal base 
and is correlated with market position. 
 
H7: Affiliation with an AMC should be positively associated with improved 
creditworthiness, since university hospitals bring in revenue from service 
charges and research grants. 
 
H8: Centralized governing boards should be associated with decreased 
creditworthiness and decentralized boards with improved 
creditworthiness, since the former tends to align universities with state 
interests and the latter provides more operational freedom. 
 
H9: Debt limits should be associated with decreased creditworthiness, since 
these policies restrict a university’s ability to access debt. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Each of the listed models is estimated as an ordered probit and an ordered logit (two different models).  
Explanation of each symbol in the equations can be found in the “List of Symbols.” 
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H10: Improved state credit ratings should be associated with improved 
university creditworthiness, since state ratings reflect fiscal health and the 
ability to aid public institutions.  
 
H11: Total outstanding debt should be positively associated with improved 
creditworthiness, since it reflects effective implementation of oversight 
practices and short- and long-term planning. 
 
H12: Financial leverage, as measured by the ratio of total debt to total revenue 
should be negatively associated with improved creditworthiness, since a 
larger number represents decreased debt servicing capacity. 
 
Question 2: (Revenue Diversification): 
 
Model: 
Pr(Yit ≤ j | Xit ) = F[α j − (β1xhhi + β2xsel + β3xres + β4xlnufte + β5xamc
+β6xlnendowpfte + β7xhighreg + β8xdl + β9xhighstate + β10xlndbs + β11xlev )]
           (3.10) 
 
H13: Increased revenue diversification should be positively associated with 
improved creditworthiness, since it provides greater fiscal stability. 
 
The above model substitutes revenue diversification, measured with HHI, for the four 
revenue components (log tuition and fees per FTE, log state appropriations per FTE, log 
federal operating grants and contracts per FTE, and log state and local grants and 
contracts per FTE) that make up its composition.  Since revenue diversification is a 
measure composed of each of these four revenue variables (see equation 3.1), it is likely 
to be highly collinear with each one; thus, they were not included together.  Additionally, 
using the diversification index as compared to revenue structure means that it is possible 
to determine if increased flexibility, rather than simply levels of revenue components, is 
associated with a higher rating.  
Question 3: (Severe Economic Downturns): 
 
Model:   
Pr(Yit ≤ j | Xit ) = F[α j − (β1xrecession + β2xsel + β3xres + β4xlnufte + β5xln tfpfte
+β6xln sappfte + β7xln fgpfte + β8xln statefte + β9xamc + β10xlnendowpfte + β11xhighreg
+β12xdl + β13xhighstate + β14xlndbs + β15xlev )]
 (3.11)           
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H14: Severe Economic Downturns, as measured by The Great Recession, 
should negatively impact credit ratings. 
 
Although recession is not being modeled as directly impacting the independent variables, 
there are likely to be spillover effects from its inclusion.  Therefore, it is modeled with 
the individual revenue streams in order to isolate its effects on ratings while also 
including other control variables cited previously.! !!
Chapter Conclusion 
 This chapter discussed the study’s data collection and methodology procedures.  It 
outlined the worldview in which the study is situated, the proposed population and 
sample characteristics, the variables that are measured, the planned statistical procedures, 
the data-reporting format, and the hypotheses and models associated with each research 
question.  In doing so, it has aimed at providing a clear rationale for conducting this 
analysis.  As outlined throughout this study, empirical research on public research 
university credit ratings is limited.  Also, ordered response models have only been 
moderately used in this context.  As a result, information on the impact of various factors 
on university credit ratings is still largely unknown.  The analysis that follows answers 
these questions and adds to the understanding of this area of higher education finance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
 
This chapter presents the results of the econometric models specified in Chapter 
III.  It begins with an overview of the data’s features, including measures of central 
tendency and dispersion.  Following these descriptive statistics, the estimation results 
from the ordered probit and ordered logit models are provided for each research question. 
Findings and discussion are grouped by research question and appropriate hypotheses.  
This allows for a more nuanced comparison and discussion. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The data’s main features are displayed in Table 5.  For all of the variables, the raw 
mean, standard deviation, minimum value, and maximum value are provided.  For 
Institutional Credit Ratings both the within and between standard deviations are shown as 
well.  Table 5 shows quite a bit of variability in the independent variables.  This is 
especially true with the financial covariates, which show relatively large standard 
deviations and ranges.  For example, endowment values in the data set range from $44.80 
per FTE to $334,131 per FTE.  Thus, it can be inferred that although the universities 
chosen for the data set share similar Carnegie Classifications, there is still quite a bit of 
heterogeneity in their fiscal structures.  This is further evidenced by the within and 
between standard deviations for the dependent variable institutional credit ratings.  Most 
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of the variation in this response occurs between institutions (1.13), rather than within 
institutions (.534). 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics (n = 900) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
(between/within) 
Min Max 
 
Institutional Credit Rating 
 
3.74 
 
1.24 
(1.13/.534) 
 
1 
 
6 
 
Freshman Selectivity 
 
.714 
 
.146 
 
.283 
 
.992 
 
Research Intensity 
 
.186 
 
.064 
 
.065 
 
.414 
 
Undergraduate Full-Time Equivalents 
 
18276 
 
8410.49 
 
2783 
 
55016 
 
Tuition and Fees per FTE 
 
10714.19 
 
4639.56 
 
2932 
 
33152 
 
State Appropriations per FTE 
 
12158.88 
 
5606.51 
 
1530.41 
 
40714.73 
 
Federal Operating Grants and  
Contracts per FTE 
 
8257.51 
 
7854.46 
 
302.85 
 
44937.69 
 
State and Local Operating Grants and 
Contracts per FTE 
 
3453.81 
 
3016.73 
 
105.23 
 
21754.31 
 
Endowment Value per FTE 
 
32117.26 
 
45289.55 
 
44.28 
 
334131.4 
 
Academic Medical Center (AMC) 
 
.38 
 
.486 
 
0 
 
1 
 
High Regulation 
 
.786 
 
.411 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Debt Limit 
 
.859 
 
.348 
 
0 
 
1 
 
High State Credit Rating 
 
.786 
 
.411 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Debt Burden per Student (DBS) 
 
20539.78 
 
16135.7 
 
746.91 
 
92698.06 
 
Leverage 
 
.376 
 
.215 
 
.015 
 
1.52 
 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) 
 
.878 
 
.074 
 
.472 
 
.993 
 
Recession 
 
.417 
 
.493 
 
0 
 
1 
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 In addition to the above descriptive statistics, a correlation matrix, showing the 
dependence for each of the independent variables, is located in Appendix G.36  For each 
pairwise combination, the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is provided.  
Several variables share relatively strong positive correlations.  Notable examples include 
those between tuition and fees per FTE and both endowment per FTE and DBS (.530 and 
.548, respectively), federal operating grants and contracts and state/local operating grants 
and contracts (.681), and DBS and leverage (.638).  These values suggest relatively 
strong positive relationships between tuition and fees and both endowment value and 
total debt burden, grant funding at the federal and state level, and debt load and debt 
servicing capability.  These relationships will be examined in more depth later in the 
study’s analysis; however it is worth mentioning at this point that these positive 
relationships suggest a degree of covariance between the features of university credit 
ratings captured by the variables in the models.  Additionally, there are strong positive 
correlations between HHI and both grant categories (.689 and .715).  This relationship is 
likely due to HHI being a more aggregate measure of these two revenue sources.   
Results 
 
 As outlined in Chapter III, the general model for the study is as follows: 
 Pr(Yit ≤ j | Xit ) = Pr(Yit* ≤α j | Xit ) = F(α j − βXit )   
Where, F = Φ in the ordered probit and Λ in the ordered logit; αj are the cut-points in the 
distribution, or intercepts in the equations, X is a vector of time-variant and time-invariant 
regressors associated with institution and state characteristics, and β is a corresponding 
vector of estimated variable effects.  The models estimate how changes in individual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were calculated with R version 3.2.0. 
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covariates, ceteris paribus, are associated with the probability of falling into a lower or 
higher credit rating category (j).  Although the pooled models converged and did not 
report overly large standard errors and parameter estimates, the separation shown in the 
continuous variable scatterplots (Appendix D) suggests that the estimation results in this 
chapter should be interpreted with some caution. ! Model formulation was based on theoretical and practical reasons.  The former 
has already been explicated in detail throughout Chapters II and III.  As for the practical 
reasons, convergence issues hindered estimation of subject-specific models (i.e., 
correlated random effects) as well as relaxing the proportional odds assumption.  With 
subject-specific models, each time-varying covariate was originally mean-differenced 
(the within effect) and also group means for each of these variables were included (the 
between effect), to account for correlation with the error terms.  The variables employed 
in the pooled models are not mean-differenced, nor are group-level means (i.e., Mundlak 
devices) included.  In addition to changes in estimation, this also changes coefficient 
interpretation.  Whereas interpretation of parameter estimates in subject-specific models 
correspond to changes within a single unit, or university, estimates in this study’s pooled 
models refer to differences between two populations of institutions.  That is, the estimates 
discussed in the remainder of this study refer to the difference between two populations 
of public research universities. 
 Revenue Structure ! The first research question is focused primarily on the role played by revenue 
structure in determining public research university credit ratings.  This question asks, 
How are the factors involved in public research university revenue structure associated 
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with institutional credit ratings?  Estimation results for the ordered probit and ordered 
logit models pertaining to this question are shown in Table 6. 37 Odds ratios, and 
exponentiated 95% confidence intervals, which measure the estimated precision of the 
odds ratio, for the ordered logit are also provided.  Marginal effects, estimated for each 
observation and averaged across the entire sample, for both estimators, are displayed in 
Appendix E.  While there is a relationship between odds ratios and probabilities, the 
marginal effects are not a conversion of the odds ratios.  Whereas odds ratios are related 
to a change in the odds of receiving a different credit rating, marginal effects report the 
increase or decrease in probability of receiving a different credit rating, for a change in a 
specific regressor.  Table 7 compares the hypothesized to actual relationships between the 
covariates and the dependent variable.  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 For all of the estimation results in this chapter, the threshold parameters are reported in Appendix F. 
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Table 6 
Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit Results for Revenue Structure 
Variable Ordered Probit 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Ordered Logit 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Odds Ratios 
(Exp. 95% C.I.) 
 
Freshman Selectivity 
 
-1.42*** 
(.545) 
 
-2.65*** 
(1.03) 
 
.071*** 
(.009 | .535) 
 
Research Intensity 
 
-2.07 
(1.71) 
 
-3.27 
(3.38) 
 
.038 
(.00005| 28.58) 
 
Undergraduate Full-Time Equivalents 
(ln) 
 
1.67*** 
(.225) 
 
3.00*** 
(.428) 
 
20.04*** 
(8.66 | 46.35) 
 
Tuition and Fees per FTE (ln) 
 
.917*** 
(.326) 
 
1.46** 
(.617) 
 
4.30** 
(1.28 | 14.39) 
 
State Appropriations per FTE (ln) 
 
.228 
(.244) 
 
.346 
(.467) 
 
1.41 
(.566 | 3.53) 
 
Federal Operating Grants and 
Contracts per FTE (ln) 
 
.648*** 
(.163) 
 
1.14*** 
(.300) 
 
3.12*** 
(1.73 | 5.62) 
 
State and Local Operating Grants and 
Contracts per FTE (ln) 
 
-.239** 
(.106) 
 
-.436** 
(.196) 
 
.647** 
(.440 | .949) 
 
Endowment Value per FTE (ln) 
 
.424** 
(.211) 
 
.907* 
(.499) 
 
2.48* 
(.932 | 6.58) 
 
Academic Medical Center (AMC) 
 
-.392 
(.249) 
 
-.770* 
(.471) 
 
.463* 
(.184 | 1.16) 
 
High Regulation 
 
.088 
(.265) 
 
.168 
(.490) 
 
1.18 
(.452 | 3.09) 
 
Debt Limit 
 
.188 
(.288) 
 
.382 
(.539) 
 
1.47 
(.510 | 4.21) 
 
High State Credit Rating 
 
.883*** 
(.198) 
 
1.50*** 
(.381) 
 
4.50*** 
(2.13 | 9.50) 
 
Debt Burden per Student (ln) 
 
.821*** 
(.244) 
 
1.41*** 
(.464) 
 
4.09*** 
(1.65 | 10.16) 
 
Leverage 
 
-2.44*** 
(.804) 
 
-3.98*** 
(1.58) 
 
.019*** 
(.001 | .412) 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; 
*denotes statistical significance at the .10 level 
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Table 7 
 
Hypothesized Versus Actual Relationships for Revenue Structure 
 
Variable Hypothesized Relationship Actual Relationship 
 
Freshman Selectivity 
 
− 
 
− 
 
Research Intensity 
 
+ 
 
No statistical significance 
 
Undergraduate Full-Time 
Equivalents (ln) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Tuition and Fees per FTE (ln) 
 
− 
 
+ 
 
State Appropriations per FTE (ln) 
 
− 
 
No statistical significance 
 
Federal Operating Grants and 
Contracts per FTE (ln) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
State and Local Operating Grants and 
Contracts per FTE (ln) 
 
− 
 
− 
 
Endowment Value per FTE (ln) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Academic Medical Center (AMC) 
 
+ 
 
− 
 
High Regulation 
 
− 
 
No statistical significance 
 
Debt Limit 
 
− 
 
No statistical significance 
 
High State Credit Rating 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Debt Burden per Student (ln) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Leverage 
 
− 
 
− 
 
Hypothesis one.  All variables representing market position and demand were 
hypothesized to be positively associated with improved creditworthiness.  The findings 
show that while this is true for some of these factors, others are negatively associated.  
Freshman selectivity reports coefficients of -1.42 and -2.65 for the ordered probit and 
ordered logit (respectively), both at the .01 significance level.38  For a one-unit increase 
in the selectivity index, a population of institutions is 14.1 (1/.071) times as likely as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Positive coefficients indicate an increase or positive relationship between estimate value and higher 
credit rating. 
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population of institutions whose selectivity did not change to receive a lower credit 
rating.39  Because selectivity is composed of a ratio of acceptances to applicants (i.e., 
percent accepted), an increase in this number signifies decreased selectivity.  Therefore, 
increased selectivity is shown to be positively associated with increased creditworthiness.   
The value of 14.1 appears to be quite a large number for the change in odds 
associated with a 1% increase in acceptances.  Statistically, this may be due to selectivity 
not being log transformed.  Although the natural log transformation places less weight on 
outliers and reduces positive skewness, ratio variables, such as selectivity, were not log 
transformed.  These variables do not show signs of skewness and the scatterplots in 
Appendix D do not show the log transformation having much effect on the distribution of 
the data.  Substantively, since these variables are already expressed in percentages, the 
log transformation would change their interpretation to a percentage change of a 
percentage (semi-elasticity of a percentage).   
Theoretically, the research literature notes that increased market position 
decreases an institution’s price elasticity, allowing for greater flexibility in setting tuition 
and fees (Kedem, 2011).  Additionally, increased competitive position is often 
accompanied by increased philanthropic support (e.g., endowment value), as well as a 
greater share of federal operating grant monies (Bogaty, 2013; Kedem, 2011).  All three 
of these variables (tuition and fees, federal operating grants, endowment value) are 
positively associated with improved creditworthiness.  If freshman selectivity is a strong 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 For odds ratios that are less than one, the effect on moving in the opposite direction can be calculated by 
taking the inverse of the odds ratio.  Due to its easier interpretation, odds ratios greater than one are 
interpreted as increases in credit rating, while those less than one are interpreted as decreases in credit 
rating from here forward. 
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measure of market position and demand, then its impact may also reflect the combined 
impact of these other variables. 
Regardless of the bias that may exist in selectivity’s large odds ratio, it can be 
concluded that decreased selectivity is viewed negatively by credit rating agencies.  This 
is further illustrated with the average marginal effects, which show the greatest impact 
occurring between categories A1 and Aa3.  While these numbers, as with other estimates 
should be interpreted with caution, due to the data separation discussed in Chapter III, 
movement between these two categories demonstrates a clear shift in the sign of the 
effect.  When selectivity decreases, as measured by an increase in the percentage of 
applicants whom are accepted, the probability of receiving an A1 rating increases by 
9.9% to 10.1%, depending on the distributional assumptions.  The probability increases 
for A2, a less-creditworthy category, by between 12.5% and 13.5%.  At the same time, 
the probability of receiving an Aa3 rating (improved creditworthiness), decreases by 
between 4.1% and 4.9%, and for Aa2 the probability decreases by between 12.4% and 
14.1%.   
 The results for selectivity follow the research literature (Standard & Poor’s, 2007; 
Kedem, 2011), which claims that increased selectivity positively impacts 
creditworthiness.  This makes sense, especially if increased selectivity is viewed as a 
reflection of increased market demand.  However, the results do not match those in 
Michael Moody’s (2008) analysis.  His findings show a positive relationship between 
decreased selectivity and increased creditworthiness.  But, as discussed in Chapter II, 
none of the marginal effects in Michael Moody’s (2008) study are statistically significant, 
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and the direction of his coefficient may be biased by his data set’s small sample size (146 
institutions). 
 Similar effects are found for undergraduate full-time equivalents (FTEs).  For a 
one-percent increase in the number of undergraduate FTEs, a population of institutions is 
20 times as likely to receive a higher credit rating than a population whose undergraduate 
FTE’s do not increase.  The average marginal effects show increases in this variable as 
having the greatest impact between A1 and Aa3, where a one percent increase changes 
the probability from negative to positive, respectively.  The large odds ratio for this 
variable may be due to it capturing multiple determinants.  As discussed in the literature, 
increased enrollment (i.e., undergraduate FTEs) likely reflects increased student demand 
for a specific institution (Heller, 1999; Kedem, 2011; Koshal & Koshal, 2000; 
McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Serna, 2012, 2013a, 2013b).  As a result, increases 
in enrollment enable greater pricing power.  Thus, populations of institutions with larger 
enrollment numbers are likely able to generate greater revenues.  If credit ratings are 
revenue dependent, which is suggested by Michael Moody’s (2008) findings, increases in 
FTEs can be understood as enabling institutions to generate additional revenues and 
improve their creditworthiness.  
 The third market position variable is research intensity, as measured by the ratio 
of graduate FTEs to total FTEs.  While the literature suggests that this variable is 
positively associated with improved creditworthiness (Rubinoff & Marion, 2007), the 
estimations failed to return statistically significant results.  This may be due to data 
separation in this variable, most clearly seen by collapsing categories one through three 
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and 4 through six (see Figure 2D), because of the small observation values (mean=.186), 
or from the reflection of research standing in federal operating grants and contracts. 
Hypothesis two.  Hypothesis two predicts that tuition and fee revenues are 
negatively associated with improved creditworthiness.  This is supported by the literature 
highlighting the slowed growth in tuition revenue, especially in recent years because of 
factors such as fewer high school graduates, decreased household net worth and income, 
increased government scrutiny over tuition costs, and increased price discrimination 
(Bogaty, 2013; Serna, 2013a; Tuby, 2014).  Surprisingly, tuition and fees per FTE 
returned positive and statistically significant coefficients for both the ordered probit and 
ordered logit models.  For a one percent increase in this variable, the odds of receiving a 
higher credit rating are 4.3 times that of a population of institutions without an increase.  
As with the other variables, the average marginal effects show the greatest change 
occurring between A1 and Aa3, where a one percent gain decreases the probability of 
receiving the former rating by between 11.5% and 11.8%, and increases the probability of 
receiving the latter rating by 4.6% to 5.8%.  This suggests that while tuition growth may 
have slowed in recent years, revenue from this source is still viewed as a strength.   
Also, as noted in the last section, enrollment growth is strongly associated with 
increased creditworthiness.  Between FY 2002 and FY 2013, undergraduate FTEs for the 
universities in the data set grew at an average rate of 1.6%.  So, even though tuition 
growth rates may have slowed, increased enrollments have consistently generated 
revenue for institutions.  Finally, increased tuition and fees may also represent decreased 
reliance on state appropriations, where the former represents increased autonomy and 
control over revenue generation decisions.   
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Hypothesis three.  Turning to the other side of the tuition and fees/state 
appropriations duality, hypothesis three predicts that state appropriations are negatively 
associated with improved credit ratings, due to continued reductions in this source 
(Bogaty, 2013; Tuby, 2014) and recent attachments of state monies to performance 
requirements (Dougherty et al., 2014; Dougherty & Reddy, 2011).  Both models failed to 
return statistically significant estimates for this variable.  This may be because state 
appropriations represent an ever-shrinking piece of university revenue structure, as a 
result of decreased state budgets and transitions to high tuition models of postsecondary 
education. In other words, the reliance upon state funds for operating revenue at public 
research institutions may have decreased sufficiently so as to make this variable a less 
important revenue component when rating these types of institutions. 
Hypothesis four.  Federal operating grants and contracts show positive and 
statistically significant parameter estimates for both the ordered probit and ordered logit.  
For a one percent increase in this variable, ceteris paribus, a population of institutions is 
3.12 times as likely as one with no increase to receive a higher credit rating.  Movement 
is most pronounced between A1 and Aa3, where the probability for the receiving the 
former rating declines by a factor of 4.4% to 4.6%% and increases for the latter by 1.7% 
to 2.2%.  The probability magnitude continues decreasing and increasing for A2 and Aa2, 
respectively. 
These findings confirm hypothesis four and align with the literature showing that 
because competition for federal grant monies has steadily increased, funding from this 
source signifies increased competitive standing and greater brand recognition (Bogaty, 
2013).  This also translates into a larger and more diversified revenue base, which is also 
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viewed positively by ratings agencies (Kedem, 2011).  Additionally, as discussed in 
hypothesis one, this variable may be absorbing some of the effects of research intensity, 
since increased competition for federal operating grants means that securing said funding 
reflects an institution’s research standing.  In other words, research intensity may be 
positively associated with improved creditworthiness, but the impact may be better 
captured by this variable. 
Hypothesis five.  The parameter estimates for state and local operating grants and 
contracts are statistically significant and negative, indicating a negative association with 
improved creditworthiness.  For a one percent increase in this variable, ceteris paribus, a 
population of institutions is 1.55 (1/.647) times as likely as a population with no increase 
to receive a lower credit rating.  This equals an increase in the probability of receiving an 
A2 rating by 1.7%, versus a decrease in the probability of receiving an Aa3 rating by just 
less than 1%.  These findings confirm the hypothesized relationship.  Whereas increases 
in federal operating grants and contracts reflect increased geographic scope and presence, 
increases in state and local grants may reflect the opposite.   
Hypothesis six.  Hypothesis six predicts that the market value of an institution’s 
endowment fund is positively associated with improved creditworthiness.  Based on the 
literature, university endowment size reflects its ability to accumulate wealth, largely 
through philanthropic support, which can in turn increase reserves and debt service 
capacity (Serna, 2013a, b; Winston, 1999).  Findings from both estimations support this 
assumption.  For a one percent increase in endowment value per FTE, a population of 
institutions is 2.48 times as likely as a population that did not increase its endowment to 
receive a higher credit rating.  More specifically, the probability of receiving an Aa3 
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rating increases by an average of 1.4% to 1.5%, while the probability of receiving an A1 
rating decreases by 3% to 3.5%.  Thus, as with most of the other variables, the shift in 
impact direction for endowment gains occurs between the A and Aa categories.  
Additionally, this variable can also be understood as reflecting an institution’s market 
position, since increased philanthropic support implies broader recognition and demand 
for its services.  
Hypothesis seven.  Hypothesis seven predicts that affiliation with an academic 
medical center (AMC) is positively associated with improved creditworthiness.  Due to 
its ability to provide greater revenue diversification and increased operational scope, 
credit rating agencies are presumed to positively view affiliation with an AMC (Kedem, 
2011).  Michael Moody (2008) includes this variable in his analysis of university credit 
ratings, but his findings for this variable are not statistically significant.  Results from this 
study are statistically significant at the .10 level, only for the ordered logit estimator.40  
But, instead of the hypothesized positive relationship, the parameter estimates for this 
variable are negative.  Institutions affiliated with an AMC are 2.16 (1/.463) times as 
likely as those not affiliated with an AMC to receive a lower credit rating.  The 
probability of receiving an A1 rating increases by 2.5%, and the probability of receiving 
an Aa2 rating decreases by 3.9%.  Although these findings run counter to the 
hypothesized impact, they are supported by the literature suggesting that slowed growth 
in patient-care revenues, reductions in funding to graduate medical education, cuts to 
Medicare and Medicaid, and uncertainty over the effects of healthcare reform have made 
AMCs a liability for public universities (Bogaty, 2013; Tuby, 2014). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 The p-value for AMC in the ordered probit model is .116. 
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Hypothesis eight.  Although hypothesized to negatively impact university credit 
ratings, the parameter estimates for the presence of a highly centralized governing board 
are not statistically significant in either model.  This is surprising since the research 
literature largely suggests that high levels of centralization inhibit operational freedom 
(Burgess, 2011; Knott & Payne, 2004; Lowry, 2001), which can lead to restrictions on 
debt issuance (Moody, 2007) and hinder an institution’s ability to fully leverage its assets 
(Serna, 2013b).  One explanation for this failure to find statistical significance is the 
buffering effect played by governing boards.  That is, highly centralized boards have 
been shown to magnify the budgetary powers of the state governor (Tandberg, 2013).  
Since state credit ratings can be viewed as reflections of how rating agencies view a 
state’s fiscal governance, the inclusion of state credit rating in the models may be 
absorbing some of the affects of the high regulation variable.  Also, since highly 
centralized boards have been shown to restrict the level of university debt issuance 
(Moody, 2007), debt burden per student (DBS) may also be absorbing some of the 
parameter’s effects.  Finally, increased governing board centralization has been shown to 
align universities’ interests with those of the state and a public model that is less tuition-
heavy, while universities operating under less centralized boards align more with a 
private model that is strongly supported by tuition revenue and research dollars (Knott & 
Payne, 2004; Lowry, 2001).  Therefore, the positive parameter estimates for tuition and 
fees may also reflect credit rating agencies’ positive views toward decreased governing 
board centralization.   
Hypothesis nine.  The binary variable for the presence of an umbrella debt limit 
also failed to return statistically significant parameter estimates.  Similar to the above 
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findings this is surprising, since the research literature suggests that these fiscal restraints 
can negatively impact a public university’s borrowing activity and credit ratings (Moody, 
2007, 2008).  However, as with governing boards, the inclusion of a variable for state 
credit rating may be absorbing the debt limit variable’s effects.  This is supported by 
research showing the negative impact of debt limits on state credit ratings (Johnson & 
Kriz, 2005).  Additionally, since debt limits restrict the amount of debt issuance, debt 
burden per student (DBS) may again be responsible for absorbing some of the effect. 
Hypothesis 10.  Unlike the previous two variables, high state credit rating shows 
statistically significant estimates (at .01 level in both models).  For universities in states 
with high credit ratings (≥Aa2), the odds of a higher institutional credit rating are 4.5 
times those of institutions in states with lower General Obligation credit ratings.  The 
impact shifts from negative to positive between A1 (-5.4% to -5.8%) and Aa3 (5% to 
5.6%), and remains positive for the two higher categories.  These findings confirm the 
hypothesized relationship, as well as findings from the research literature (Moody, 2008; 
Serna, 2013a). 
Hypothesis 11.  Debt burden per student (DBS), a measure of total long-term 
debt scaled by undergraduate FTEs, is positively associated with increased credit ratings.  
For a one percent increase in DBS, the odds of a higher credit rating increase 4.09 times.  
The probability of receiving an A1 credit rating decreases by 5.4% to 5.8%, while the 
probability of receiving an Aa3 credit rating increases by 2.2% to 2.8% and 7.2% to 7.5% 
for an Aa2 rating.  These findings support the hypothesized relationship, and the past 
literature’s suggestion that larger amounts of debt reflect diverse debt market usage and 
effective realization of oversight and planning (Kedem, 2011; Moody, 2008).   
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Hypothesis 12.  As hypothesized, the level of financial leverage, measured by the 
ratio of total debt to total revenue, negatively impacts public research university credit 
ratings.  For a one-unit increase in the leverage ratio (.001), indicating decreased debt 
service capability, the odds of receiving a lower credit rating increase by almost 53 times 
(1/.019 = 52.63).41  With decreased debt service capability (increase in ratio), the 
probability of receiving an A1 rating increases by 15.2% to 17.1%, while the probability 
of receiving an Aa3 rating decreases by 8.4%.  The signs remain consistent below A1 and 
above Aa3.  As discussed in Chapter III, this variable helps separate the effects of debt 
service capability from high levels of debt and debt market usage (i.e., DBS), the latter of 
which is often associated with high levels of research (Kedem, 2011; Rubinoff & Marion, 
2007).  Therefore, in addition to being focused on a specific aspect of debt, the effects of 
variables associated with research (e.g., federal operating grants and contracts, research 
intensity) may be influencing the parameter estimate. 
Revenue Diversification 
The second research question focuses on the role played by revenue 
diversification in determining public research university credit ratings.  It asks, How is 
the level of revenue diversification in public research university revenue structure 
associated with institutional credit ratings? The estimation results for the ordered probit 
and ordered logit models pertaining to this question are shown in Table 8.  Odds ratios, 
and exponentiated 95% confidence intervals for the ordered logit are also provided.  
Again, AMEs for the continuous variables, for the ordered probit and ordered logit 
estimators, are displayed Appendix E. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 As with selectivity, this variable is also expressed as a proportion (debt as a percentage of revenue) and it 
is not log transformed.  Therefore, its high odds ratio may also be due to it not being transformed. 
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Table 8 
Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit Results for Revenue Diversification   
Variable Ordered Probit 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Ordered Logit 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Odds Ratios 
(Exp. 95% C.I.) 
 
Revenue Diversification (HHI) 
 
2.43** 
(1.16) 
 
4.08** 
(2.08) 
 
59.29** 
(1.00 | 3510.98) 
 
Freshman Selectivity 
 
-1.55*** 
(.545) 
 
-2.97*** 
(1.04) 
 
.051*** 
(.007 | .392) 
 
Research Intensity -.891 
(1.36) 
-1.59 
(2.63) 
.204 
(.001| 35.10) 
 
Undergraduate Full-Time Equivalents 
(ln) 
 
1.61*** 
(.237) 
 
2.90*** 
(.436) 
 
18.15*** 
(7.72 | 42.67) 
 
Endowment Value per FTE (ln) 
 
.510** 
(.232) 
 
1.11** 
(.455) 
 
3.02** 
(1.24 | 7.37) 
 
Academic Medical Center (AMC) 
 
-.541** 
(.242) 
 
-.1.07** 
(.433) 
 
.342* 
(.146 | .798) 
 
High Regulation 
 
.076 
(.264) 
 
.156 
(.495) 
 
1.17 
(.443 | 3.08) 
 
Debt Limit 
 
.082 
(.276) 
 
.260 
(.512) 
 
1.30 
(.475 | 3.54) 
 
High State Credit Rating 
 
.802*** 
(.178) 
 
1.32*** 
(.328) 
 
3.73*** 
(1.93 | 7.23) 
 
Debt Burden per Student (ln) 
 
1.38*** 
(.225) 
 
2.35*** 
(.441) 
 
10.49*** 
(4.42 | 24.89) 
 
Leverage 
 
-3.16*** 
(.651) 
 
-5.24*** 
(1.27) 
 
.005*** 
(.0004| .064) 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; 
*denotes statistical significance at the .10 level 
    
 Hypothesis 13.  As hypothesized, both the ordered probit and ordered logit 
parameter estimates for revenue diversification are positive, indicating a positive 
association between this variable and university credit ratings, at the .05 level.  For a one-
unit increase in the HHI index (.001), the odds of receiving a higher credit rating are 
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59.29 times those for no increase.  The average marginal effects show that the probability 
of receiving an A1 credit rating decreases by 19.1% to 21.1%.  At the same time, the 
probability of receiving an Aa3 rating increases by 8.7% to 10.6%.  The relationship 
between revenue diversification and university credit ratings follow past studies modeling 
revenue diversification and state GO ratings (Grizzle, 2012; Yan, 2011).  
The parameter estimates for revenue diversification do seem a bit large for this 
variable.  This is most apparent in the magnitude of the odds ratio (59.29), as well as the 
exponentiated 95% confidence interval range (1.001 to 3510.98).  It is suggested in the 
literature that large confidence intervals imply sample sizes that are too small (Long & 
Freese, 2006).  However, with 900 observations, and no similar magnitude ranges for the 
other covariates, problems due to sample size are unlikely.  What is more probable is that 
the parameter estimates are biased because of separation in the data.  Examination of 
figure D6 in Appendix D shows clear separation around x-values of 0.5, occurring in 
rating category four.  Since these are outliers at the lower extreme of the x-range, 
collapsing categories would not correct for this problem.  However, it is important to note 
that the parameter estimates for this variable are actually smaller than those found in past 
studies (e.g., Grizzle, 2012 = 10.071; Yan, 2011 = 23.953).42  Thus, although it is wise to 
interpret this variable with caution, as with other large estimates, the magnitude and 
direction follow results in the research literature and confirm the related hypothesis.  
 Comparison with first question estimates.  Since this research question is 
closely related to, though distinct from, the first, parameter estimates from the variables 
included in both models speaks to the accuracy of the above results.  They also allow for 
reflection on reasons behind any major changes.  Table 9 shows the odds ratios from the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Both Grizzle (2012) and Yan (2011) use only an ordered probit estimator. 
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ordered logit estimation for the first research question alongside the odds ratios for the 
ordered logit estimation used in this research question.  Additionally, the change between 
the two estimations is noted. 
All of the covariates from the revenue structure models that are included in the 
revenue diversification models retain their statistical significance, or in the case of high 
regulation and debt limit remain statistically insignificant.  Just as important, the direction 
of their signs remains constant.  While the odds ratios change between these two models, 
most of these changes are relatively minor and can be attributed to differences in model 
specification.  This is illustrated with freshman selectivity, which changed from an odds 
ratio of 14.1 in the earlier model to 19.4 in the latter.  Since selectivity is negatively 
correlated with the four primary revenue sources (tuition and fees, state appropriations, 
federal operating grants and contracts, and state and local operating grants and contracts), 
and revenue diversification is an aggregate of these variables, the magnitude changes are 
likely due to HHI being a more blunt measure of revenue in terms of its diversification 
rather than its specific structure. 
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Table 9 
Comparison of Odds Ratios from Ordered Logit Estimations with and without HHI 
Variable No Recession Odds Ratio 
(Exp. 95% C.I.) 
Recession Odds Ratio 
(Exp. 95% C.I.) 
Change 
 
Freshman Selectivity 
 
.071*** 
(.009 | .535) 
 
.051*** 
(.007 | .392) 
 
− (.02) 
 
Research Intensity 
 
.038 
(.00005| 28.58) 
 
 
.204 
(.001| 35.10) 
 
+ (.166) 
 
Undergraduate Full-
Time Equivalents (ln) 
 
20.04*** 
(8.66 | 46.35) 
 
 
18.15*** 
(7.72 | 42.67) 
 
− (1.89) 
 
Endowment Value per 
FTE (ln) 
 
2.48* 
(.932 | 6.58) 
 
 
3.02** 
(1.24 | 7.37) 
 
+ (.54) 
 
Academic Medical 
Center (AMC) 
 
.463* 
(.184 | 1.16) 
 
 
.341* 
(.146 | .798) 
 
− (.122) 
 
 
High Regulation 
 
 
1.18 
(.452 | 3.09) 
 
 
1.17 
(.443 | 3.08) 
 
 
− (.01) 
 
 
Debt Limit 
 
 
1.47 
(.510 | 4.21) 
 
 
 
1.30 
(.475 | 3.54) 
 
 
− (.17) 
 
High State Credit Rating 
 
4.50*** 
(2.13 | 9.50) 
 
3.73*** 
(1.93 | 7.23) 
 
− (.77) 
 
Debt Burden per 
Student (ln) 
 
4.09*** 
(1.65 | 10.16) 
 
 
10.49*** 
(4.42 | 24.89) 
 
+ (6.4) 
 
Leverage 
 
.019*** 
(.001 | .412) 
 
 
.005*** 
(.0004| .064) 
 
− (.014) 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; 
*denotes statistical significance at the .10 level 
 
Two notably larger changes between the models occur with log debt burden per 
student (DBS) and leverage.  In the revenue structure model, a one percent increase in 
DBS is associated with a population of institutions being 4.09 times as likely to receive a 
higher credit rating.  In the revenue diversification model, a one percent increase in DBS 
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is associated with a population being 10.49 times as likely to receive a higher credit 
rating.  The average marginal effects show a similar increase, with the probability of 
receiving an A1 rating changing from a decrease of 5.4% to a decrease of 11% and the 
probability of receiving an Aa3 rating changing from an increase of 2.2% to an increase 
of 5%.  As discussed in the literature, research-intensive universities on average have 
higher levels of debt per student (Rubinoff & Marion, 2007).  This is one of the reasons 
for including leverage, to separate total debt amount from debt service capacity.  It is also 
known, from the extant literature, that large research universities generally receive a 
greater share of federal research dollars (Bogaty, 2013; Standard & Poor’s Ratings 
Services, 2013).  Furthermore, these institutions tend to have more pricing power, 
especially when it comes to tuition and fees, due to their improved market position 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2007).  This study has shown that all of these variables (federal 
operating grants and contracts, tuition and fees, enrollment) positively impact credit 
ratings.  Since the first two of these factors are measured in revenue diversification, albeit 
in a more aggregate manner, the increase in the DBS estimate can thus be understood as a 
spillover from HHI’s emphasis upon diversification over specific categories. 
 This coefficient spillover is also exemplified in leverage.  In the revenue structure 
model, a decrease in debt service capacity (decrease in debt to revenue ratio) is associated 
with a population of institutions being almost 53 times (1/.019) as likely to receive a 
lower credit rating.  This translates to a 15.2% increase in the probability of receiving an 
A1 rating and a 6.1% decrease in the probability of receiving an Aa3 rating.  In the 
revenue diversification model, the odds ratio for receiving a lower credit rating increases 
to 200.  The average marginal effects for this model show that the probability of 
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receiving an A1 rating increases by 24.5% and the probability of receiving an Aa3 rating 
decreases by 11.2 percent, for a small increase in leverage.  Since this variable is 
composed of total long-term debt, which is measured in DBS, and total revenue, which is 
captured in HHI, the magnification of this variable in the revenue diversification models 
can therefore be attributed to the growth in the impact of log DBS and the aggregation of 
categories in the HHI measure. 
Severe Economic Downturns 
The final research question examines the role played by the Great Recession in 
determining public research university credit ratings.  It asks, How do severe economic 
downturns, specifically the Great Recession, impact public research university credit 
ratings?  For this question, the models used for the first question were re-run, with the 
inclusion of a binary variable for recession (1 = ≥ FY 2009).  Estimation results are 
shown in Table 10.  Odds ratios, and exponentiated 95% confidence intervals for the 
ordered logit are also provided.  Average marginal effects (AME) for the ordered probit 
and ordered logit estimators are displayed again in Appendix E. 
Hypothesis 14.  The binary variable for recession is positive in both the ordered 
probit and ordered logit models, at a statistical significance of .01.  With the inclusion of 
this variable, the odds of receiving a higher credit rating increase 5.4 times.  The 
probability of receiving an A1 rating decreases by 5.4% to 5.8%, while the probability of 
receiving an Aa3 rating increases by 2.6%, an Aa2 rating by 6.3% to 7%, and an Aa1 or 
above rating by 6.5% to 7.1%.  This provides strong evidence that for FY 2009 and 
beyond, public research universities, on average, received higher credit ratings.   
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Table 10 
Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit Results for Recession and Revenue Structure 
Variable Ordered Probit 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. Error) 
Ordered Logit 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. Error) 
Odds Ratios 
(Exp. 95% 
C.I.) 
 
Recession 
 
.849*** 
(.198) 
 
1.69*** 
(.406) 
 
5.40*** 
(2.43 | 11.96) 
 
Freshman Selectivity 
 
-.852 
(.562) 
 
-1.66 
(1.03) 
 
.190 
(.025 | 1.44) 
 
Research Intensity 
 
-2.77 
(1.75) 
 
-4.43 
(348) 
 
.012 
(.00001| 10.96) 
 
Undergraduate Full-Time 
Equivalents (ln) 
 
1.74*** 
(.240) 
 
3.14*** 
(.458) 
 
23.18*** 
(9.45 | 56.89) 
 
Tuition and Fees per FTE (ln) 
 
.802** 
(.329) 
 
1.18* 
(.624) 
 
3.24* 
(.953 | 11.01) 
 
State Appropriations per FTE (ln) 
 
.530** 
(.264) 
 
.929* 
(.488) 
 
2.53* 
(.973 | 6.59) 
 
Federal Operating Grants and 
Contracts per FTE (ln) 
 
.797*** 
(.160) 
 
1.36*** 
(.294) 
 
3.90*** 
(2.20 | 6.94) 
 
State and Local Operating Grants 
and Contracts per FTE (ln) 
 
-.296*** 
(.105) 
 
-.517*** 
(.191) 
 
.596*** 
(.410 | .868) 
 
Endowment Value per FTE (ln) 
 
.517** 
(.249) 
 
1.18** 
(.578) 
 
3.25** 
(1.05 | 10.09) 
 
Academic Medical Center (AMC) 
 
-.455* 
(.267) 
 
-.994* 
(.510) 
 
.370* 
(.136 | 1.00) 
 
High Regulation 
 
.134 
(.273) 
 
.190 
(.502) 
 
1.21 
(.452 | 3.23) 
 
Debt Limit 
 
.161 
(.289) 
 
.383 
(.546) 
 
1.47 
(.503 | 4.27) 
 
High State Credit Rating 
 
.849*** 
(.207) 
 
1.38*** 
(.419) 
 
3.98*** 
(1.75 | 9.05) 
 
Debt Burden per Student (ln) 
 
.640** 
(.266) 
 
1.11** 
(.522) 
 
3.04** 
(1.09 | 8.47) 
 
Leverage 
 
-2.34*** 
(.899) 
 
-4.00** 
(1.88) 
 
.018** 
(.001 | .730) 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; 
*denotes statistical significance at the .10 level  
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These findings are surprising and run counter to the sector-wide negative outlooks 
that began being issued in 2009 (Bogaty, 2013; Goodman & Nelson, 2009; Tuby, 2014; 
Tuby & Nelson, 2012).  This literature cites factors such as macroeconomic conditions 
weakening postsecondary budgets, uncertainty around philanthropic support, investment 
losses, and decreased net tuition growth as reasons for these outlooks.  All of these are 
financial, and if credit ratings are revenue dependent (Research Question 1), which this 
study has shown to be largely true, then it can be inferred that in spite of these warnings 
revenues have continued to grow during and after FY 2009.  Thus, credit ratings at public 
research institutions have remained largely immune to the warned recessionary pressures.  
As a result, with regard to question three, the effects of the Great Recession have not 
negatively impacted public research university credit ratings based on the evidence 
provided here.   
Spillover effects.  Examining the other covariates in Table 10, further 
conclusions surrounding the behavior of individual determinants in recessionary years 
can be developed.  The intent of the following discussion is not to imply a direct, possibly 
causal, impact of The Great Recession on these covariates.  Instead, changes in the model 
covariates can be understood as the product of spillover effects from the recession.  To 
aid in this comparison, Table 11 shows the odds ratios from Table 6, listed alongside 
those from Table 10, as well as the difference and direction in magnitude changes. 
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Table 11 
Comparison of Odds Ratios from Ordered Logit Estimations with and without Recession 
Variable No Recession Odds 
Ratio (Exp. 95% C.I.) 
Recession Odds Ratio 
(Exp. 95% C.I.) 
Change 
Freshman Selectivity .071*** 
(.009 | .535) 
.190 
(.025 | 1.44) 
+ (.119) 
Research Intensity .038 
(.00005| 28.58) 
 
.012 
(.00001| 10.96) 
 
− (.026) 
Undergraduate Full-
Time Equivalents (ln) 
20.04*** 
(8.66 | 46.35) 
 
23.18*** 
(9.45 | 56.89) 
 
+ (3.14) 
Tuition and Fees per 
FTE (ln) 
4.30** 
(1.28 | 14.39) 
 
3.24* 
(.953 | 11.01) 
 
− (1.06) 
State Appropriations 
per FTE (ln) 
1.41 
(.566 | 3.53) 
 
2.53* 
(.973 | 6.59) 
 
+ (1.12) 
Federal Operating 
Grants and Contracts 
per FTE (ln) 
3.12*** 
(1.73 | 5.62) 
3.90*** 
(2.20 | 6.94) 
+ (.78) 
State and Local 
Operating Grants and 
Contracts per FTE (ln) 
.647** 
(.440 | .949) 
.596*** 
(.410 | .868) 
− (.051) 
Endowment Value per 
FTE (ln) 
2.48* 
(.932 | 6.58) 
 
3.25** 
(1.05 | 10.09) 
 
+ (.77) 
Academic Medical 
Center (AMC) 
.463* 
(.184 | 1.16) 
 
.370* 
(.136 | 1.00) 
 
− (.93) 
High Regulation 1.18 
(.452 | 3.09) 
1.21 
(.452 | 3.23) 
+ (.03) 
Debt Limit 1.47 
(.510 | 4.21) 
 
1.47 
(.503 | 4.27) 
 
No Change 
High State Credit 
Rating 
4.50*** 
(2.13 | 9.50) 
3.98*** 
(1.75 | 9.05) 
 
− (.52) 
Debt Burden per 
Student (ln) 
4.09*** 
(1.65 | 10.16) 
 
3.04** 
(1.09 | 8.47) 
 
− (1.05) 
Leverage .019*** 
(.001 | .412) 
 
.018** 
(.001 | .730) 
 
− (.001) 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; 
*denotes statistical significance at the .10 level 
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Market position and demand factors.  While the odds ratio for freshman 
selectivity increases by .119, indicating a decrease in the odds of receiving a lower credit 
rating by a factor of 8.8 times (1/.119), it is difficult to compare these two estimates, 
since freshman selectivity is not statistically significant in the latter model.  In this model, 
research intensity also remains statistically insignificant.  However, the log of 
undergraduate FTEs retains its statistical significance in the recession model.  The odds 
ratio increases from 20.04 to 23.18, a difference of 3.14.  Without the recession variable, 
a one percent increase in undergraduate FTEs increased the odds of receiving a higher 
credit rating 20.04 times.  With recession, the increase in odds is 23.18 times.  
Undergraduate FTEs appear to be an even greater predictor of creditworthiness when 
recession is included in the model.   
This makes sense in the context of the research literature.  As a measure of 
increased demand for an institution (Heller, 1999; Kedem, 2011; Koshal & Koshal, 2000; 
McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Serna, 2012, 2013a, 2013b), increased enrolment 
allows institutions to generate additional revenue.  The greater uncertainty around 
household income and wealth, philanthropic support, investment returns, state 
appropriations, and federal funding that was generated during The Great Recession is 
likely to have placed additional emphasis on the ability to accrue revenues through 
enrollments.  This emphasis is further accentuated upon consideration of increased 
concerns over adequate liquidity and greater debt issuance (Blumenstyk & Field, 2008; 
Field, 2008; Gephardt, 2011; Goodman & Nelson, 2009; Kiley, 2012; Krantz, 2015 
Serna, 2013b;Wilson, 2008; Wolverton, 2008).  With institutions shifting more of the 
cost burden onto students in the form of tuition and fees (Bogaty, 2013; Serna, 2013a), 
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increased enrollment likely equates to institutions better able to their service debt, which 
eases concerns among credit rating agencies after the economic downturn. 
Finances and operations variables.  Tuition and fees per FTE remains positively 
associated with increased credit ratings, but the odds ratio drops from 4.3 to 3.24, a 
change of 1.06.  When recession is added to the model, a one unit increase in tuition and 
fees per FTE increases the odds of receiving a higher credit rating by 3.24 times.  This 
decrease in the positive impact of the tuition and fee variable is likely a reflection of the 
slowed growth in this funding source during recessionary years, however its statistical 
significance shows that it is still highly important for credit ratings. 
One of the most interesting changes in the recession model is state appropriations 
per FTE.  Whereas this variable is not statistically significant in the earlier models, when 
recession is added it is both significant at the .10 level and positively associated with 
improved creditworthiness.  For a one percent increase in state appropriations per FTE, 
ceteris paribus, a population of institutions is 2.53 times more likely to receive a higher 
credit rating.  The average marginal effects (Appendix E, Table E3) show that for a one 
percent increase the probability of receiving an A1 rating drops 3.2% to 3.4%, and the 
probability of receiving an Aa2 rating increases by 3.9% to 4%.43  These results are 
surprising, since the research literature highlight the instability in this funding source, 
especially with performance requirements (Tuby, 2014), state budget cutbacks (Zumeta, 
2013; Zumeta & Kinne, 2011), and vulnerability to ratings downgrades placed on 
institutions that are dependent on these monies (Gephardt & Nelson, 2010).  One 
explanation is that this variable reflects an increase in these funds, ceteris paribus, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 The average marginal effects at Aa3 are also positive, indicating an increased probability of receiving 
this rating with an increase in state appropriation dollars; but, neither of the estimates for the ordered probit 
nor ordered logit at this response are statistically significant. 
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does not reflect increased dependence or decreases in other funding sources.  Therefore, 
in light of Moody’s report that all non-tuition revenue sources either slowed or declined 
since FY 2008 (Bogaty, 2013), the positive parameter estimates for state appropriations 
are likely a reflection of the ability to accrue greater revenue, rather than dependence on a 
specific revenue source. In other words, increased revenues in the form of state 
appropriations appear to take on a more important role after the recession than before it.  
The signs on both operating grant variables remain constant and the magnitude 
increases for both.  Whereas the odds ratio for federal grants increases from 3.12 to 3.90, 
suggesting a greater impact on improved creditworthiness for a one percent increase, the 
odds ratio for state and local grants decreases from .627 to .596.  That is, for a one 
percent increase in state and local operating grant funding the odds ratio of a receiving 
lower credit rating increases from 1.55 to 1.68.  The magnitude changes for federal grants 
likely reflect increased emphasis on greater operational scope (i.e., federal research 
grants).  Similarly, the greater negative impact associated with state and local grant 
funding evidences rating agency caution surrounding narrower operational scope (i.e., 
state and local grants), largely due to state budget cutbacks in recent years and the role 
played by macroeconomic conditions. 
The variables for endowment value per FTE and academic medical center follow 
similar patterns as the two operating grant variables.  The odds ratio for endowment 
increased with the inclusion of recession from 2.48 to 3.25, while the odds ratio for AMC 
decreased from .463 to .370.  In other words, for a one percent increase in the market 
value of endowment fund per FTE, a population of universities is 3.12 times as likely to 
receive a higher credit rating when recession is not accounted for, and 3.90 times as 
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likely to receive a higher credit rating when recession is measured.  These results follow 
the literature highlighting endowment losses in recent years (Bogaty, 2013; Goldstein, 
2012), and the strong correlation between high credit ratings and endowment value in 
recent years (Standard & Poor’s Rating Services, 2014); that is, greater value is placed on 
the ability to grow investments after accounting for recessionary pressures.  With AMC, 
the odds ratio for receiving a lower credit rating increased from 2.16 to 2.7.  This follows 
the literature highlighting the greater liability from association with an AMC, due in 
recent years to reductions in funding to graduate medical education, cuts to Medicare and 
Medicaid, and uncertainty over the effects of healthcare reform (Bogaty, 2013; Tuby, 
2014).   
Governance variables.  In the recession model, both high regulation and debt 
limits remain statistically insignificant.  Since the other covariates remain the same 
between the models, failure to return statistically significant parameter estimates is 
probably still due to the effects being absorbed by variables such as debt burden per 
student (DBS), state credit rating, and tuition and fees per FTE.  High state credit rating 
remains statistically significant and positively associated with improved creditworthiness.  
However, while the impact of the other financial/operations covariates intensify with the 
addition of recession, high state credit rating lessens.  Without recession, a high state 
credit rating (≥Aa2) is associated with an increase in the odds of a higher university 
credit rating by 4.5 times. But with recession included, universities in states with high 
GO ratings are only 3.98 times as likely to receive a higher credit rating.  Although both 
of these odds ratios suggest that state fiscal strength plays a strong role in determining 
improved institutional creditworthiness, the change may reflect increased uncertainty 
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surrounding state finances and/or less weight appointed to the state’s role in public 
university financing. 
Debt variables.  Debt burden per student (DBS) remains positively associated 
with improved creditworthiness, but the magnitude lessens with the inclusion of 
recession.  Prior to including recession, a one percent increase in DBS is associated with 
a population of institutions being 4.09 times as likely to receive a higher credit rating.  
With recession, the odds ratio of a higher credit rating drops to 3.04.  This variable may 
be capturing the spillover effects from rating agency concerns regarding high levels of 
institutional debt and inadequate liquidity in the years following the economic downturn 
(Blumenstyk & Field, 2008; Field, 2008; Gephardt, 2011; Goodman & Nelson, 2009; 
Kiley, 2012; Krantz, 2015 Serna, 2013b; Wilson, 2008; Wolverton, 2008); however, it is 
still likely that total long-term debt is a strong indicator of effective debt market usage 
and strategic planning. 
Rating agency caution can be seen in the change in the leverage parameter 
estimate.  Prior to including recession, a population of institutions is 52.6 times as likely 
to receive a lower credit rating if its debt servicing capacity decreases (leverage ratio 
increase); with the recession, institutions are 55.6 times as likely to receive a lower 
rating.  This is a fairly small change; yet, it suggests equivalent and possibly greater 
emphasis being placed on universities’ ability to service their debt during and after the 
Great Recession. 
Limitations 
 While this study is one of the most extensive analyses of university credit ratings 
to date, it does suffer from several limitations.  The first is related to data availability.  
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Originally, the data set included 151 public research universities, classified as having a 
high or very high level of research activity by the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching.  76 institutions were omitted because of reasons such as being 
rated at the system level, lacking sufficient years worth of credit ratings, or reporting data 
via different accounting standards (i.e., FASB).  Each omitted university is listed in 
Appendix A, with the reason for its removal.  This left 75 institutions with 12 years of 
data on each.  While 900 observations (75 × 12) is a fairly large data set, if data were 
available on the initial list of institutions, there would have been 1,812 observations.  
This would have significantly increased the study’s statistical power.   
What is more important than the total number of institutions omitted, is the 
decrease in similar institutions.  By omitting universities, there are effectively fewer 
similar institutions in the data set.  What this means is that there is an increased chance of 
separation in the data due to greater heterogeneity within units.   
As shown in this study, data separation was a problem with the continuous 
variables.  Covariates such as endowment per FTE, undergraduate FTEs, and federal 
operating grants and contracts per FTE, were especially problematic.  While the log 
transformation of these variables improved estimation, they still proved difficult for 
estimation of more advanced models, such as correlated random effects and partial 
proportional odds.  Attention to bias correction methods (e.g., penalized maximum 
likelihood) for ordered response models is just now starting to take root in the statistical 
literature (e.g., Kosmidis, 2014; Lipsitz et al., 2013).  But, the quantity of work remains 
extremely small and mainly theoretical.  That is, software programs that are able to 
implement the methods being developed have yet to be written.  As compared to other 
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estimators, such as OLS and those for binary responses, ordered response models are still 
largely underdeveloped. 
Because of the data issues, and insufficient technology, the study was not able to 
take full advantage of the longitudinal nature of the data.  Subject-specific estimates (e.g., 
correlated random effects models) were run for the data, but the data separation resulted 
in false convergence.  Therefore, the study had to resort to treating the data as a large 
cross section, using traditional pooled ordered probit and pooled ordered logit estimators 
and robust standard errors clustered by group (i.e., university).  While this is not an ideal 
approach to estimating longitudinal data, it helps correct for serial correlation, reducing 
the likelihood of committing Type I error.  What this approach is not able to do is 
estimate how changes in the covariates impact a single university over time (i.e., subject 
specific estimates).  So, the modeling approach utilized in this study should be thought of 
more as a less-ideal approach, rather than a full limitation.  Since it is doubtful that the 
data will change in the future, so that perfect prediction is not an issue, more advanced 
analyses, which utilize panel data methods, will have to wait for technology to advance.  
Furthermore, as credit rating agencies, such as Moody’s, begin rating more public 
universities, data sets can be expanded to potentially help reduce problematic 
heterogeneity. 
Chapter Conclusion 
 This chapter reported descriptive statistics and estimation results from the ordered 
probit and ordered logit models for the three research questions.  With regard to the first 
question, factors involved in a public research university’s fiscal structure, such as tuition 
and fees, federal operating grants, and endowment value, are all positively associated 
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with improved creditworthiness.  These factors reflect the importance of broad 
operational scope, a diverse revenue base, and the ability to generate expansive funding.  
Market position variables, such as enrollment and selectivity, are also positively 
associated with increased creditworthiness.  These variables demonstrate demand for 
institutions, as well as the ability to generate revenue through adequate student demand 
for enrollment spaces, as positively viewed by credit rating agencies.  High state credit 
rating and debt burden per student are both positively associated with improved credit 
ratings.  Whereas the former signifies the state’s ability to consistently fund its public 
institutions, the latter implies active and efficient debt market usage by institutions, which 
allow for successful implementation of short- and long-term plans.  Negative factors 
include state and local operating grants, affiliation with an academic medical center 
(AMC), and increased leverage.  The first demonstrates the negative view of narrower 
operational scope, the second a financial liability, and the third concerns an institution’s 
ability to service its outstanding debt. 
 With regard to question number two, increased revenue diversification positively 
impacts public research university credit ratings.  In light of the extant literature, this is 
not surprising.  Finally, in response to the third research question, The Great Recession is 
positively associated with improved credit ratings.  This is surprising, considering the 
repeated negative outlooks issued by the rating agencies.  However, from the model 
estimates, it can be inferred that public research universities consistently grew their 
revenues during these recent years, and revenue structure and flexibility trumps other 
conditions. 
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 Chapter five revisits these findings.  Examining the variables estimated to answer 
the study’s three research questions, it contextualizes the results.  That is, implications for 
institutional planners, governing board officials, budget officers, and senior 
administrators are addressed.  Specifically, the relationship between the knowledge 
developed thus far and institutional growth and longevity are expounded.  In doing so, the 
final chapter also discusses the implications of the study’s findings for institutions of 
various sizes, and credit rating agency values that are implicated by the model estimates.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSONS 
 
 This final chapter of the study returns to the findings discussed in Chapter IV in 
order to examine their implications for higher education.  Emphasis is placed not only on 
how these findings relate to the study’s three primary research questions, but also the 
importance of these results for policy, practice, and research.  Attention is specifically 
focused on how the study’s results inform higher education budgeting, planning, and debt 
policy.  
Revenue Structure 
 As the primary focus of the first research question, revenue structure was modeled 
with attention to four distinct variables– tuition and fees, state appropriations, federal 
operating grants and contracts, and state and local operating grants and contracts–all of 
which, based on the extant literature, were judged to best represent revenue categories 
that determine public research university credit ratings (Bogaty, 2013; Kedem, 2011; 
Moody, 2008; Serna, 2013a, b; Tuby, 2014).  Each of these variables was divided by 
undergraduate FTEs, in order to control for scale effects.  Additionally, they were also 
log transformed, a common practice in higher education finance literature (e.g., Baldwin 
& McCraken, 2013; Dar & Lee, 2-14; Delaney & Kearney, 2015; Doyle, 2010 2012; 
Hearn, Griswold, & Marine, 1996; Lacy & Tandberg, 2014; Morphew & Baker, 2004; 
Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Serna, 2012; Serna & Harris, 2014; Tandberg, 2010; Tandberg 
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& Ness, 2011, 2013; Zhang, 2007, 2011); in addition to standardizing interpretation (as 
percent changes) and correcting for positive skewness, the natural log transformation 
helped with issues of model convergence related to data separation. 
 Prior to running any of the estimations, federal operating grants and contracts was 
hypothesized to positively impact public research university credit ratings, while the 
other three variables were hypothesized to have a negative impact.  These assumptions 
were driven by the literature suggesting that rating agencies positively view federal grant 
monies as a sign of an institution’s operational scope, market position, and stability.  
Tuition and fees, state appropriations, and state and local operating grants and contracts 
were hypothesized to have a negative impact, due to slowed growth and greater 
instability in these funding sources.  As expected, federal operating grants and contracts 
returned statistically significant positive parameter estimates, while state and local 
operating grants and contracts returned statistically significant negative estimates.  
Surprisingly, tuition and fees showed a statistically significant positive relationship with 
improved credit ratings.  Neither the ordered probit or ordered logit models for the first 
research question reported statistically significant coefficients for state appropriations. 
 From a ratings perspective, where credit ratings are viewed as an objective 
indicator of the probability of an institution defaulting on a debt issue, it makes sense that 
federal operating grants and contracts are positively associated with improved 
creditworthiness.  With cuts to state budgets and increased competition for federal 
research dollars, the ability to grow federal grant monies can be understood as both a sign 
of an institution’s national presence, as well as evidence of a broader fiscal base.  
Additionally, by increasing federal grant funding, universities can increase the extent of 
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their national recognition, thus potentially broadening their geographic reach for student 
recruiting; in other words, increased federal operating grant revenues signal an increased 
likelihood of a continued stream of applicants, student related funding, and research 
dollars.  On a related note, a similar logic can be applied to interpreting the negative 
impact associated with state and local operating grants and contracts.  Not only do 
increases in this source suggest a narrower scope associated with an institution’s funding 
base, but also with the geographic scope of student recruitment. This could also suggest 
that these institutions are actually better at serving the local population and region.    
Moreover, what this interpretation does not provide is a measure of the subjective 
bias inherent in valuing these funding sources.  In other words, it can be assumed that an 
institution’s reputation plays a factor in its ability to generate federal grant monies, 
because of its ability to attract high profile researchers, build cutting edge research 
facilities, and because of its positive bias among grant reviewers.  Therefore, already 
“prestigious” institutions, that have an active agenda that includes federal grant funding, 
are better situated to continue receiving funding from this source.  In a sense, money and 
reputation beget revenues and high credit ratings.   
These results may send the message to public institutions to focus more on 
research funding and less on instruction and public service.  This assumption is supported 
by the positive estimates for tuition and fees.  As discussed in the context of governing 
boards in Chapter III, high levels of centralization are associated with a public model of 
higher education, where institutions tend to closely align their own interests with those of 
the state, and emphasize low tuition and greater reliance on state funding.  Conversely, 
low levels of centralization are associated with a private model of higher education, 
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where more emphasis is placed on high levels of research and tuition dollars (Knott & 
Payne, 2004; Lowry, 2001).  Therefore, although it was hypothesized that tuition and fees 
will be negatively associated with higher credit ratings, the positive impact may be 
attributed to this public/private, high/low centralization duality.  These results warrant 
questions about whether credit rating agencies are unintentionally incentivizing public 
universities to “privatize” and further depart from their core mission of serving the needs 
of the state and its residents.  Answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this 
study, but definitely merit future consideration.      
Market Position and Demand 
 In addition to the above variables that constitute revenue structure, a number of 
market position and demand related factors were modeled in Chapter IV.  The first, 
freshman selectivity, measured as the percentage of applicants admitted, is negatively 
associated with higher credit ratings (or positively associated with negative credit 
ratings).  This suggests that although credit rating agencies view increased revenue as a 
sign of creditworthiness, they also desire for institutions to demonstrate a high degree of 
selectivity.  This variable is intended to reflect increased student demand for an 
institution.  Thus, greater selectivity signifies a higher probability that institutions will 
consistently be able to generate revenues, due to their high level of student demand.  It is 
important to note that this variable is not a measure of institutional quality; rather, it is 
merely a reflection of student demand.  This finding could suggest that the most well-
funded, highly selective public universities actually face an incentive from credit rating 
agencies to choose more competitive students, regardless of whether they reside in the 
state or local region.  Because of its potential to exclude a portion of the state/regional 
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population, such admissions policies may actually work to the detriment of in-state 
students.  
What is masked by the parameter estimates for selectivity is the impact of 
institutional size.  That is, as the number of acceptances increases, applicants must 
increase at a greater rate in order to maintain the same level of selectivity.  For example, 
if an institution has 5000 applicants and admits 3000 of those, its selectivity is 60% 
(3000/5000).  If the number of admissions increases by 500, in order to maintain a 
selectivity level of 60% the number of applicants must increase by 833 (3500/5833 = 
.60).  So, it appears from selectivity that institutions are in a sense penalized for 
increasing the number of students accepted.  But, revenue variables such as tuition and 
fees and federal operating grants suggest that institutional growth is rewarded by credit 
rating agencies.  That is, larger institutions are better able to generate increased tuition 
and fee revenues through a larger student body, as well as increased federal operating 
grants from building larger research facilities and increasing their presence.  Therefore, 
freshman selectivity shows that the process of improving credit ratings is more 
complicated than simply increasing revenues.  It also shows that freshman selectivity on 
its own does not provide a complete picture of institutional demand and creditworthiness. 
Related to selectivity is the number of undergraduate full-time equivalents, which 
is positively associated with higher credit ratings.  On the surface, the impact of this 
variable is fairly straightforward.  As a proxy for enrollment demand, changes in an 
institution’s undergraduate FTEs reflect changes in student demand (Heller, 1999; Koshal 
& Koshal, 2000; McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Serna, 2012).  In addition to 
reflecting demand for an institution, increased enrollment can be understood as positively 
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impacting revenues (e.g., greater tuition and fees dollars).  Yet, as evidenced by 
selectivity, increasing an institution’s credit rating is not simply a product of increasing 
the size of its student body.  The acceptance percentage must also be maintained, which 
as discussed above requires a disproportionately greater number of applicants as 
admissions increase.  Still, based on previous research, this is likely to be more feasible 
for already wealthy, well-positioned institutions, due to their ability to attract a larger 
number of students nationwide through greater tuition subsidies (Winston, 1999).  So, the 
issue raised with revenue structure arises once again: wealthier institutions may be in a 
better position to increase and maintain high levels of creditworthiness; in other words, 
there appears to be an uneven playing field when it comes to university credit ratings. 
As institutions grow the size of their plants, market position, and student body, it 
is also likely that they will build an academic medical center (AMC).  These facilities 
help support graduate medical education and biomedical research, as well as serve the 
state through patient care services.  However, as shown in Chapter IV, affiliation with an 
AMC negatively impacts creditworthiness.  Explanations for this are provided by the 
literature emphasizing the revenue challenges (e.g., reductions in funding to graduate 
medical education, cuts to Medicare and Medicaid, and uncertainty over the effects of 
healthcare reform) associated with these facilities (Kedem, 2013; Tuby, 2014).  So, it 
would seem that in order to improve creditworthiness, institutions would want to distance 
themselves from AMCs.  But, since a large portion of federal research grants are awarded 
for biomedical research (Tuby, 2014), and federal operating grants positively impact 
credit ratings, these facilities may be a necessity for large research universities.  
Furthermore, AMCs help institutions develop and maintain large, nationally known 
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graduate medical education programs, thus enhancing their national presence.  This 
presents a bit of a conundrum for institutional planners and senior administrators seeking 
to maximize creditworthiness.  One potential outcome of this situation is increased 
privatization of these facilities.  Such a policy approach begs the same question raised by 
the positive relationship between tuition and fee revenue and credit ratings—whether 
ratings agencies unintentionally incentivize policies that distance public research 
universities from their core mission of serving a state’s interests and population.  If 
institutions begin privatizing their AMCs in order to distance themselves in the eyes of 
credit rating agencies, they in effect neglect part of their mission to serve the state and 
overall public good. 
Finally, university endowment is shown to positively impact credit ratings.  This 
finding is not surprising, considering that endowment size serves as a measure of an 
institution’s ability to accumulate wealth and reserves (Serna, 2013a, b; Winston, 1999).  
These funds also provide evidence of an institution’s ability to meet debt obligations, 
since endowments tend to grow proportionally with the value of an institution’s assets 
(Moody, 2008), and also since institutions are able to use portions of these funds to pay 
for operating expenses (Goldstein, 2012).  What is not shown by this study’s results is 
whether institutions are equally able to grow their endowment funds.  The answer is 
probably no, since larger institutions, with greater market position and larger 
endowments, are more likely to be able to garner greater philanthropic support (Sharma 
& Smith, 2015; Winston, 1999).  Thus, increases in endowments positively impact 
creditworthiness, but endowment growth disproportionately benefits wealthier 
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institutions. Once again, this exposes the gaps between the wealthiest institutions and 
others.    
Oversight and Governance 
 High state credit rating is shown to positive impact university credit ratings.  This 
finding is not surprising, since a state’s General Obligation (GO) rating reflects its fiscal 
health and ability to support its public institutions (Serna, 2013a).  As discussed in 
Chapter IV, it is likely that this variable also provides insight into how credit rating 
agencies view the presence of an umbrella debt limit.  Although the variable for debt 
limit was not statistically significant in the models, theory shows that debt limits 
negatively impact state credit ratings (Johnson & Kriz, 2005).  Therefore, high state 
credit ratings may reflect the absence, or marginality, of such fiscal restraints.  However, 
without statistically significant estimates for debt limit on its own, this is merely an 
assumption.  Furthermore, institutional planners and senior administrators have the least 
influence over this category, since these factors are at the state level.  In other words, 
though these variables may be related to university credit ratings in some way, 
institutions respond to rather than set these policies and factors.  But, if state legislators 
and governing board members wish to aid their public institutions in developing and 
maintaining strong creditworthiness, it would be prudent for them to consider how their 
state fiscal policies impact public higher education. 
Debt Factors 
 Although debt limits did not return statistically significant parameter estimates, 
the two measures of institutional debt, debt burden per student (DBS) and leverage, were 
both statistically significant.  As hypothesized, DBS positively impacts public research 
!!
131 
university credit ratings.  Larger debt levels likely signify greater and more diverse debt 
market usage, as well as increased experience with debt issuance and management.  They 
also imply that institutions are fully leveraging their assets and most effectively 
instituting short- and long-term plans.  However, this variable is also likely to favor larger 
universities, since these institutions tend to carry larger debt loads (Rubinoff & Marion, 
2007).  Another issue that is raised is whether strong credit ratings cause institutions to 
issue more debt and weak credit ratings deter debt issuance, where the former reaffirms 
stronger ratings and the latter weaker ratings.  In other words, it may be that the credit 
rating/debt burden relationship promotes a cycle that favors and insulates highly 
creditworthy universities. 
  Furthermore, there remains the issue of whether there is a maximum level of 
acceptable debt; that is, whether there exists a point where institutions are penalized for 
issuing larger amounts of debt.  The results for DBS suggest that there is not, based on 
total debt; but leverage tells a different story.  As a measure of the level of debt to 
revenue, this variable shows that decreased debt servicing capacity (i.e., larger amounts 
of debt relative to revenue) negatively impacts credit ratings.  So, institutions are not 
rewarded by credit rating agencies for simply issuing large amounts of debt.  Instead, 
leverage highlights rating agency concerns regarding whether debt levels can be properly 
managed.  The variable’s large odds ratio and average marginal effects evidence the 
importance of this finding.  For administrators, this harkens back to whether issuing large 
bonds to build consumption amenities attracts students.  Jacob, McCall, and Stange 
(2013) argue that it does for middle and lower performing students, but not for those in 
the academic top-tier.  However, it is important to remember that the purpose of a public 
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university is education.  So, reforming the system based on academic performance related 
demand factors would in fact mean that some institutions should realign resource 
allocation decisions to make the education component less of a focus and the contrary for 
others.  This is highly problematic, in that it reifies a form of class stratification based on 
current, typically flawed, notions of merit. Instead, it would behoove institutions to revisit 
this question of debt levels when examining capital spending policies in order to ensure 
that education is always at the forefront, and not an afterthought once students are on 
campus.   
 An additional concern is the burden placed onto students for this additional debt.  
While institutional credit ratings may be rewarded for larger debt burdens and lower 
leverage ratios, the latter is calculated by including all revenues.  This includes tuition 
and fees, which also positively impact credit ratings.  While increasing tuition and fees to 
maintain debt service coverage may be beneficial from a capital planning perspective, the 
human impact needs to be considered as well.  That is, are the increased costs going to be 
borne by current and future generations?  By itself, cost shifting and intergenerational 
transfers are not necessarily be a bad thing, especially since capital projects can provide 
infrastructure needed for students to obtain their education; however, it is important that 
the added costs to students do not begin to negatively impact access and affordability to a 
postsecondary education.  When institutions of higher education accrue too much debt 
(i.e., when debt servicing capacity begins suffering from additional debt), they can boost 
tuition revenue by either increasing tuition and fees or decreasing revenue discounts (e.g., 
decreasing tuition subsidies).  These policies tend to impact the most price-sensitive 
students; that is, those at the lower end of the demand curve.  Thus, while additional 
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capital projects may appear as a sure way to increase student enrollments, in some cases 
such approaches can work to the detriment of access and affordability.  So, when 
addressing the costs and benefits of capital projects, it is important that institutional 
planners and administrators understand how resource allocation decisions can impact 
current and future student populations. 
Revenue Diversification 
 Related to the first research question, the second views revenue structure from the 
perspective of diversification.  Specifically, the second research question examines 
whether diversification in revenue streams positively impacts credit ratings.  The 
empirical literature shows that this is true at the state level (Grizzle, 2012; Yan, 2011), 
and credit rating methodologies argue that the same is true at the public university level 
(Kedem, 2011).  The parameter estimates for revenue diversification in both the ordered 
probit and ordered logit models were statistically significant and strongly associated with 
improved creditworthiness.  These findings add another level of nuance to the 
understanding of public research university credit ratings.  In addition to healthy revenue 
generation, strong market position and demand, active debt market usage, and sufficient 
debt servicing capacity, it would be prudent for institutions to also maintain a well-
diversified revenue portfolio.  This means ensuring that not too much of their revenue is 
coming from a single source, so as to reduce the impact of variance in specific revenue 
streams especially during economic downturns or business cycle fluctuations.  As 
discussed in the section on revenue structure, this may be easier for certain institutions, 
which have greater access to federal funding. 
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 What are not reflected in the revenue diversification measure are the varying 
weights assigned to different revenue streams.  The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) is 
designed to treat each source equally.  That is, perfect diversification is defined by equal 
revenue coming from each source.  However, this study’s findings indicate that not all 
revenue sources are equal in the eyes of credit rating agencies.  Certain revenue sources 
have a greater impact on improved credit ratings, and some (e.g., state and local operating 
grants and contracts) impair creditworthiness.  In light of the findings of this study, it 
seems wise for institutional planners and senior administrators to seek diversification in 
funding, so as to effectively manage their risk, but at the same time properly weigh 
different sources of funding.  That is, if institutions are able to access all sources equally, 
they may want to place greater emphasis on federal operating grants, versus state and 
local operating grants.  This is not to say that the latter category should be ignored 
completely, but rather that an acceptable balance between diversification and targeted 
funding should be sought.  In other words, a policy that maximizes the funding sources 
that are shown most strongly to positively impact credit ratings, for an established level 
of diversification should be pursued.  This is actually similar to Markowitz’s (1952) E-V 
rule, but instead of maximizing returns for an accepted level of variance, public research 
universities will want to maximize funding sources most strongly associated with a 
desired level of variance.  Calculation of this equilibrium, or efficient point, is beyond the 
focus of this study, but warrants future attention.  It must be emphasized, that this point 
focuses purely on balancing revenue and variance, and does not account for the social 
impacts of these resource allocation decisions, which cannot be ignored. 
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Recessionary Impacts 
 In order to evaluate the impacts of severe economic downturns, The Great 
Recession of 2007 to 2009 was modeled as a treatment variable since it is clear that both 
macroeconomic fluctuations and business cycles impact revenues.  The results were some 
of the most surprising.  Though the research literature suggested that the impact on 
university credit ratings would be negative, due to poor macroeconomic conditions 
affecting a multitude of factors the binary variable used to model recession (≥FY 2009) 
showed a positive association with higher credit ratings.44  Given the many negative 
outlooks and reports for the sector since 2009 (Bogaty, 2013; Gephardt, 2011; Gephardt 
& Nelson, 2010; Goodman & Nelson, 2009; Inside Higher Ed, 2012 Tuby, 2014; Tuby & 
Nelson, 2012), this result seems even more puzzling.  One explanation is that The Great 
Recession disproportionately impacted colleges and universities.  As discussed in 
Chapters I and III, this study focused on public research institutions with either a high or 
very high level of research activity.  Thus, the universities in the data set may have 
simply weathered the storm, so to speak, better than their regional and small liberal arts 
counterparts.  Related to this is the fact that during times of economic hardship, college 
applications tend to increase (Dunbar et al., 2011; Fain, 2014).  With research universities 
having stronger market position, these institutions may have been able to maintain, and 
possibly increase, revenues, demand, and selectivity as more individuals sought to attend 
these institutions.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Examples of negative conditions emanating from the Great Recession include slowed consumer 
spending, increased unemployment levels, decreased state and postsecondary budgets, less stable interest 
rates, decreased access to university assets, insufficient liquidity, slowed tuition and fee growth, diminished 
investment earnings, and fewer federal grant dollars (Blumenstyk & field, 2008; Bogaty, 2013; Field, 2008; 
Peng et al., 2014; Tuby, 2014; Wolverton, 2008; Zumeta, 2010; Zumeta, 2013; Zumeta et al., 2012; Zumeta 
& Kinne, 2011). 
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 However, without examining the changes in individual predictors between the 
models, with and without recession, it is difficult to generate a clear picture around this 
issue.  As stated in Chapter IV, examining changes in individual predictors is not meant 
to imply a causal relationship with recession, nor is it intended to demonstrate the direct 
interaction of this economic variable with each of the covariates.  Rather, by studying 
changes in predictors between the models, inferences can be made based on spillover 
effects from the recession, which arguably served as a natural cut-off to makes these 
comparisons.45 
Revenue Structure   
Beginning with revenue structure, federal operating grants and contracts 
maintained their positive impact on credit ratings, while increasing the magnitude of their 
effect.  Tuition and fees also maintained their positive relationship, albeit one of 
decreased magnitude.  This makes sense, in the context of the literature citing slowed 
tuition and fee growth and increased competition for federal grants (Bogaty, 2013; Tuby, 
2014; Zumeta, 2013).  Yet, the positive coefficients on this variable may still suggest that 
the credit ratings process is promoting a private model of higher education.  This 
argument is bolstered by the greater negative estimate associated with state and local 
operating grants and contracts in the recession models.  If federal operating grants and 
contract are primarily allocated to only a small segment of wealthy, highly prestigious 
institutions, and funding from this source is strongly rewarded by credit rating agencies, 
public higher education may be at risk of becoming increasingly segregated, based 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Since the Great Recession is a purely exogenous shock, including it for the third question essentially 
turns the analysis into a pre- and post-test.  Since all institutions experienced this treatment (i.e., recession), 
the research design is not quasi-experimental.  But the results and inferences come close to the level of 
causality. 
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primarily on wealth.  That is, the credit rating process may work to promote an 
economically and socially stratified system, where the financial, operational, and 
educational benefits that come with high creditworthiness may be less available to the 
majority of higher education and disproportionately favor a small segment of “elite” 
universities.   
 One of the most surprising findings from the revenue variables is the statistically 
significant positive coefficient for state appropriations, which was returned in both 
recession models.  The evidence up to now suggests that credit rating agencies favor 
private institutional models that are driven more by tuition and fees and research, rather 
than state funding.  However, estimates for state appropriations should not be interpreted 
as a negation of this thesis.  Rather, it may simply reflect credit rating agencies rewarding 
institutions in states where there are increases in state appropriation revenues, especially 
since this is a source of postsecondary funding that has received significant budget cuts in 
recent years (Zumeta, 2013; Zumeta & Kinne, 2011).  Additionally, since this variable 
measures growth in state funding, rather than a percentage/representative share of total 
institutional revenues, the positive estimate may actually represent the impact of 
increasing revenue.  Institutions that are able to increase their revenues, especially from a 
source that has been largely withdrawn, may be viewed as effectively lobbying for funds 
in a highly competitive process.  From the lobbying perspective, state appropriations can 
thus be interpreted in a similar fashion as federal operating grants and contracts.  That is, 
institutions that are able to increase these sources are the ones most effectively leveraging 
their reputation and national standing. 
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Market Position   
Moving to market position and demand variables, undergraduate FTEs remained 
statistically significant and the magnitude of its positive impact increased; AMC 
remained statically significant and the magnitude of its negative impact increased; and 
endowment value remained statistically significant and the magnitude of its positive 
impact increased.  What can be taken away from these results is that institutions are being 
rewarded for increasing their market position and philanthropic support, while AMCs are 
still viewed as an increased liability.  In the context of this chapter’s discussion of 
wealthy universities being disproportionately rewarded by credit ratings agencies for 
specific fiscal behaviors, these findings further evidence such an argument.  Wealthier 
institutions are better positioned to receive higher credit ratings due to their ability to 
attract greater enrollments, offer larger tuition subsidies, leverage their reputation, and 
grow endowments through the accumulation of significant donative resources.  As a 
result, credit ratings may be furthering the division between the wealthiest institutions 
and others, by providing those at the top higher credit ratings, which in-turn allow for 
easier access to debt financing and lower interest rates.  That is to say, the budgetary and 
financial behaviors and practices incentivized by the rating agencies, and reflected in 
higher credit ratings, may be driving the growing wealth gap between institutions at the 
top and bottom.  Moreover, that the demographics of schools along the hierarchy reflect 
social and economic stratification should be particularly important for public institutions, 
whose missions are ostensibly related to serving the public interest and serving a state’s 
residents.    
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Of course, increases in prestige and market position often come with the 
affiliation with an AMC.  Because these medical facilities are increasingly being viewed 
by credit rating agencies as liabilities to institutional creditworthiness, public institutions 
of higher education, in an effort to strengthen their creditworthiness, may pursue policies 
geared toward disassociating themselves from AMCs through methods such as 
privatization.  Again, such a policy action could work to distance public universities from 
their core missions of public service and serving a state’s populace. 
Governance   
While high state credit rating remained positively associated with improved 
creditworthiness in the recession models, the magnitude of its positive impact decreased.  
The change is minor, and it is likely due to the macroeconomic impacts of The Great 
Recession being felt by the states.  Regardless, public research universities housed in 
states with high GO ratings are still impacted positively.  To reiterate the point made 
earlier, the estimate on high state credit rating implies that state legislators, governing 
board members, and other state officials should consider how state fiscal policies and 
budget rules impact the creditworthiness of their public institutions. 
Debt Factors   
Both debt variables remain statistically significant in the recession models, and 
the directions of their signs remain consistent.  The impact associated with DBS is 
smaller when recession is added.  While this change could be attributed to differences in 
model specification, it can also be looked at as being due to spillover effects of The Great 
Recession.  This makes substantive sense, in that some of the immediate impacts of the 
recession included institutions’ lack of access to assets (Blumenstyk & Field, 2008; Field, 
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2008) and concerns over adequate liquidity to service debt obligations (Gephardt, 2011; 
Wolverton, 2008).  In fact, in 2011, Moody’s stated that they were still uncertain about 
liquidity risks for some universities (Gephardt & Nelson, 2011).  Although DBS 
remained a credit positive in the recession models, due to it representing institutions 
actively utilizing debt markets and effectively managing debt portfolios, some of this 
caution over large debt loads may be expressed in the smaller positive coefficients.  
While public research university credit ratings are still rewarded in the recession models 
for increases in DBS, the reward is less than in the first models thus suggesting that rating 
agencies may approach overall debt burden with more caution after the recession. 
 This interpretation is bolstered by the variable for leverage.  Although the 
parameter estimate change for this variable in the recession models is marginal, the 
important aspect that needs to be highlighted is that it is still highly impactful on 
creditworthiness.  Regardless of the changes in the impact of DBS, increased leverage 
(i.e., decreased debt servicing capacity), strongly impacts university credit ratings in a 
negative manner.  While institutions are rewarded, albeit at a lower level, for increasing 
their debt burden in the recession models, there is still a strong expectation that they will 
be able to service said obligations.  As with the first models, what is not expressed is how 
institutions will pay for this debt.  This means asking which resources will be allocated 
toward debt service.  The concern, especially for students from lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds, is that the costs will be borne by future students, in the form of tuition and 
fees.  While public finance theory dictates that future students should share the financial 
burden of project costs, due to these individuals realizing many of these projects’ future 
benefits (Oates, 1972), the question around the size of the burden is one that looms 
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heavy, and particularly when considering issues of access.  To reiterate the point made 
earlier, institutional planners and senior administrators must not lose sight of how 
resource allocation decisions impact access and affordability for their current and future 
student populations. 
Avenues for Future Research 
 In its detailed analysis of public university credit ratings, this study sheds light on 
possible avenues for future research.  First, as discussed in this chapter’s implications, 
positive associations between federal operating grants and contracts and tuition and fee 
revenues may be unintentionally incentivizing private models of higher education.  
Future work may wish to examine these relationships in more depth.  Specifically, is 
there evidence of a direct correlational, or even causal, relationship between credit rating 
determinants and the higher education models adopted by postsecondary institutions?  
 Second, the findings for freshman selectivity reveal that the process of improving 
creditworthiness is more complicated than simply increasing revenues or enrollment.  In 
fact, as enrollment increases, and by extension revenues, institutions must receive a 
disproportionately greater number of applicants in order to maintain their levels of 
selectivity.  Future research might examine how selectivity interacts with various other 
credit rating determinants.  That is, for different levels of selectivity, do other credit 
rating determinants become more or less impactful in increasing or decreasing 
creditworthiness. 
 Third, the implications on revenue diversification suggest that while revenue 
diversification positively impacts public research university credit ratings, the varying 
impacts for the individual revenue streams implies that perfect diversification (i.e., even 
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funding from each source) may not be the most effective policy.  Following the work of 
Markowitz (1952), there may exist ideal points, or equilibria, where the E-V rule is 
maximized.  Research into this area may examine various ideal E-V points, based on 
institutional size, mission, and policy. 
 Fourth, while this study utilized longitudinal data, the methods employed 
essentially treat the data as a single cross section, albeit while still accounting for serial 
correlation.  One of the benefits of panel data methods is their ability to account for 
dynamic effects associated with repeated observations over time.  As methods for ordered 
response models develop, research into the short- and long-term impacts of credit rating 
determinants would provide a more nuanced understanding of how resource allocation 
and fiscal decisions by postsecondary institutions impact credit ratings over time.  
 Fifth and finally, this study focused on public research universities with either a 
high or very high level of research activity.  This leaves many sectors of higher education 
unexamined (e.g., regional public institutions, small liberal arts colleges, private colleges 
and universities, minority-serving institutions).  As ratings data become more readily 
available on some of these other sectors, analyses of the impacts of determinants on 
credit ratings for these types of institutions would greatly enhance knowledge around 
access to credit and the costs of borrowing for other types of colleges and universities. 
Chapter Conclusion 
 This study has examined the impact of various credit rating determinants on 
public research university credit ratings.  Using ordered response models, this study has 
greatly enhanced the understanding of how institutional creditworthiness is impacted by 
changes in various revenue, market position, debt, and state-level factors.  In addition, it 
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also examined the impacts of revenue diversification and The Great Recession on 
institutional credit ratings.  Following the work of Moody (2008) and Serna (2013a, b), 
this study has significantly added to the research literature, by filling gaps in the 
empirical literature on university debt financing and credit ratings. 
 The results of this study indicate that revenue structure impacts credit ratings 
differently for various funding streams.  Federal operating grants and contracts and 
tuition fees revenue show positive impacts with improved creditworthiness, while state 
and local operating grants and contracts show a negative impact.  These findings suggest 
that credit rating agencies value broad fiscal bases, and possibly revenue structures 
aligned more closely with private models of higher education.   
Additionally, market position factors, such as selectivity, enrollment levels, and 
endowment fund values positively impact credit ratings, while affiliation with an AMC 
plays a negative role.  Supporting the findings from revenue structure, these findings 
bolster the argument that expanded market presence, associated with stability in student 
demand and philanthropic support, are greatly valued.  These findings also suggest that 
wealthy institutions and their financial choices and behaviors are favored by credit rating 
agencies, and that creditworthiness improvement and maintenance favors the wealthiest 
universities. 
Finally, debt variables demonstrate that while credit rating agencies favor large 
debt loads, they also strongly emphasize the ability to service these obligations.  That is, 
as debt burdens increase, credit ratings are positively impacted, but if the level of debt 
service coverage decreases institutional credit ratings may be greatly penalized.  As with 
the previous findings, debt variables also support the argument concerning credit rating 
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bias for large, wealthy institutions, since these universities are most easily able to 
generate additional revenues (e.g., through federal grants, increased enrollment, and 
tuition revenue) and as a result increase their debt loads without sacrificing their debt 
servicing capacity. 
The findings for research question two show that revenue diversification has a 
strong, positive impact on public research university credit ratings.  As institutions further 
diversify their revenue base, they are better able to decrease the impacts of variation 
within a single revenue source; thus, revenue diversification reduces risk emanating from 
funding source fluctuations, especially when institutions face significant macroeconomic 
changes or substantial business cycle fluctuations.  However, when viewed alongside the 
findings for revenue structure, credit rating improvement is not simply a game of 
maximizing revenue diversification.  Rather, various funding sources must be weighed 
accordingly, and an appropriate level of diversification for a desired level of revenue 
generation needs to be identified. 
Turning to the third and final research question, severe economic downturns, as 
measured in this study by The Great Recession, positively impact credit ratings.  This 
may seem questionable, especially in light of the repeated warnings and negative 
outlooks from credit rating agencies.  But, the sample of institutions analyzed in this 
study may have simply performed better during and after the recession, due in part to 
their increased market position, ability to maintain student demand, and their ability to 
continue generating revenues, as compared to smaller postsecondary institutions. 
Finally, it is appropriate to end this study by briefly discussing the social impacts 
associated with debt issuance policy and resource allocation decisions related to this 
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study’s findings.  While the results from the various econometric models shed much light 
on how changes in revenue, enrollment, selectivity, philanthropic support, debt issuance, 
and servicing capacity impact credit ratings, these findings are exactly that, a measure of 
how changes in these factors impact receiving a higher or lower credit rating.  What they 
do not show is how these decisions may affect student populations or the public service 
mission,  As public postsecondary institutions continue to issue bonds to fund capital 
projects, it makes sense that they will want to maximize their creditworthiness, as a 
strategy for ensuring the lowest interest rates possible.  However, it is imperative that the 
decisions driving these actions do not result in neglecting the interests of students, nor 
that of the public good.  That is, as debt levels increase, cost shifting may ultimately 
result in students bearing the brunt of the burden, in the form of increased tuition and 
fees, and/or decreased subsidies.  Furthermore, behaviors associated with higher credit 
ratings, and undertaken by these institutions (e.g., increased tuition and fees, decreased 
state alignment), may further exacerbate social and institutional stratification. 
Finally, the findings from this study suggest that factors associated with more of a 
private model of higher education are desired by credit rating agencies.  However, 
planners and senior administrators must not lose sight of the fact that one of a public 
university’s core functions is serving the state’s needs.  This must not be forgotten.  
Higher education researchers, policy makers, and administrators have a duty to ensure 
that public universities are continually bettering society through service and education, 
and not simply competing for the top spot in a credit ratings arms race.  
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TABLES OF INCLUDED AND  
EXCLUDED INSTITUTIONS 
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Table A1 
 
Included Institutions and Percent of System Revenue (if applicable) 
 
Institution Location % of System Revenue 
Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 96.0 
Auburn University Auburn, AL 92.1 
Ball State University Muncie, IN  
Bowling Green State University Bowling Green, OH  
Clemson University Clemson, SC  
Colorado School of Mines Golden, CO  
Colorado State University Fort Collins, CO 92.4 
Florida Atlantic University Boca Raton, FL  
Florida International University Miami, FL  
Florida State University Tallahassee, FL  
Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, GA  
Georgia State University Atlanta, GA  
Idaho State University Pocatello, ID  
Indiana University Bloomington, IN 86.9 
Iowa State University Ames, IA  
Kansas State University Manhattan, KS  
Kent State University Kent, OH 85.0 
Louisiana State University and Agricultural 
& Mechanical College 
Baton Rouge, LA 92.2 
Louisiana Tech University Ruston, LA  
Miami University Oxford, OH 97.4 
Michigan State University East Lansing, MI  
Michigan Technological University Houghton, MI  
Mississippi State University Mississippi State, MS  
Montana State University Bozeman, MT 85.0 
New Jersey Institute of Technology Newark, NJ  
New Mexico State University Las Cruces, NM 89.7 
North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC  
North Dakota State University Fargo, ND  
Northern Arizona University Flagstaff, AZ  
Northern Illinois University DeKalb, IL  
 
Note. Blank cells indicate that institution is not part of a multi-campus system. 
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Table A1, continued 
 
Institution Location % of System Revenue  
Ohio University  Athens, OH 92.4 
Oklahoma State University Stillwater, OK 91.9 
Purdue University West Lafayette, IN 92.9 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, IL  
The University of Alabama Tuscaloosa, AL  
The Ohio State University Columbus, OH 98.7 
University of Akron Akron, OH  
University of Alabama- Birmingham Birmingham, AL  
University of Alabama- Huntsville Huntsville, AL  
University of Arizona Tucson, AZ  
University of Arkansas Fayetteville, AR  
University of Central Florida Orlando, FL  
University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, OH 94.7 
University of Connecticut Storrs, CT  
University of Florida Gainesville, FL  
University of Georgia Athens, GA  
University of Hawaii at Manoa Honolulu, HI 85.0 
University of Iowa Iowa City, IA  
University of Kansas Lawrence, KS  
University of Kentucky Lexington, KY  
University of Louisville Louisville, KY  
University of Michigan Ann Arbor 97.0 
University of Minnesota- Twin Cities Minneapolis, MN 91.0 
University of New Hampshire Durham, NH 98.1 
University of New Mexico Albuquerque, NM 98.4 
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, NC  
University of North Carolina- Greensboro Greensboro, NC  
University of North Dakota Grand Forks, ND  
University of Oklahoma Norman, OK  
University of Rhode Island Kingston, RI  
University of South Alabama Mobile, AL  
University of South Carolina Columbia, SC 85.0 
 
Note. Blank cells indicate that institution is not part of a multi-campus system. 
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Table A1, continued 
 
Institution Location % of System Revenue 
University of South Florida Tampa, FL 94.7 
University of Toledo Toledo, OH  
University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT  
University of Vermont Burlington, VT  
University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA  
University of Washington Seattle, WA 99.3 
Virginia Commonwealth University Richmond, VA  
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University 
Blacksburg, VA  
Washington State University Pullman, WA  
West Virginia University Morgantown, WV 96.6 
Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, MI  
Wright State University Dayton, OH 97.2 
 
Note. Blank cells indicate that institution is not part of a multi-campus system. 
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Table A2 
 
Excluded Institutions 
 
Institution Location Reason for Omitting 
Cleveland State University Cleveland, OH No published ratings prior to July 
2012 
College of William and Mary Williamsburg, VA Only published rating in December 
2006 
CUNY Graduate School and 
University Center 
New York Primarily graduate education; only 
rated at the system level 
George mason University Fairfax, VA No published ratings 
Indiana University- Purdue 
University 
Indianapolis, IN No published ratings 
Jackson State University Jackson, MS First published rating in July 2006 
Missouri University of Science and 
Technology 
Rolla, MO No published ratings 
North Carolina A&T State University Greensboro, NC First published rating in November 
2011 
Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA No published ratings 
Oregon State University Corvallis, OR Prior to 2015, rated at state level 
Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA Reports with FASB 
Portland State University Portland, OR Earliest rating September 2008 
Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ Missing data 
Rutgers University Newark, NJ Not rated 
San Diego State University San Diego, CA No published ratings 
South Dakota State University Brookings, SD Rated at the state level 
Stony Brook University Stony Brook, NY Rated as part of SUNY system; 
average operating revenue = 25.9 
SUNY Albany Albany, NY Rated as part of SUNY system; 
average operating revenue = 8.3 
SUNY Binghamton Binghamton, NY Rated as part of SUNY system; 
average operating revenue = 4.2 
SUNY College of Environmental 
Science and Forestry 
Syracuse, NY Rated as part of the SUNY system; 
average operating revenue = .59 
Texas A& M University College Station, TX Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 76.8 
Texas Tech University Lubbock, TX Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 62.7 
 
Note. Average operating revenue listed as % of system; FASB = Financial Accounting Standards Board.  
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Table A2, continued 
 
Institution Location Reason for Omitting 
Temple University Philadelphia, PA Reports with FASB 
The University of Montana Missoula, MT First published rating in December 
2010 
The University of Tennessee Knoxville, TN No published ratings 
The University of Texas Arlington, TX Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 4.8 
The University of Texas Austin, TX Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 24.1 
The University of Texas Dallas, TX Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 3.5 
The University of Texas El Paso, TX Rate as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 3.6 
The University of Texas San Antonio, TX Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 4.6 
University at Buffalo Buffalo, NY Rated as part of SUNY system; 
average operating revenue = 9.2 
University of Alaska Fairbanks, AK Multi-campus university; average 
operating revenue = 58.0 
University of California Berkeley, CA Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 6.9 
University of California Davis, CA Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 12.8 
University of California Irvine, CA Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 8.0 
University of California Los Angeles, CA Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 20.0 
University of California Riverside, CA Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 1.8 
University of California San Diego, CA Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 12.6 
University of California Santa Barbara, CA Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 2.8 
University of California Santa Cruz Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 2.0 
University of Colorado Boulder, CO Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 52.2 
University of Colorado Denver, CO Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 40.6 
 
Note. Average operating revenue listed as % of system; FASB = Financial Accounting Standards Board.  
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Table A2, continued 
 
Institution Location Reason for Omitting 
University of Delaware Newark, DE No published ratings before 
November 2010 
University of Houston Houston, TX Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 77.7 
University of Illinois Chicago, IL Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 54.0 
University of Illinois Urbana Champaign, IL Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 45.0 
University of Louisiana at Lafayette Lafayette, LA No published ratings 
University of Maine Dallas, TX No published ratings 
University of Maryland- Baltimore 
County 
Baltimore, MD Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 10.5 
University of Maryland, College 
Park 
College Park, MD Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 46.5 
University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 30.9 
University of Massachusetts Boston, MA Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 9.4 
University of Massachusetts Lowell, MA Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 8.2 
University of Memphis Memphis, TN Not rated 
University of Mississippi Oxford, MS Only published rating is on August 
2013 
University of Missouri Columbia, MO Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 77.8 
University of Missouri Kansas City, MO Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 12.3  
University of Missouri,  St. Louis, MO Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 7.5 
University of Nebraska Lincoln, NE Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 75.0 
University of Nevada  Las Vegas, NV Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 48.3 
University of Nevada Reno, NV Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 51.8 
University of New Orleans New Orleans, LA Missing data 
University of North Texas Denton, TX Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 73.0 
 
Note. Average operating revenue listed as % of system.  
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Table A2, continued 
 
Institution Location Reason for Omitting 
University of Oregon Eugene, OR Rated at the state level prior to 2015 
University of Pittsburg Pittsburg, PA Reports with FASB 
University of Puerto Rico Rio Piedras Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 15.7 
University of South Dakota Vermillion, SD Rated at the state level 
University of South Florida Sarasota, FL Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 1.3 
University of South Florida St Petersburg, FL Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 4.1 
University of South Florida 
Polytechnic 
Lakeland, FL Not rated 
University of Southern Mississippi Hattiesburg, MS First published rating in April 2013 
University of Wisconsin Madison, WI Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 55.3 
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee Rated as part of system; average 
operating revenue = 11.0 
University of Wyoming Laramie, WY First published rating in April 2010 
Utah State University Logan, UT Not rated 
Wayne State University Detroit, MI First published rating in February 
2008 
Wichita State University Wichita, KS Initially rated in May 2012 
 
Note. Average operating revenue listed as % of system; FASB = Financial Accounting Standards Board.  
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CONTINGENCY TABLES 
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Table B1 
 
Debt Limit Counts 
 
Debt Limit Institutional Credit Rating 
 ≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 Total 
No 1 15 67 20 8 16 127 
Yes 20 100 205 233 136 79 773 
 
Table B2 
 
High Governing Board Regulation Counts 
 
 Institutional Credit Rating 
High 
Regulation 
≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 Total 
No 12 22 30 55 32 42 193 
Yes 9 93 242 198 112 53 707 
 
Table B3 
 
Academic Medical Center Counts 
 
 Institutional Credit Rating 
High 
Regulation 
≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 Total 
No 20 90 204 161 65 19 559 
No 1 25 68 92 79 76 341 
 
Table B4 
 
High State Credit Rating Counts 
 
 Institutional Credit Rating 
High State 
Rating 
≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 Total 
No 17 44 79 38 10 5 193 
Yes 4 71 193 215 134 90 707 
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MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONTINGENCY TABLES 
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Table C1 
 
Debt Limit × High Regulation 
 
 Institutional Credit Rating 
Debt Limit High 
Regulation 
≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
No No 0 9 17 4 8 16 
Yes 1 6 50 16 0 0 
Yes No 12 13 13 51 24 26 
Yes 8 87 192 182 112 53 
 
Table C2 
 
Debt Limit × Academic Medical Center 
 
 Institutional Credit Rating 
Debt Limit AMC ≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
No No 1 14 47 17 8 4 
Yes 0 1 20 3 0 12 
Yes No 19 76 157 144 57 15 
Yes 1 24 48 89 79 64 
 
Table C3 
 
Debt Limit × High State Credit Rating 
 
 Institutional Credit Rating 
Debt Limit High State 
Rating 
≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
No No 1 7 26 2 3 5 
Yes 0 8 41 18 5 11 
Yes No 16 37 53 36 7 0 
Yes 4 63 152 197 129 79 
 
 
Table C4 
 
High Regulation × Academic Medical Center 
 
 Institutional Credit Rating 
High 
Regulation 
AMC ≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
No No 12 15 21 23 16 4 
Yes 0 7 9 32 16 38 
Yes No 8 75 183 138 49 15 
Yes 1 18 59 60 63 38 
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Table C5 
 
High Regulation × High State Credit Rating 
 
 Institutional Credit Rating 
High 
Regulation 
High State 
Rating 
≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
No No 9 14 12 1 3 5 
Yes 3 8 18 54 29 37 
Yes No 8 30 67 37 7 0 
Yes 1 63 175 161 105 53 
 
Table C6 
 
Academic Medical Center × High State Credit Rating 
 
 Institutional Credit Rating 
AMC High State 
Rating 
≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
No No 16 33 53 20 4 1 
Yes 4 57 151 141 61 18 
Yes No 1 11 26 18 6 4 
Yes 0 14 42 74 73 72 
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SCATTERPLOTS 
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Figure D1.  Distribution of Freshman Selectivity and Research Intensity among Response Categories. 
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Figure D2.  Distribution of Undergraduate FTEs and Endowment Value among Response Categories.  
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Figure D3. Distribution of Tuition and Fees and State Appropriations among Response Categories. 
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Figure D4. Distribution of Federal and State/Local Operating Grants among Response Categories. 
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Figure D5. Distribution of Debt Burden per Student and Leverage among Response Categories. 
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Figure D6.  Distribution of Hirschman-Herfindahl Index among Response Categories. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS 
  
!!
196 
Variable ≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
Freshman 
Selectivity .055** | .054** .125** | .135** .099** | .101** -.049* | -.041* -.124** | -.141** -.107*** | -.109*** 
Research Intensity .081 | .066 .183 | .167 .145 | .125 -.071 | -.050 -182 | -.174 -.156 | -.134 
Undergraduate 
Full-Time 
Equivalents (ln) 
-.065*** | -.061*** -.148*** | -.153*** -.118*** | -.115*** .058*** | .046** .147*** | .159*** .126*** | .123*** 
Tuition and Fees 
per FTE (ln) -.036** | -.030* -.081** | -.074** -.064** | -.056** .032* | .022 .080*** | .077** .069*** | .050** 
State 
Appropriations per 
FTE (ln) 
-.009 | -.007 -.020 | -.018 -.016 | -.013 .008 | .005 .020 | .018 .017 | .014 
Federal Operating 
Grants and 
Contracts per FTE 
(ln) 
-.025*** | -.023** -.057*** | -.058*** -.046*** | -.044*** .022*** | .017** .057*** | .060*** .049*** | .047*** 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; *denotes statistical significance at the .10 level 
 
Table E1 
 
Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit Marginal Effects for Revenue Structure (without recession variable) 
  
!!
197 
Variable ≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
State and Local 
Operating Grants 
and Contracts per 
FTE (ln) 
.009** | .009* .021** | .022** .017** | .017** -.008* | -.007 -.021** | -.023** -.018** | -.018** 
Endowment Value 
per FTE (ln) -.017* | -.018* -.037** | -.046* -.030** | -.035** .015** | .014* .037** | .048* .032** | .037** 
Academic Medical 
Center (AMC) .018 | .019 .033 | .038* .024* | .025** -.014 | -.012 -.033* | -.039* -.029* | -.031* 
High Regulation -.004 | -.004 -.008 | -.009 -.006 | -.006 .003 | .003 .008 | .009 .007 | .007 
Debt Limit -.008 | -.008 -.017 | -.020 -.013 | -.014 .008 | .008 .016 | .020 .013 | .015 
High State Credit 
Rating -.040** | -.035** -.087*** | -.087*** -.058*** | -.054*** .056*** | .050** .075*** | .073*** .055*** | .052*** 
Debt Burden per 
Student (ln) -.032** | -.029** -.072*** | -.072** -.058*** | -.054** .028** | .022* .072*** | .075*** .062*** | .058*** 
Leverage .10** | .080* .215** | .203** .171*** | .152** -.084* | -.061 -.214*** | -.211** -.184*** | -.163** 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; *denotes statistical significance at the .10 level 
 
Table E1, continued 
  
!!
198 
Variable ≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
Revenue 
Diversification -.092* | -.076 -.226** | -.222* -.211** | -.191** .106** | .087* .215** | .214* .208** | .188* 
Freshman 
Selectivity .059*** | .055** .144** | .162** .135*** | .139*** -.068** | -.064* -.137*** | -.156*** -.132*** | -.137*** 
Research Intensity .034 | .030 .083 | .087 .077 | .074 -.039 | -.034 -.079 | -.083 -.076 | -.073 
Undergraduate 
Full-Time 
Equivalents (ln) 
-.061*** | -.054** -.149*** | -.158*** -.139*** | -.136*** .070*** | .062*** .142*** | .152*** .137*** | .133*** 
Endowment Value 
per FTE (ln) -.019** | -.021* -.047** | -.060** -.044** | -.052*** .022** | .024*** .045** | .058** .044** | .051*** 
Academic Medical 
Center (AMC) .026* | .026* .048** | .057** .036*** | .036*** -.021* | -.018* -.045** | -.053*** -.045** | -.047*** 
High Regulation -.003 | -.003 -.007 | -.009 -.006 | -.007 .004 | .004 .007 | .008 .006 | .007 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; *denotes statistical significance at the .10 level 
 
Table E2 
 
Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit Marginal Effects for Revenue Diversification 
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Variable ≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
Debt Limit -.003 | -.005 -.008 | -.015 -.007 | -.012 .004 | .006 .007 | .014 .007 | .012 
High State Credit 
Rating -.036** | -.028* -.084*** | -.082*** -.064*** | -.056*** .056*** | .047** .072*** | .068*** .055*** | .051*** 
Debt Burden per 
Student (ln) -.053*** | -.044** -.128*** | -.128*** -.120*** | -.110*** .061*** | .050** .122*** | .123*** .119*** | .108*** 
Leverage .120*** | .097** .293** | .285*** .274*** | .245*** -.138** | -.112* -.279*** | -.275*** -.270*** | -.241*** 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; *denotes statistical significance at the .10 level 
 
Table E2, continued 
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Variable ≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
Recession -.033*** | -.031*** -.067*** | -.078*** -.054*** | -.058*** .026** | .026** .063*** | .070*** .065*** | .071*** 
Freshman 
Selectivity .033 | .031 .067 | .077 .054 | .057 -.026 | -.026 -.064 | -.070 -.065 | -.070* 
Research Intensity .108 | .083 .219 | .206 .177 | .152 -.085 | -.069 -.207 | -.185 -.212 | -.187 
Undergraduate 
Full-Time 
Equivalents (ln) 
-.068*** | -.059** -.137*** | -.146*** -.111*** | -.108** .053*** | .049** .130*** | .131*** .133*** | .133*** 
Tuition and Fees 
per FTE (ln) -.031** | -.022 -.063** | -.055* -.051** | -.040* .025* | .018 .060** | .049* .061** | .050* 
State 
Appropriations per 
FTE (ln) 
-.021* | -.017 -.042* | -.043* -.034* | -.032* .016 | .014 .040** | .039* .041* | .039* 
Federal Operating 
Grants and 
Contracts per FTE 
(ln) 
-.031*** | -.025** -.063*** | -.063*** -.051*** | -.047***  .025*** | .021*** .060*** | .057*** .061*** | .057*** 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; *denotes statistical significance at the .10 level 
 
Table E3 
 
Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit Marginal Effects for Revenue Structure (with recession variable) 
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Variable ≤ A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 ≥ Aa1 
Other Operating 
Grants and 
Contracts per FTE 
(ln) 
.012** | .010** .023** | .024** .019** | .018* -.009** | -.008* -.022*** | -.022*** -.023*** | -.022*** 
Endowment Value 
per FTE (ln) -.020** | -.022* -.041** | -.055** -.033** | -.041** .016** | .018** .039** | .049** .040** | .050** 
Academic Medical 
Center (AMC) .021 | .024 .034* | .043** .025** | .028* -.014 | -.015 -.032* | -.039** -.034* | -.041** 
High Regulation -.006 | -.004 -.011 | -.009 -.008 | -.006 .004 | .003 .010 | .008 .034 | .008 
Debt Limit -.007 | -.008 -.013 | -.018 -.010 | -.013 .006 | .007 .012 | .016 .012 | .015 
High State Credit 
Rating -.038** | -.029* -.073*** | -.069*** -.054*** | -.049*** .048** | .041* .064*** | .058*** .054*** | .049*** 
Debt Burden per 
Student (ln) -.025** | -.021* -.051** | -.052** -.041** | -.038* .020* | .017 .048** | .046** .049** | .047** 
Leverage .092** | .075* .185** | .186* .149** | .138* -.072* | -.062 -.175** | -.167** -.179*** | -.169** 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; *denotes statistical significance at the .10 level 
 
Table E3, continued 
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THRESHOLD PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
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Table F1 
 
Threshold Coefficients for Revenue Structure Models (without recession) 
 
Threshold Ordered Probit (Robust Standard Errors) 
Ordered Logit 
(Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Threshold 1 | 2 
 
37.53 
(3.62) 
 
65.57 
(6.55) 
 
Threshold 2 | 3 39.03 
(3.59) 
 
68.36 
(6.45) 
 
Threshold 3 | 4 40.76 
(3.62) 
 
71.48 
(6.53) 
 
Threshold 4 | 5 42.28 
(3.67) 
 
74.13 
(6.63) 
 
Threshold 5 | 6 43.70 
(3.70) 
 
76.68 
(6.68) 
 
 
 
Table F2 
 
Threshold Coefficients for Revenue Diversification Models 
 
Threshold Ordered Probit (Robust Standard Errors) 
Ordered Logit 
(Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Threshold 1|2 
 
 
 
30.84 
(3.49) 
 
55.69 
(6.82) 
Threshold 2|3 
 
 
32.27 
(3.50) 
58.48 
(6.83) 
Threshold 3|4 
 
 
33.88 
(3.56) 
61.37 
(6.96) 
Threshold 4|5 
 
 
35.32 
(3.63) 
63.90 
(7.11) 
Threshold 5|6 
 
 
36.60 
(3.70) 
66.21 
(7.25) 
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Table F3 
 
Threshold Coefficients for Revenue Structure Models (with recession variable) 
 
Threshold Ordered Probit 
(Robust Standard Errors) 
Ordered Logit 
(Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Threshold 1|2 
 
40.33 
(3.95) 
 
71.43 
(7.08) 
 
Threshold 2|3 
 
41.85 
(3.94) 
 
74.33 
(7.02) 
 
Threshold 3|4 
 
43.75 
(3.98) 
 
77.81 
(7.14) 
 
Threshold 4|5 
 
45.39 
(4.06) 
 
80.75 
(7.32) 
 
Threshold 5|6 
 
46.86 
(4.10) 
 
83.39 
(7.41) 
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
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 Selectivity Research 
Intensity 
Undergrad
. FTE (ln) 
T&F per 
FTE (ln) 
State 
Appr. per 
FTE (ln) 
Fed. 
Grant per 
FTE (ln) 
State/Local 
Grant per 
FTE (ln) 
Endowment 
per FTE 
(ln) 
DBS (ln) Leverage HHI 
Freshman 
Selectivity 
1.00***           
Research 
Intensity 
-.335*** 1.00***          
Undergrad 
FTE (ln) 
-.205*** .154*** 1.00***         
T&F per FTE 
(ln) 
-.108*** .264*** .062* 1.00***        
State Appr. 
per FTE (ln) 
-.173*** .493*** .061* -.185*** 1.00***       
Fed Grant per 
FTE (ln) 
-.178*** .461*** -.016 .269*** .515*** 1.00***      
State/Local 
Grant per 
FTE (ln) 
-.174*** .434*** .014 .214*** .475*** .681*** 1.00***     
Endowment 
per FTE (ln) 
-.189*** .397*** .187*** .530*** .283*** .486*** .446*** 1.00***    
DBS (ln) -.020 .343*** -.080** .548*** .163*** .447*** .214*** .477*** 1.00***   
Leverage .103*** -.038 -.146*** .274*** -.265*** -.140*** -.277*** -.002 .638*** 1.00***  
HHI -.068** .251*** -.017 .050 .362*** .689*** .715*** .253*** .097*** -.257*** 1.00*** 
***denotes statistical significance at the .01 level; **denotes statistical significance at the .05 level; *denotes statistical significance at the .10 level 
 
Table G 
 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients (Continuous Covariates) 
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APPENDIX H 
 
 
DEFINITIONS OF RELEVANT TERMS 
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• Capital Budgets- capital budgets address revenues and expenses for multi-year 
projects.  Typical projects included in capital budgets are construction and 
acquisition of physical plants and campus infrastructure.  Some examples include 
new building construction, large building renewal projects, facility upgrades, 
maintenance, and major technology/infrastructure upgrades. 
• Credit Ratings- Credit ratings are a measure of the likelihood that a debt issuer 
will make timely payments.  Similarly, credit ratings also measure the probability 
that an issuer will default on a debt obligation.  Credit ratings are typically 
expressed as a letter along with either a numeric or symbolic qualifier. 
• Exogenous- In economics, something is said to be exogenous if forces outside of 
a system or model determine it.  An example is macroeconomic shocks, such as 
recessions, which are exogenous to credit ratings.  That is, forces outside of the 
credit ratings process determine these fiscal shocks.   
• Leverage- In finance, leverage refers to the relationship between debt and equity.  
As the level of debt increases, compared to equity or assets, the level of leverage 
increases.  In the context of credit ratings and capital budgeting, leverage can be 
understood as the use of debt to finance operations and capital projects.  Leverage 
is usually expressed as a ratio of liabilities or debt to assets or equity. 
• Liquidity- In finance, liquidity refers how easily assets can be converted into 
cash without losing much of their market value.  Types of illiquid investments 
include real estate, futures, and options.  Liquid investments include Mutual 
Funds, Treasury Bills, and cash. 
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• Operating Budgets- operating budgets include revenues and expenses for a fiscal 
year.  Operating budgets are the primary university budgets, in that they address 
the day-to-day activities.  Expenses and revenues from capital projects ultimately 
spillover into the operating budget, in that these plants require daily maintenance, 
staff, utilities, furniture, and bring in revenue from service charges.  
• Price-Sensitive Students- Price-sensitive students are those who are more 
sensitive to changes in tuition and fee prices.  In economic terms, these students 
tend to be the most elastic, in that they are the most responsive to price changes.   !
 
